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ABSTRACT 
The United States is engaged in a new type of warfare.  Defeating the enemy is now 
predicated on winning over local populations.  To win these groups, commanders need to 
know what responses to expect for various operations in particular locations.  Social 
simulations are a promising means of modeling these reactions, and there are several 
current methods used to populate these simulations with agents representative of a 
specific society.  These methods, however, often require the input of subject matter 
experts and are costly in price and time.  This thesis examines the simplification and 
automation of the agent instantiation process by conducting a usability study of two data 
development tools currently under consideration by the U.S. Army and TRAC-MTRY.  
The tools, a survey data case file generator developed at TRAC-MTRY and a text 
analysis tool (STANLEY) developed by Sandia National Laboratory, were examined in 
separate manners, and the results were encouraging.  The survey tool was tested to 
validate in a practical manner its generated case files with respect to simulation output 
and real-world surveys.  STANLEY was evaluated by scoring sentiment in a document 
corpus and attempting to correlate those scores to a real world issue.  Results of the study 
indicate that the survey data tool generated case files of adequate quality to instantiate 
social simulations, potentially minimizing SME requirements and costs.  Technical 
limitations precluded STANLEY from returning enough data for sufficient correlation 
comparison, although the results indicate the tool has potential. 
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The last decade has seen a significant shift in the challenges faced by U.S. 
military forces and her allies.  The types of battles being fought are not the same as those 
fought by previous generations.  No longer is the battlefield a large space where soldiers, 
armor, and artillery engage in the mutual goal of annihilating each other.  The skies 
overhead are no longer filled with dogfights at Mach 2.  The recent wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have resulted in a dramatic shift in the way the United States approaches 
combat and military operations.  In fact, a new type of warfare has developed.  Irregular 
Warfare (IW) is defined as the ―violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for 
legitimacy and influence over relevant populations‖ (DoD, 2007, p. 2).   
1. Irregular Warfare, Counterinsurgency Operations, and a New Center 
of Gravity 
People, not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key 
to…success (DoD, 2007, p. 1). 
The U.S. military is not shying away from conventional warfare.  Quite the 
contrary, it understands that wars nowadays are multifaceted and multiregional.  Wars 
and conflicts can take on any variation of intensity, longevity, and scope.  Like 
conventional warfare, the goal of IW remains the same:  win.  Gain control of the forces, 
population, and territory of the enemy.  While conventional warfare is state versus state 
and employs direct military confrontation to destroy an adversary, IW focuses on the 
influence of the local populations.  IW is a political struggle with components that are 
both violent and nonviolent.  The struggle, however, is not for outright destruction of 
enemy forces and its military machine, or for conquering of territories.  This new struggle 
is for the influence and support of the relevant, local populations.  The two sides in the 
conflict are both battling for the physical, psychological, and ideological support of the 
central, local population (DoD, 2007).  Figure 1 shows the ideological shift from 
conventional to IW.   
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Figure 1.   Contrasting conventional and irregular warfare (From DoD, 2007) 
At the strategic level, IW is concerned with the security, stability, transition, and 
reconstruction (SSTR, now known as stability operations) of a region.  Tactically, the 
focus is on counterinsurgency operations (COIN).  As with any war, there has to be some 
goal, some target or area that should be the focus of all the combat effort.  This is the 
center of gravity of the enemy.  Clausewitz stated that the center of gravity is ―the point 
against which all the energies should be directed‖ (Osgood, 2011).  Mansoor and Ulrich 
(2007) build upon the centrality of the population when they conclude that the population 
is the new center of gravity for COIN and IW operations.  They state that people are the 
key to success because people are the environment.  Since the goals of insurgents and 
counterinsurgents are to separate the other group from the population while at the same 
time drawing the population‘s support (whether actively or passively) themselves, 
whichever group wins the people wins the fight.  From a United States and ally 
perspective, the success of IW and COIN rests, then, with the safeguarding of the 
population.  Protect them from the kinetic effects of military operations, maximize the 
positive impacts of nonkinetic operations, and ultimately win over their support and trust 
(Alt, Jackson, Hudak, & Lieberman, 2009).  The true challenge, though, and the vein in 
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which this thesis is written, is how to best go about winning the support and trust of the 
local populations.  With so many operators vying for the local population‘s support, how 
does one group win out over another?   
The answer is not at all a simple one.  U.S. forces involved in the conflict need to 
have an understanding of the local population.  This understanding needs to go beyond 
the simple idea of basic needs.  The ability to determine how a society will respond to an 
event requires training and experience.  Forecasting sentiment–trying to determine how a 
group of people will react to something–is exceptionally difficult, even in peaceful 
situations.  How much more so in a conflicted environment, when the local populations 
are already at high mistrust levels?   
In order to know how a society or group will react to an operation, and more 
importantly, how to get desired results in the population‘s response, the society has to be 
broken down into and understood from the most basic levels.  Analysts need to be 
intimately familiar with a society‘s beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors (Alt, 
Everton, & Lieberman, 2010).  One method to accomplish this is through creating social 
simulations that model societies.  While exceptionally difficult to make perfect, these 
simulations can be extremely useful in gaining insight into a society‘s beliefs, values, and 
interests (BVI) and can lead to forecasts on possible futures of societal responses to 
events and operations. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem, as it applies to this research, is how to populate social simulations in 
an efficient and effective manner using disparate sources of information.  How can 
models be instantiated in a manner that gives commanders and decision-makers adequate 
representations of social dynamics in insurgency warfare in a timely fashion while still 
providing analysts powerful methods to develop forecasted BVIs of a society?  This 
thesis will discuss and analyze two of the tools used to generate societal belief networks 
that can be used to populate social simulations 
 4 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research issues and questions that this thesis attempts to explain and answer 
are: 
1. Can automation tools effectively assist in the generation and population of agents 
in cognitive models and social simulations? 
a. Does the Survey Data Development Tool (or Survey Data Case File 
Generator) developed in-house at TRAC-MTRY simplify and enhance the 
creation of stereotyped case files for use in social simulations? 
i. Do the resulting case files make sense in terms of the surveys 
examined and the scenario developed and tested? 
ii. Does the output from the Cultural Geography (CG) model 
scenarios instantiated with the tool generated case files similarly 
compare to the results of the Pew research? 
b. Can the text analysis tool STANLEY effectively aid in the generation of 
agent belief networks through sentiment analysis? 
i. Can STANLEY correctly indicate a correlation between the 
narratives pertaining to some real world event and the 
corresponding effects on some other event? 
2. How do model outputs compare to empirical data from selected real-world case 
studies? 
D. APPROACH AND SCOPE 
The research presented here examines two independent social simulation 
population tools.  The tools take as input some manner of societal beliefs (in this case, 
survey data and Internet articles that represent narratives) and produce case files and 
sentiment similarity scores that are used to instantiate the social simulations.  This thesis 
is a usability study of the two tools, which are currently proofs of principal and parts of 
on-going research.  The results of model runs using the tools‘ input will be compared to 
real world scenarios to check the practical validity of the tools as effective population 
methods for social simulations. 
E. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Commanders in the field need information on possible operational effects on local 
populations as quickly as possible.  Organizations like the U.S. Army‘s Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC) provide that information.  This 
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thesis will contribute significantly to the processes of populating social simulations in 
general and the Cultural Geography model specifically.  Not only will it determine the 
usability of two tools currently under consideration by the U.S. Army and TRAC-MTRY 
and prove the viability of semi-automating the case file development and agent 
instantiation processes, it will also attempt to prove the viability of the tools‘ output as 
input for social simulation instantiation by comparing the output of the tools to real world 
results.  Additionally, through semi-automation, organizations can expect to save money 
and resources by removing much of the extensive amount of subject matter expert (SME) 
involvement in the processes examined in this thesis. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
 Chapter I: Introduction.  This chapter introduces the problem and the 
research questions to be answered.  It lays out the plan of attack for the 
research and summarizes the organization of the paper. 
 Chapter II: Social Simulation and Tool Overview.  Here, the concepts 
of social simulations, cognitive theory, and model population are 
discussed.  Additionally, the tools examined in this thesis are explicitly 
discussed. 
 Chapter III: Methodology.  This chapter defines the constraints, 
limitations, and assumptions of the work and describes the step-by-step 
processes undertaken in the setting up and execution of the research.   
 Chapter IV: Analysis.  The results of the model runs are analyzed and 
compared to real world data.  Graphical representations of the data are 
explained and discussed. 
 Chapter V: Conclusion and Recommendations.  The final chapter 
summarizes the research and the results returned and makes 
recommendations regarding the benefits of the tools and possible areas of 
continued research. 
 Appendix A: Sample Pew Research Center Survey.  This is included so 
the user has an idea of how Pew conducts its surveys and the type of 
questions asked to respondents. 
 Appendix B: Preliminary Work with STANLEY.  Prior examination and 
experimentation with the STANLEY tool was conducted by the author and 
other research team members.  The results of that study are included here 
and provide insight into the tool‘s behaviors. 
 Appendix C: Seed Documents for the Spider.  The documents used as 
STANLEY‘s classifier documents are included here. 
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 Appendix D:  Sample XML File Generated by Spider.  Included for the 
reader‘s curiosity, a sample xml file containing a website‘s text returned 
from the spider. 
 Appendix E: Analysis of Original STANLEY Results.  The tool returned 
similarity scores that included zero (0).  These scores were excluded for 
the analysis conducted for the research.  This appendix contains the 
analysis of the results including the scores of zero.  This is here to show 
the difference in the two analyses. 
 Appendix F: Survey Data Development Tool Users Guide.  Part of the 
usability study of the survey data tool involved writing a user guide for the 
tool.  This appendix includes that guide. 
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II. SOCIAL SIMULATIONS AND TOOL OVERVIEW 
As previously mentioned, this thesis will analyze and discuss two of the tools 
used to populate societal belief networks that can be used to populate social simulations.  
However, before that can be accomplished, the idea of social simulations needs to be 
defined and explained.  Additionally, the social simulation used in this thesis, the Cultural 
Geography (CG) model, needs to be introduced, as do the two tools that are the focus of 
this research. 
A. SOCIAL SIMULATIONS 
1. Cognitive Theory 
Attempting to explain human behavior and all its complexities is no easy task.  
Scientists and psychologists have been trying for centuries to understand how people 
make decision and why, and the approaches to this understanding are manifold (Ajzen, 
1991).  In order to simulate decision making and BVIs, however, this understanding must 
take place.  Two methods of comprehending human behavior that are used in the 
development of social simulations are the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and 
Fisher‘s Narrative Paradigm.   
a. The Theory of Planned Behavior 
TPB describes a manner in which people carry out actions based on 
intentions developed through beliefs.  Specifically, 
TPB accesses an individual‘s 1) belief toward a particular behavior, 2) 
belief about the social norms associated with a particular behavior, and 3) 
belief regarding the ability to control the outcome of a particular behavior.  
These are referred to as ‗behavioral beliefs‘, ‗normative beliefs‘, and 
‗control beliefs‘, respectively, and together yield the individual‘s level of 
intention to carry out a particular action.  (Alt & Lieberman, 2010b, p. 
127) 
This intention that the individual develops is thought to be the precursor to 
actual action that he or she might take.  If the intentions can be modeled, then the actions  
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can be predicted.  This is where social simulations can be beneficial.  The actions of a 
society as a whole can be predicted by determining the sums of the intentions of the 
individuals in the group. 
b. Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm 
Fisher‘s paradigm can serve as a foundational concept for the populating 
of social simulations and models.  Fisher (1989) believes that each person possesses a 
unique identity based on his/her culture and experiences, and that this identity is 
presented through the narratives and stories he/she tells.  These stories, essentially, are 
the individual‘s view of the world in which he/she lives and of the other people he/she 
encounters in it.  The collection of all these narratives, then, can be representative of the 
population of which the individuals are part.   
2. Social Simulations Defined and Explained 
Social simulations, as a whole, attempt to represent large human populations as 
complex adaptive systems (CAS).  A CAS is a complex, self-similar collection of 
interacting adaptive agents (―Complex Adaptive Simulations,‖ 2010).  These 
representations can be at varying levels of detail and granularity, but the overarching goal 
of action/response prediction remains the same.  Regardless of the type of social 
simulation, the key goals remain the representation of BVIs of individuals in a population 
and the changes that occur in their BVIs across a range of events (Alt, Jackson, Hudak, & 
Lieberman, 2010). 
The make-up of a social simulation consists of actors which are representations of 
the individuals comprising the strata of the population.  In order to accurately develop the 
social simulation, each entity must be informed of the issues relevant within its group, 
know the rules for interaction within its society, and be able to formulate intention in 
order to carry out actions (Alt et al., 2010).  The simulation must also contain a 
representation of the social environment within which the actors ―live‖ and ―interact‖ 
(National Research Council, 2008).   
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A benefit of social simulations and simulated societies is that they provide tools 
for analysts to gain insights into the complexities of populations.  As previously 
mentioned, social simulations are made up of entities, or agents.  These agents perceive 
and influence aspects and areas of their environments (including other agents), and they 
may learn.  Emerging from the complex interactions among the agents, patterns may 
develop (a society is born), and these interactions can provide explanations for social 
phenomena (Sun, 2007).  Ultimately this is the goal:  To use social simulations to explain 
social phenomena, and from that explanation, predict societal responses to events in order 
to plan and conduct COIN and IW operations with the bi-fold results of attaining national 
strategic and tactical security objectives while improving local conditions and opinions. 
3. Feeding and Populating Social Simulations 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of the process used to gather data and develop a 
scenario for use in a model such as the Cultural Geography model.  This is a broad 
reaching example, as it lists many of the methods used to collect data, but both polling 
data and narratives are mentioned and considered important methods for gathering 
regional data on a population for use in modeling. 
 
Collect Data
• Sources: DoD, academia, open 
press, polling data, experts, etc.





• Period of interest.
• Issues.
• Possible scenarios.







• Identify demographic dimensions & 
population groups; develop narrative 
identities; derive belief, values, or 
interest, & issue stances.
• Define stereotypes; define Bayesian 
belief networks and starting conditions; 
define agent behaviors; define agent 
count, disposition & location.
• Identify essential goods & services, 
providers, location & capacity of 
infrastructure.
• Identify and define social networks.
• Identify threat groups & other actors 
that influence the population; derive 
their motivations, beliefs, history, 
techniques, capabilities, & goals.
• Stereotypes, BVI, BBN, & behaviors.
• Infrastructure, essential goods & 
services.
• Other actors, events, & behaviors.
Scenario Development
• Implement of the civilian population, other 
actors, essential goods & services, and the 
supporting infrastructure.
• Develop scripted categories of events or 
semi-autonomous behaviors to support actors 
courses of action; social network interactions 
between population groups & actors; case 
files that impact beliefs & behaviors based on 
events or population behaviors.
CG Model 
Scenario
Iterative process focused on defining the population to obtain an accurate representation 
of relevant BVI and assessing how actions from and interactions of other actors within 
the conflict ecosystem impact related BVI, issue stances, and behaviors.
 
Figure 2.   Summary of data collection and scenario development methodology  
(After Baez, 2011) 
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In order for the social simulation to work, in order for it to be of any use in 
providing insight and feedback about a society‘s beliefs and reactions, it must be 
populated, or fed, with useful and reliable information from which it can derive authentic 
representations of human behavior and develop cognitive agents.  There are numerous 
ways of instantiating the models, but this thesis will focus on two.  The first utilizes 
quantitative survey and polling data of local populations to generate Bayesian belief 
networks (BBN) that can be used to populate the models.  The second uses the idea of the 
narrative paradigm, that societies are made up of agents whose BVIs are expressed 
through their stories and what they have to say, to develop narrative ethnographies (Alt & 
Lieberman, 2010b). 
a. Survey Data Development 
The use of polls and surveys to predict outcomes and sentiment is nothing 
new.  These methods have been around for centuries to aid researchers, analysts, 
politicians, etc. in drawing conclusions and making decisions regarding how society feels 
about a specific issue or how it will behave or respond to a certain event.  Using survey 
and polling data in the population of social simulations requires flexibility in the methods 
used to garner the data.  Since there are no survey instruments executed on a recurring 
basis used solely for the purpose of social simulation (Alt & Lieberman, 2010b), analysts 
and model developers must look elsewhere to find the data they need.  This is an ongoing 
effort across multiple disciplines.  The tools and techniques to leverage the less common 
polling and survey data are well known (Kalton, 1983; Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985; Alt & 
Lieberman, 2010; Lieberman & Alt, 2010), though work is required to collect the data 
and tailor it for use with social simulations. 
There are some strengths and limitations to survey use.  It is extremely 
difficult and untenable to directly observe a population‘s behavior over the time scales of 
interest.  However, the models can be informed by sample observations and self reporting 
data.  While sample observations are certainly possible for very specific behaviors in 
concise contexts (e.g., employees using the stairs or the elevators at the office), self report 
(social surveys) tends to be easier to conduct.  There are of course limits to self report.  It 
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is prone to errors as respondents may have memory lapse or misunderstanding of the 
questions.  Furthermore, respondents can directly deceive the questionnaire, providing 
false or misleading answers.  This effect can be mitigated with insurances of anonymity 
and confidentiality, but variance in error rates is still difficult to determine (Alt & 
Lieberman, 2010b).  Finally, the collection of valid polling data within conflict 
environments will always be somewhat problematic (McKaughan, Alt, Heath, & 
McClain, 2011). 
b. Current Methods of Survey Collection 
The tools and techniques used to collect survey data are widely known and 
well established.  The World Value Survey (WVS) is a long term social and behavioral 
research project that is striving to determine and describe the cross-cultural values 
spanning 62 countries.  The detailed questionnaires contain over 250 items and are 
mostly associated with socio-cultural, political, religious, and moral views of the 
respondents (―World Values,‖ 2010).  The WVS has been conducted in waves since 
1981.   
Other popular social survey organizations include Gallup, which has been 
―studying human nature and behavior for more than 75 years‖ 
(www.gallup.com/corporate/115/About-Gallup.aspx, 2010), the European Social Survey 
(www.europeansocialsurvey.org), the Pew Research Center (www.people-press.org/), 
and the United States General Social Survey (www.norc.org/GSS+Website/)  
c. Leveraging a Document Corpus for Social Simulation 
The other method of representing a society that this thesis will look at is 
through the use of a document corpus, or a body of documents (texts, websites, media, 
blogs).  Using the principles of the narrative paradigm, a collection of narratives 
(documents) is assumed to be representative of the agent‘s BVIs in a simulation.  By 
collecting large amounts of literature and writings from a population and comparing the 
documents to a set of test documents which have been predetermined to be representative 
of a society, it is possible to construct BNs for use in social models. 
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Like survey data, this too has some weaknesses and limitations.  While the 
number of documents could be quite large, retrieving and sorting the corpus can be quite 
time consuming.  Determining and developing the comparison test sets often requires 
subject matter expertise.  The cognitive model framework has traditionally been manually 
populated.  This manual process requires the assistance of a SME in a particular field to 
build the model of that field.  This can be a very time consuming process (Bauer et al., 
2005).  Also, it is still possible to deceive and bias the outcome (Basilico et al., 2008).  
The media can be quite effective at changing the opinions of a group, so media related 
documents should not be the primary input to a model. 
The overall general approach to using a collection of narratives, or a 
document corpus, is illustrated in Figure 3.  Simply stated, the documents are collected 
by some method (a web crawler, for example).  Then, they are categorized using methods 
described in II.C and Figure 4.  These categorized documents form a training set of 
documents that are used as a comparison for other documents collected.  Belief networks 
are established based on the results of the comparison, and the agents in the model are 
then initialized. 
 




Figure 4.   Document processing using a web crawler (From Baez, 2011) 
B. THE CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY MODEL 
The CG model is a government owned, open source agent-based model (ABM) of 
the operational environment based on doctrine and the interpretation of social networks.  
It is a population-centric model developed to support the analysis of societal behaviors 
focusing on population perception based upon friendly and threat actions.  The purpose of 
the model is to address the responses of a population in a conflict environment 
(Wiedemann, 2010).  Developed at TRAC-MTRY, the CG model is designed to provide 
insight into the potential effects U.S. operations will have on the BVIs of local civilian 
populations.  It provides the following benefits: 
 Provides the commander with information toward developing an 
understanding of how the population responds to actions within the area of 
operations. 
 Supports course of action (COA) development by characterizing potential 
futures of population stances on multiple lines of effort. 
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 Data and scenario development process provides framework toward a 
thorough understanding of indigenous population. 
 Versatile ―interest driven‖ modeling architecture capable of receiving 
many forms of data about the population.  
Patterned after the conflict eco-system described by Kilcullen (2007) in an 
attempt to capture the complexities of irregular warfare, the model uses various theories 
of social science to allow decision makers to track changes to positions at various sizes of 
the population (Alt & Lieberman, 2010).  Figure 5 summarizes the CG model. 
The CG model consists of agents or entities that represent people in a group or 
population.  These ―people‖ are modeled to interact with each other and respond to 
specific events.  Every agent is defined by a set of demographic dimensions that 
collectively shape the entity‘s BVIs and stances on issues such as security, governance, 
etc., and behaviors.  ―The model captures the behavioral response of the civilian 
population in the environment of conflict, which can provide valuable insights regarding 
actions or events under consideration by the coalition forces‖ (Wiedemann, 2010).  
Fisher‘s narrative paradigm (Fisher, 1987), described above, is underlying social theory 
upon which narrative identities are developed to form agent BVIs (Hudak et al., 2010).   
The key aspect of the CG model is that it allows users and analysts to schedule 
within the model events that have the potential to impact the beliefs and stances of 
populations of interest through the use of Bayesian networks.  These scheduled events 
could range from the murder of a community leader by insurgents to a Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) constructing a building or providing a service (Hudak 
et al., 2010).  Additionally, the CG model supports representation of a social network by:  
Applying concepts of propinquity (physical proximity) and homophily 
(tendency to associate with those of similar interests).  Specifically, when 
an entity‘s belief changes, the entity attempts to communicate the result to 
other entities within a pre-defined physical distance that possess similar 
interests.  If communication is successful, the receiver‘s beliefs are 
impacted accordingly.  (Hudak et al., 2010, p. xvi) 
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Figure 5.   Graphical view of CG model (best viewed in color) (After Wiedemann, 2010)  
C. SURVEY DATA DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
The survey data development tool, also known as the survey data case file 
generator, was also developed in house at TRAC-MTRY.  The primary purpose of the 
tool is to generate case files.  In their simplest forms, case files represent an agent‘s 
beliefs, implemented in spreadsheet form.  Case files feed the underlying conditional 
probability tables within the issue networks, resulting in changes to end node 
probabilities (issue stances).  They serve two main purposes: (1) establishing starting 
condition probabilities for an entity‘s issue network, and (2) changing the probabilities of 
an entity‘s issue network due to external events (such as a natural disaster or terrorist 
bombing) and population behaviors (such as acquiring essential services).  Traditionally, 
case files were generated manually through SME intervention and assistance.  SMEs 
completed surveys of questions about beliefs, issues, and values of a group of people and 
how those groups might react to certain events.  This SME survey data helped inform 
case file development. 
The Java-based development tool analyzes survey data and develops case files 
based on a score(s) related to a question or term‘s dependency(ies) on other terms or 
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questions within the survey and ranks according to which is most significant.  These case 
files are then used to develop stereotypes of a population based on the survey results, and 
they represent the final step of data development for instantiating issue stances.  One or 
more survey files can be selected for loading.  Once loaded, the user has the option of 
choosing the type of data he is working with.  The default is categorical, but this can be 
changed to continuous if needed.  A target can also be selected.  Setting a target is 
important, as this will be the term or question that is of interest.  The targeted term will 
not be ranked in the final tool output since its values are used to calculate two-way Chi-
squared classification for the other categorical terms.  Continuous terms are ranked by 
variance. 
If no target is selected, then the distributions for the categorical terms can be 
customized.  The default values are evenly distributed based on the number of categorical 
terms.  For example, if a term has values of either 1 or 2, then the tool expects 50% of the 
terms to be valued at 1 and 50% of the terms to be valued at 2.  Figure 6 shows the survey 
tool graphical user interface (GUI), Figure 7 the GUI for delineating the bin values, and 
Figure 8 shows the command screen while case files are being generated. 
Once the specification and customization are complete, the tool will read through 
all the loaded files and output a ranking of the terms.  Again, the categorical terms are 
ranked based on Chi-square values and continuous terms by variance.  By default, only 
the top four ranked terms are selected, but this is modifiable as the user may choose any 
or all of the terms.  The tool will only generate case files for selected terms.  The user 
may then customize the bins for each term selected.  The tool by default assumes six 
responses per term and assigns values to those terms.  These values should be modified to 
reflect the responses‘ values in the survey.  If the question in the survey has more or less 
than six terms, the user may alter the number of responses and adjust the output values 
accordingly.  For example, if the survey contains the demographic response of race, and 
gives the respondent four choices (white, black, Hispanic, other), the user has the option 
of decreasing the number of responses from six to four, appropriately naming each bin, 
and inputting minimum and maximum values for each response.  A solid, easily 
recognizable naming convention is essential, as these names will form the stereotype 
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names.  A naming convention for the current example would be R1, R2, R3, R4 
(representing white, black, Hispanic, and other, respectively).  After the case files are 
created, stereotypes of the population can be generated based on the results.   
Note:  the tool was modified extensively over the course of the thesis progress.  
The above description is for the original version of the tool.  Section II.C.2 describes the 
changes made to the tool.  Section III.B describes the process of tool utilization and case 
file generation that revealed the shortfalls and resulted in the changes made to the tool 
throughout the research. 
 
Figure 6.   Survey Tool GUI (original version) showing selected target question  
and top four responses 
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Figure 8.   Snapshot of command window while case files are being generated 
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Table 1.   Summary of steps used to set up and execute survey data tool (original) 
 Set Up Step Description/Instructions Image 
1. 
Open survey data tool 




Specify survey data 
Click on search icon to locate survey to be used by the 
tool (this can be one survey or all in a given directory) 
See Figure 6 
3. Select target or 
customize the target 
distributions 
Click on the question that is the desired target, or set up 
the distributions for the questions 
Figure 6 
4. 
Load the survey 
Click the ―Load‖ button 
  This will activate the tool and scored and ranked 
results will populate the ―Ranking Terms by Chi 
Square or Variance‖ window 
Figure 6 
5. Select factors upon 
which to build 
stereotypes 
Click the boxes that contain the desired terms or 




Ensure proper bin 
labeling 
Click on the ―Define Stereotypes Based on Selected 
Factors‖ button 




7. Load the stereotypes Click the ―Apply‖ button Figure 7 
8. Determine where case 
files will be out put 
Click the search icon to locate the directory and/or 
folder where case files will be deposited upon creation 
Figure 6 
 
9. Set minimum number of 
rows 
Check the box to set minimum number of rows in case 
file and set value 
Figure 6 
10. 





1. Issues with the Initial Version of the Tool 
Initially, the tool had some significant drawbacks that greatly affected its ease of 
use and its ability to handle surveys containing multiple response types.  (Survey 
responses can be numbers, rankings, string responses, etc.)  First, it did not take string 
data, only non-negative integers.  This proved unacceptable as most survey data (and 
nearly all used here) have responses that are strings.  Second, the tool did not take 
negative numbers.  The dynamic index of consumer economic confidence (defined in 
III.B.5 below) is a negative number based index.  Both of these drawbacks were 
discovered by trial and error, as there was no documentation for the tool.  Finally, it was 
not possible to save individual tool application set up.  For example, significant work 
goes in to delineating the responses for each question and ensuring the tool knows how 
many responses are available for each question and what those responses are.  This effort, 
which must go in to each application of the tool, cannot be saved, and this greatly 
increases the amount of time doing work that has already been completed.  While these 
drawbacks will be discussed in greater detail later in Chapter III, it is necessary to 
mention them here in order to understand the changes in survey preparation and 
processing that had to occur if the original version of the tool were to be used. 
 Limitation: The tool would not accept string responses 
o Effect: All survey responses that were strings had to be given numerical 
equivalencies and the survey data had to be rewritten to account for and 
include numerical responses 
 Limitation: The tool would not accept negative numbers 
o Effect: Certain dynamic indexes that are negative number based had to be 
rewritten to be positive number based.  These new indexes had to be added 
to existing survey data 
 Limitation: The tool would not save set up data and updated bin 
delineations 
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o Effect: If mistakes were made, or the tool needed to be rerun using 
previously used survey data, the user had to reenter all the bin names and 
values 
The tool, in its original form, was deemed to be too time consuming and required 
too much alteration of the survey data in order to be effective and of any beneficial use.  
At the request of TRAC-MTRY, Greggory Sullivan, an analyst and computer software 
developer employed by Rolands and Associates, made alterations to the tool‘s code to 
rectify the issues discussed above.  The tool will now take string responses, in addition to 
both positive and negative numerical values.  Additionally, the tool will now save prior 
sessions, as long as the tested surveys‘ configuration files reside in the same directory as 
the execution file.  These configuration files are automatically generated when the user 
executes the tool.  Mr. Sullivan also made many additional tweaks to the tool‘s code in 
order to facilitate its use.  These alterations will be discussed in the subsequent sections 
where they were noticed. 
2. The Tool Used in the Research 
Given the issues discussed above, and the corrections made by Mr. Sullivan, an 
improved version of the tool had to be used for the generation of case files used in 
populating the CG model.  Several other changes were made to streamline the tool and 
the case files generated.  First, after the user selects the terms of interest to a particular 
target question, he can now select which of those terms are to form the stereotypes for 
case file generation and which terms solely represent the data that will be included in the 
case files.  Figures 9 and 10 show the improved tool‘s interface and bin delineation 
screens.  There is a new option to select all the terms in the ranking and a ―Stereotype‖ 
box can be checked to mark that term as a stereotype.  If a term is checked as a 
stereotype, it will be used in case file generation and will be a part of the case file‘s name.  
Remaining terms not designated as stereotypes will indicate which data will be included 
in the stereotype.  Figure 11 shows a sample case file that includes data not checked as a 
stereotype.  The case file columns are generated in order of the ranked terms, with the 
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target as the first column.  Section III.B.3 describes the stereotype demographics used in 
this thesis while III.B.5–7 describes the other data included in the case files. 
Table 2 includes the steps to operate the tool with the additional improvements 
included.  Appendix D. contains an up-to-date Survey Data Development Tool User 
Guide.  It is highly recommended to reference the User Guide for the particulars 
regarding saving the tool‘s operating settings and using these saved files. 
 
Figure 9.   Improved Survey Data Tool Interface 
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Figure 10.   Stereotype Definition screen showing the inclusion of boxes to indicate a term 
as a stereotype 
 
Figure 11.   Example case file showing stereotypes and other data 
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Table 2.   Improved Tool execution steps 
 Set Up Step Description/Instructions Image 
1. 
Open Survey data tool 




Specify survey data 
Click on search icon to locate survey to be used 
by the tool (this can be one survey or all in a 
given directory) 
See Figure 9 
3. Select target or customize 
the target distributions 
Click on the question that is the desired target, or 
set up the distributions for the questions 
Figure 9 
4. 
Load the survey 
Click the ―Load‖ button 
  This will activate the tool and scored and ranked 
results will populate the ―Ranking Terms by Chi 
Square or Variance‖ window 
Figure 9 
5. 
Select factors upon which 
to build stereotypes 
Click the boxes that contain the desired terms or 




Ensure proper bin labeling 
Click on the ―Define Stereotypes Based on 
Selected Factors‖ button 
 Can choose default settings, or name and put 
proper responses in 
Figures 9 and 10 
7. 
Choose stereotype factors 
Deselect ―Use each value‖ button and check 
―Stereotype‖ button 
Note:  data from terms not selected as stereotypes 
will appear in case files  
Figure 10 
8. Load the stereotypes Click the ―Apply‖ button Figures 7 and 10 
9. 
Determine location where 
case files will be saved 
Click the search icon to locate the directory 




10. Set minimum number of 
rows 
Check the box to set minimum number of rows in 
case file and set value, if desired 
Figure 9 
11. Generate case files Click on the ―Generate Case Files‖ button Figures 8 and 9 
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D. SANDIA’S TEXT ANALYSIS EXTENSIBLE LIBRARY (STANLEY) 
As previously discussed, it is a possibility that the sentiment of a population or 
society is represented by the collected body of narratives that the particular society of 
interest generates.  As introductory groundwork to this thesis, McKaughan, Alt, Heath & 
McClain (2011) took an extensive preliminary look at STANLEY in an attempt to 
determine its viability as a tool to populate social simulations through the generation of 
Bayesian networks.   
Sandia‘s Text Analysis Extensible Library (STANLEY) is a text analysis library 
developed under Sandia‘s Cognitive Science & Technology program.  STANLEY builds 
on decades of research in the fields of information retrieval, linguistics, and machine 
learning to analyze the statistics of a concept (in this case a body of narrative documents) 
used by an individual or group and thereby discover implicit semantic relationships 
among those concepts.  Concepts can be representative of nearly anything that can be 
extracted from text, including words, phrases, geospatial locations, and abstract notions 
(e.g., hostile intent). 
STANLEY supports a wide range of document types as input from which it can 
extract text to build a profile.  Each profile consists of a searchable repository of 
documents along with statistical information about each document and the group of 
documents as a whole.  STANLEY employs a bag-of-words approach to create a vector-
space model (Salton, Wong, & Yang, 1975).  The vector-space model represents each 
document as a vector of concept activations.  The relative weight of each concept in the 
vector is calculated using a modified version of the log-entropy method (Equation 1.1) 
(Dumais, 1991; Ribeiro-neto & Baeza-Yates, 1999), which assigns higher values to 
concepts that are better at distinguishing between documents (Salton & Buckley, 1991).  
STANLEY is quite versatile in its ability to handle varieties of text.  It eliminates 
words that do not convey much information such as words with less than four characters, 
words with more than 18 characters, words that contain a combination of letters and 
numbers, and commonly used stop-words.  Furthermore, STANLEY is capable of 
handling text in non-English languages or other alphabets, as long as a list of stop-words 
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can be provided.  The produced textual profiles can be used to measure the similarity of 
individual or groups of documents by comparing their concept vectors using a cosine 
similarity measurement.  Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the comparison of two documents 
using cosine similarity.  This process begins by converting both documents into their 
associated term vectors.  These two vectors are then compared using the cosine similarity 
function shown  in Equation 1.3 (Berry et al., 2003; Ko & Berry, 2004; Bauer, Laham, 
Benz, Dooley, & Kimmel, 2005). 
Table 3.   Sample output of comparison of documents 
 Doc 1  Doc 2  Doc 3  
Model  0.57  0.76  
 
Cognitive  0.12  0.84  
 
Psychology  0.32  
  
Software    0.23  
UMBRA   0.91 0.43  



























































Table 4.   Computing document similarity with cosine similarity function 
 
 
One of the most important features of STANLEY is the ability to create cognitive 
models from textual profiles.  In order to do this, STANLEY makes the assumption that 
each concept (word, phrase, etc.) in a textual profile corresponds to a concept in a 
cognitive model.  In other words, words or phrases in one document can be found in 
another.  The idea of co-occurrence is then used to populate the network.  Co-occurrence 
describes how often two words or phrases occur within the two documents.  The co-
occurrence can be in paragraphs, chunks or whole documents (Basilico et al., 2008). 
Social simulations need to represent the beliefs and values of a society or group of 
people.  Bayesian belief networks are one method used to represent those aspects in a 
social simulation.  As a matter of fact, mathematicians and philosophers have been using 
probability theory to describe human cognition for well over 200 years (Alt, Jackson, 
Hudak, & Lieberman, 2009).  To utilize the STANLEY tool in the development of 
Bayesian Belief networks, some preparation work has to be done to the document corpus, 
in particular in the development and establishment of the test body, otherwise known as 
classifiers. 
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1. Constructing Classifiers 
The test body of documents with which the document corpus for the group under 
analysis will be compared needs to be divided into a series of classifiers.  The process to 
partition and accurately analyze the corpus relies on the construction of classifiers which 
represent and describe the categories for each partition of the data set.  The categories 
represent branches in a tree that divides the document corpus into appropriate bins based 
on comparisons to a classifier.  The specific categories used in each scenario might vary 
based on the geographic area of interest and the issues to be modeled.  Figure 12 is an 




Figure 12.   Example ontology for population identities 
Further detail is often required to refine and define categories within the 
dimensions chosen from the terminal nodes of Figure 12 for representation within the 
scenario.  Partitioning of the corpus could take a sequential approach, given appropriate 
documents as classifiers.  In order to accurately detail the group or society in question, it 
may be required to further define categories, as shown by Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.   Example classification tree for partitioning a corpus.   
The classifiers are constructed by providing example documents for each category 
value within the hierarchy.  STANLEY is used to build a textual profile for the category 
values based on these example documents.  Corpus documents will be compared to the 
documents in the classifier list and then given a category value classification score based 
on how well they match the category value profile.  This score is taken directly from the 
cosine similarity comparison of the document‘s concept vector with the concept vector of 
the category value‘s corpus.  A profile and subsequent scoring is also generated for each 
category as a whole.  The matching scores of a document and a set of thresholds are used 
to determine the category observations for that document and used later in the belief 
network generation process.  The level of confidence of the subsequent partitioning steps 
is directly related to the level of confidence in the documents used to construct the 
classifiers.  
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2. Partitioning the Corpus 
The partitions chosen for the corpus depend on the needs of the scenario and 
should be geared to inform cognitive models for the relevant population subtypes.  Socio-
demographic, socio-economic, and socio-cultural factors are typically used to describe 
the population.  These same factors can be used to partition the corpus.  The other 
overlying theme in social simulation is the concept of salient issues, or the determination 
of what issues are of significant importance to a population (Alt, Jackson, Hudak, & 
Lieberman, 2009).  Ideally, the cognitive models would be developed that represent the 
society‘s stance on these defined issues.  
If the document is related to socio-cultural factors, for example, it can be related 
to ethnicity or tribe.  The document would then be checked for similarity with one of the 
terminal bins in this example, being given a strength of association with tribe A or tribe 
B, for instance.  Once a document has been associated with the terminal bins in the tree in 
Figure 12, the set of documents associated with a particular composite entity can be 
classified by relevant issue and stance.  For example, the documents related to young, 
male, low-income, manual laborers from racial group A, tribe B and ethnic group 2 can 
be classified by their level of agreement with a categorizer related to satisfaction on 
security or a categorizer related to dissatisfaction with security.  Through this sequential 
process the analyst provides a quantitative level of confidence regarding the 
appropriateness of the documents used to inform each representative entity stereotypes 
stance on a given issue. 
3. Generating Case Files 
In order to create the belief networks, each document is treated as an observation 
of the represented population.  These document observations are created using the 
category matching scores generated by the classifiers.  Every document is given a score 
for each category and category value.  The scores are passed through a simple, 
configurable threshold function, also known as the configuration file, to assign a category 
value to each category.  The threshold functions set the minimum scores that a document 
must possess in a given category.  These minimum scores are arbitrarily established by 
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the user.  It allows checks to see if the document matches the profile for the category as a 
whole with a given confidence.  It then checks each category value score and categorizes 
the document based on the largest.  The user can also establish a score delta (difference 
between the highest score and the values of all the other classifier scores for that 
particular classifier) that must be exceeded in order for the category to be matched.  Any 
document that does not meet the threshold criteria will be given an assignment of 
UNKNOWN (represented as a ―?‖ in the output file) for that category.  After the full 
categorization stage, there is a list of document observations and each document provides 
an observed category value for each category.  These observations allow one to observe 
correlations of category values across the population.  The observations can be fed to a 
machine learning tool such as Weka to determine the conditional probabilities of a pre-
defined Bayesian belief network or learn the structure of a Bayesian belief network 
directly.  This type of machine learning is ideal for the case when there is missing 
observation data, such as when a category value of UNKNOWN is assigned.  The 
generated belief networks can now be used to initialize the agent-based model.  It needs 
noting that the quality of the generated Belief networks is highly dependent on both the 
appropriateness of the classifiers and how well the gathered corpus represents the 
population being modeled.   




As mentioned, this thesis looked at two different tools that could be of potential 
benefit in the instantiation and application of the CG model.  The overall methodology 
for this thesis was relatively straight forward.  At the outset, two separate scenarios were 
developed and examined which would test the potential usefulness and benefits of each 
of the two model populating tools.  First, data was collected for each tool.  Survey and 
polling data concerning the country‘s overall satisfaction with the state of the nation were 
gleaned from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press for use in the survey 
data development tool.  Historical oil price data as well as documents relating to the early 
2011 turmoil and unrest in the Middle East and North Africa were gathered to run and 
test the STANLEY tool.  Once the data for each tool was gathered, collated, and cleaned, 
scenarios were developed for use in the CG model to test the survey tool.  The CG model 
output generated with the tool‘s case files was examined and compared to the known 
results of the surveys to test the practical validity of the tool.  For STANLEY, the 
document scores generated through tool application were compared to the oil prices to 
determine the existence of a correlation.  Each tool‘s set up and execution is described in 
detail in this chapter. 
A. CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
As with any usability study or research project, there are certain constraints, 
limitations, and assumptions that the researcher sets and/or must work within to 
accomplish the goals of the study.  This section describes those associated with each of 




 STANLEY was run offsite, at Sandia‘s lab in Albuquerque, 




oversight of the operation.  Additionally, any changes to be 
affected to the tool over the course of the research could 
not be made. 
 Average time for a spider crawl was three to five days per 
website, with an additional one to two days for similarity 
computations and analysis, resulting in over a week per 
website processing. 
 CG Model 
 In order to control the behavior of the model to 
deterministic behavior, distributions utilized within the 
model‘s input tables were held constant. 
2. Limitations 
 Survey Data Tool 
 The tool is a prototype, with research ongoing.  As such, 
development and upgrades occurred concurrent with this 
research and were limited to those issues discovered during 
its use that could be brought to the attention of and 
corrected by contractors assigned to TRAC-MTRY.   
 No case studies of the tool existed prior to this research.  
There were no previous experiences with the tool to use as 
guidelines for shaping and conducting this study. 
 STANLEY 
 Like the survey tool, STANLEY is on-going research.  
While other studies have been conducted in the area of 
sentiment forecasting and semantic analysis, it is still a 
proof of concept, particularly in the area of social 
simulations and model population. 
 Data Limitations 
 The survey data used in this research was concatenated 
from numerous, varying surveys conducted by the Pew 
Research Center. 
 As such, not all respondents had answers to all the 
questions (not all questions were asked in every survey).  
This resulted in answers with no responses (blanks) in the 
surveys used for this research. 




 CG Model 
 Run time was a significant limiting factor.  Number of 
agents and replications had to be kept relatively low to 
minimize model run time. 
 Runs took two days to over ten, depending on number of 
replications. 
3. Assumptions 
 STANLEY returned similarity scores of zero (0).  After consulting 
with Sandia, the zero scores are present for one of two main 
reasons.  First, there were no words in common between the two 
documents (except for common stop words).  Second, the tool 
could not score the document because it was an image or some 
other text free object.  The former is extremely unlikely, so this 
thesis assumes the latter for scores of zero (0). 
 CG Model:  Numerous assumptions were made for the CG model 
scenarios used with the survey tool. 
 Constant distributions of actions in the model reflected 
population attitudes and were reflected in satisfaction 
shifts. 
 Only three indicators affected the agents‘ satisfaction.  
These were Oil Prices, Unemployment Rate, and Economic 
Confidence Index (all described in III.5). 
 The shifts in satisfaction created by changes in these 
indexes were enough to reflect the actual Pew survey 
results. 
 1,296 stereotypes (generated by the survey tool) were 







B. SURVEY DATA DEVELOPMENT TOOL RESEARCH METHODS 
This section lays out the research methodology that was used in analyzing and 




• Use of Pew Research 
polling data to determine 
satisfaction
• Survey data tool use to 
create stereotypes for CG 
model
2) Run Survey Tool to Generate Case Files
• Choose top 3 ranked questions 
• Ensure proper bin delineations
• Case files will be used in CG model
3) Scenario Development 
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Results, Insights, & Conclusion.
 
Figure 14.   Research methodology for Survey Data Development tool  
1. Gathering the Survey Data 
Figure 14 illustrates the method used to evaluate the survey data development 
tool.  As mentioned above, this tool takes survey data from one or more sources, 
generates stereotypes based on the survey results, and produces case files that are fed into 
a social simulation, such as the Cultural Geography model.  For this part of this research, 
polling data was gathered from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 
(http://people-press.org/).  The surveys spanned nine months from January to September 
2010, and eight total surveys were use (one each from January and February, two from 
March, and one each from April, May, August, and September).  See Appendix A for a 
sample Pew survey.  The targeted question examined in all the surveys asked participants 
about their satisfaction with the state of the nation (at the time the survey was taken), and 
respondents were allowed to answer ―Satisfied,‖ ―Dissatisfied,‖ or ―Don‘t 
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Know/Refuse.‖  Figure 15 shows the responses of participants for the satisfaction 
question over 20 years of Pew Research polling.  Figure 16 shows the satisfaction levels 
for the first nine months of 2010.   
The original survey data did not include dynamic inputs.  Dynamic inputs are 
significant as they act as catalysts to affect change in population responses.  For this 
research, three dynamic factors were added to the survey data.  These were the national 
unemployment rate, the economic confidence index, and oil prices.  The former two are 
explained below in Section III.B.5.  The original data for these factors were pulled from 
their respective websites (see III.B.5) and entered into Excel.  Once in Excel, the data 
were trimmed to match the dates of the survey data, and then they were put into the 
master survey in JMP Pro 9.  New columns were created in master survey and the factors 
were copied over from Excel.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Twenty year running track of satisfaction with current state of the nation 
(From Pew, 2010) 
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Figure 16.   Snapshot of results for Pew satisfaction question for 2010 
2. Scrubbing and Cleaning the Data 
Prior to being able to use the surveys in the tool, the surveys had to be 
concatenated into one combined survey.  This was done using JMP Pro 9 statistical 
software.  Once all the surveys were combined into one large survey, similar question 
then had to be combined and consistently formatted.  For example, the question of age 
was asked of the respondents in all surveys, but it was not always asked in the same 
manner for each survey.  One survey would ask for a specific age, while another had the 
respondents give their age based on a range of ages.  The principle of the least common 
denominator was applied, and question results were put into a form that covered all 
possible responses.  In the age example, ages were finally put into ranges that could be 
interpreted by the tool.  Finally, to remove irrelevant information from the surveys, 
respondents who refused to answer or did not know the answer to a major question and 
term (answer to satisfaction question, statements regarding race, income, etc.) were 
removed from the data sets.  This was accomplished in JMP Pro 9 by creating subsets of 
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surveys, and eliminating those respondents as they were identified.  Only respondents 
who answered ―satisfied‖ or ―dissatisfied‖ to the question of national satisfaction were 
used in the survey data. 
3. Establishing the Demographics and Organizing the Data 
In order to develop stereotypes for use in the CG model, a series of consistent, 
persistent questions that were present in all the surveys and had a possible chance of 
directly relating to the question of satisfaction had to be used.  After that, questions that 
scored relevant to satisfaction and the dynamic national events and national sentiment 
could be incorporated.  The obvious starting location was the demographics of the 
respondents, as these pieces of information were present in all the surveys and seemed 
like a logical starting point for predicting satisfaction.  The demographics used for this 
part of the research were age, community type, education level, income, political party 
affiliation, and race.  Each demographic is explained below.  It is significant to note that 
several of the demographics were simplified (compressed or significantly reduced in 
number) in order to reduce the overall number of stereotypes entered into the CG model.  
This was done to reduce run time and memory requirements as well as reduce the overall 
number of case files generated.  Table 5 summarizes the demographics chosen.   
a. Age 
As mentioned previously, age was asked of the respondents in a variety of 
manners.  With the variation in response, it was thought best to combine the ages into 
three broad reaching ranges that would adequately cover the spectrum of respondents and 
provide useful information into the survey tool.  The three ranges were ―young‖ (less 
than 36 years), ―middle age‖ (36–55), and ―senior‖ (older than 55).   
b. Community Type 
Another characteristic deemed significant to the satisfaction of a 
respondent was the location of that individual within the country.  Pew asked several 
questions about location and provided many aspects of respondent residence that could 
have been used in this research.  Respondents were asked their zip code, and Pew was 
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able to determine their state, region of the country, and the type of community the 
respondents lived in.  Community type was chosen based primarily on the fact that it only 
contained three choices and would reduce the number of stereotypes developed.  
Community type was determined by Pew based on zip code, and the three types were 
Urban, Rural, and Suburban. 
c. Education Level 
A respondent‘s education level could also shed some perspective on 
his/her satisfaction with the state of the nation.  Thus, four categories of education level 
were constructed from the Pew results.  These categories were ―LTHighSchool‖—less 
than a high school diploma; ―HighSchool‖—a high school diploma; ―SomeCollege‖—
some college; and ―GTCollege‖—a college degree or higher. 
d. Income 
A respondent‘s income appears that it would directly affect his/her 
satisfaction with the nation.  For this study, four income levels were created from the nine 
income levels from which Pew divided the respondents.  Pew‘s original income brackets 
were ―Less than $10,000‖; ―10 to under $20,000‖; ―20 to under $30,000‖; ―30 to under 
$40,0000‖; ―40 to under $50,000‖; ―50 to under $75,000‖; ―75 to under $100,000‖; ―100 
to under $150,000‖; and ―$150,000 or more.‖  These were retracted into the following 
four brackets:  ―<40K‖; ―40–75K‖; ―75–150K‖; and ―>150K.‖ 
e. Political Party Affiliation 
It appeared obvious that a classification such as political party affiliation 
would certainly correlate to how someone feels about the state of the nation.  While there 
were several parties available to Pew respondents, this thesis used respondents who 
classified themselves as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.   
f. Race 
The final demographic extracted from the survey is race.  There were 
numerous races as options for respondent selection in the survey (black, white, Hispanic, 
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Asian, Native American, and other).  In the same vein as other demographics, race was 
simply divided into three categories (black, white, and other). 
Table 5.   Final demographic bins of respondents for survey tool 
CommunityType PoliticalAffiliation Age Race Education Income
Urban Democrat Young White GTCollege <40K
Rural Republican MiddleAge Black SomeCollege 40-75K




4. Adding Additional Responses to Account for Multiple Questions 
As mentioned above, a question might be asked in several surveys in different 
ways.  This was true of the question on how respondents viewed President Obama and 
their satisfaction with the job he has done as President.  This particular question was 
initially deemed significant to overall national satisfaction, and thus it needed to be 
included in all the surveys.  (It was later discovered that the tool did not score Obama‘s 
rating as significant.)  Across the year of surveys, that question was asked in three 
different ways.  The three questions and possible responses were: 
 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as 
President? 
o Approve, Disapprove 
 Would you say your overall opinion of Barack Obama is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
o Very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, very unfavorable 
 Now I’d like to ask your impression of some groups and individuals.  Would you 
say Barack Obama is doing an excellent, good, only fair, or a poor job? 
o Excellent, good, only fair, poor 
In order to get a response to these questions across all surveys, a numerical index 
was established that ranked and took into account the responses from the participants.  
The index, titled ObamaIndex in the tested surveys, consisted of two scores:  1 or 2.  A 
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score of 1 was designated if a response was ―Disapprove,‖ ―Mostly unfavorable,‖ ―Very 
unfavorable,‖ ―Only fair,‖ or ―Poor.‖  A 2 was given otherwise.  This new index, 
accounting for all the responses across all eight months of surveys, was included in the 
tool testing data sets. 
5. Establishing the Dynamic Inputs to the Surveys 
Once the demographic information was created and formatted and similar-topic 
questions were concatenated and indexed, the dynamic input to the surveys was gathered, 
processed, and placed into the master survey.  As mentioned above, three dynamic inputs, 
called indicators, were added to the surveys.  These were the national unemployment 
level (%), the economic confidence index, and oil prices ($ per barrel).  Figure 17 shows 
the plots of consumer economic confidence and national unemployment across 2010.  
Figure 18 is the confidence index reversed (negative numbers positive, thus higher 
number is worse index).  This figure is shown so that the trends for a worse economic 
confidence and increasing unemployment would go in the same direction, in an effort to 
illustrate any potential relationship between the two indexes.  The data was taken from 
the Gallup website (http://www.gallup.com/poll/economy.aspx) and the graphs were 
produced using JMP Pro 9 software.  Quantshare.com defines the Economic Confidence 
Index as 
…a combination of the Economic Outlook and Economic Conditions 
measures created by Gallup.  The U.S. Economic conditions results from a 
rate given by Americans regarding today‘s economic conditions in the 
country, while the U.S. Economic outlook results from Americans opinion 
on whether economic conditions in the U.S. are getting better or worse.  
Both measures are obtained from telephone interviews with more than 
3000 U.S. citizens.  The Economic Confidence Index is simply the sum of 
these two measures (Economic conditions and economic outlook). 
A negative value in the Economic Confidence Index indicates that more 
Americans have negative than positive sentiments regarding the U.S. 
economy.  This is the case since January 2008 and the index still remains 
in a negative territory.  As of November 15, 2010, the Economic 
Confidence Index value is -28; a decrease of 4 points since the beginning 
of the month (-24) and 8 points since the beginning of the year (-20).  
(Bug Man, 2011) 
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The oil price data was gathered from the West Texas Research Group (WTRG) 
website (http://www.wtrg.com/daily/oilandgasspot.html) and spanned over 14 years of 
price tracking from 1997 through March, 2011.  The periods of interest for this thesis 
were all of 2010 (survey tool application) and the first six months of 2011 (STANLEY 
application).  Figures 19 and 20 show the oil prices over all 14 years.  Figure 20 is the 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Cushing oil price and the price index used in this thesis.  
Figure 21 shows the prices for 2010. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Unemployment rate and economic confidence index for 2010 
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Figure 18.   Unemployment rate and economic confidence index for 2010, reversed.  
Higher confidence index indicates worse consumer outlook. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Oil Price data from 1997 through March 2011.  Three major oil price indexes 
shown (best viewed in color) 
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Figure 20.   WTI Cushing (index used in thesis) Oil prices from 1997–March 2011 
 
Figure 21.   WTI Cushing Price Index for 2010 ($) 
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As a tracking mechanism for the model, categorical referents were created from 
the continuous unemployment, economic confidence, and oil price data.  The referents 
were created simply by assigning a value of ―NegTrend‖ to the initial value in the survey, 
and if the index then trended in a manner that would have a negative impact on society 
(i.e., higher oil prices or unemployment).  If the index trended toward a positive impact, 
the value would change to ―PosTrend.‖ 
6. Culling the Surveys:  Removing Insignificant Questions 
Once the concatenated survey was filled with dynamic data, and all the important 
demographic data was included for every respondent, the survey was culled of questions 
of lower significant effect on the question of national satisfaction.  This was 
accomplished using the partition feature in JMP Pro 9.  From the JMP website, with Y 
representing the question of national satisfaction and X representing the responses 
JMP‘s partition platform enables users to systematically analyze large data 
sets to discover unsuspected or unknown relationships.  JMP uses 
visualization to create a successive tree of partitions according to a 
relationship between the X and Y variables.  It finds a set of cuts or 
groupings of X values that best predict a Y value by exhaustively 
searching all possible cuts or groupings, recursively forming a tree of 
decision rules until the desired fit is reached.  Through the use of 
visualization and recursive portioning, JMP makes data mining techniques 
accessible (―Effective Data Mining,‖ 2011). 
Figure 22 is an example of the JMP Pro 9 output used to make decisions on which 
questions to remove from the survey.  Early in the process, while the survey contained 
over 150 questions (including demographics and dynamic input), questions with zero 
splits were removed.  The partition model was run with K-fold validation set at 100 folds.  
Higher folds were attempted, up to the maximum K value, but the results were not 
significant enough to justify the time spent running the model.  Once the number of 




Figure 22.   Sample JMP Pro 9 output used for culling survey questions 
Ultimately, 23 questions (not including all demographic data and dynamic input; 
48 total questions including all that data) were deemed as significant to the determination 
of national satisfaction among the respondents.  It was left to the survey data tool to 
further reduce the number of questions by ranking them in significance to the satisfaction 
question. 
7a. Running the Unaltered Tool:  Generating Case Files Using Modified 
Enumerated Responses 
As discussed previously, the initial issues with the tools were discovered through 
trial and error.  In the initial tool runs, it was immediately noticed that the tool would not 
take string responses.  While awaiting authorization for Mr. Sullivan to alter the tool‘s 
original code, it was determined to continue with the application of the tool using altered 
surveys.  Essentially, all survey questions that had string answers needed to have those 
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responses turned into positive integers that corresponded to the response.  Table 6 shows 
the demographic data and the enumerated values for that data used in the initial tool runs. 
Table 6.   Demographics with enumerated values to the right 
CommunityType PoliticalAffiliation Age Race Education Income
Urban -- 1 Democrat -- 1 Young -- 1 White -- 1 LTHighSchool -- 1 <40K -- 1
Rural -- 2 Republican -- 2 MiddleAge -- 2 Black -- 2 HighSchool -- 2 40-75K -- 2
Suburban -- 3 Independent --3 Senior -- 3 Other -- 3 SomeCollege -- 3 75-150K -- 3
GTCollege -- 4 >150K -- 4
 
With the demographic levels established and the surveys transformed into the 
enumerated forms of the demographics, they were saved as .csv files so they would be 
compatible with the tool.  Training and test set surveys were then chosen.  The training 
set included the surveys from January, February and the first set of March surveys (these 
were taken from 10–14 March).  The test set contained the remaining surveys.    
The ultimate purpose of the tool is to generate case files for response prediction in 
the CG model.  Case files were created from both the training and test sets.  The first set 
of case files created contained only the demographics explained above in A.5.a-f.  The 
second added the categorical dynamic conditions (an unemployment referent, economic 
confidence referent, and an oil price referent).  The third set was created from the second 
by including a satisfaction score for President Obama that was gleaned from the surveys.  
The fourth set of files included the top three responses (in addition to the demographics, 
dynamic categories, and the Obama Index) as determined by the Chi-squared calculations 
performed by the tool.  The top three questions returned were:   
 Do you [approve/disapprove] very strongly, or not so strongly (of the way 
Barrack Obama is handling his job as President)? 
o This question was labeled in the tested survey as Q2aPresSat with possible 
responses of Very strongly and Not so strongly (note:  this question was 
removed later in the process.  See section III.A.8 below for explanation.) 
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 How much effect do you think the federal government’s activities—such as the 
laws passed and so on—have on your day-to-day life?  Do they have a great 
effect, some effect, or no effect?  
o This was labeled Q20GovEffect in the tested survey data with responses 
of None (no effect), Some (some effect), and Good (great effect) 
 Considering what you get from the federal government, do you think you pay 
more than your fair share of taxes, less than your fair share, or about the right 
amount? 
o This was labeled Q23TaxBurden with responses of Less (respondent gets 
less than what he pays for), AboutRight (respondent receives right 
amount), and More (respondent receives more than he pays for). 
Of note, the time required to run the tool varied greatly depending on the number 
of case files generated.  For the demographic only run, 1296 files were created, while 
over 380,000 were created for the top three question run.  The time to run the smaller test 
was about 10 minutes.  The time to execute the top three run exceeded four to six hours, 
depending on network strength and the size and number of files generated.  Of significant 
use in the CG model was the fourth run that included the top three rated questions.  The 
original plan for the tool test included using this set of case files for use in the CG model.  
Then the code was rewritten to allow strings, and the case files were regenerated using 
the original survey answers.  Additional results from this initial testing resulted in further 
modifications to the tool as well in order to increase efficiency, reduce tool run times, and 
allow the user to specifically select stereotype terms and other data. 
7b. Running the Modified Tool:  Generating Case Files Using Original 
Responses 
The code was not only rewritten to include string responses, but it was also 
modified so that the user could select those terms that were to be included as stereotypes 
in the generation of case files and other data that would be included in the case files.  
This was a significant modification, as it allowed the user to provide as much information 
regarding other factors of interest (in this case the dynamic inputs and top three 
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questions) to the CG model through the case files while minimizing the size and number 
of case files generated (this also resulted in a significant decrease in the time required to 
generate the case files).  Figure 23 illustrates the new user interface for selecting these 
terms.  As an example, in the figure, ―Education‖ and ―Income‖ would be part of the 
stereotypes developed in the generation of case files, while data from OilPriceIndex, 
EconConfRef, Q13, and Q20 would be included in those case files as well. 
 
Figure 23.   Improved survey tool GUI.  Includes ability to select stereotypes 
Once the tool‘s code was modified by Mr. Greg Sullivan, string responses could 
be included in the surveys for analysis.  With this development, it was necessary to go 
back and regenerate case files.  Similar processes as above were used to generate these 
files.  The demographic data remained the same (no longer enumerated, however).  Some 
modifications were made to the surveys‘ allowable answers, as some were phrases or 
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sentences.  To simplify the processing done by the tool and hopefully shorten the case file 
generation time, these sentences and phrases were condensed into one or two word 
answers.  For example, one of the top three questions was ―Considering what you get 
from the federal government, do you think you pay more than your fair share of taxes, 
less than your fair share, or about the right amount?‖  The original responses, as 
recorded by Pew were 1) fair share, 2) less than fair share, and 3) about the right amount.  
These responses were shortened to 1) Fair, 2) Less, and 3) aboutRight. 
The time required to run the case files from the updated tool took only about three 
minutes to generate 1,296 case files (the number of combinations of the demographic 
divisions). 
8. Creating the Bayesian Network shell 
Once the case files were completed, the Bayesian network shell needed to be 
developed for later input into the CG model.  CG uses a software package like Netica or 
Weka for the importation of Bayesian Networks.  Netica is an open source program 
developed by Norsys Software Corporation.  The purpose of the software is to develop 
belief networks and influence diagrams that can be transferred to other networks or 
models for problem solving and analysis (―Netica application,‖ 2011).  Weka is a similar 
open source program developed by the University of Waikato built to mimic the abilities 
of IBM‘s SPSS statistical analysis software.  
a. Adjusting the Survey Data to Meet Netica Restrictions 
When the case files generated in III.B.7b above were put into Netica in 
order to generate belief network nodes, a few issues were discovered.  First, Netica 
separates responses with spaces.  Any node (nodes are based on column names, or 
questions, in the case files) whose name has a space was broken down into two nodes.  
For example, the demographic ―Political Party‖ was split into two nodes, ―Political‖ and 
―Party.‖  Second, Netica could not handle nodes whose various states (states were the 
responses for each question, or node, in the survey data) began with numbers.  It needs 
non-numeric characters as the start of state names. 
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These issues needed to be handled prior to continuing with the model 
implementation.  The spaces in the surveys were easily removed using Excel‘s find and 
replace function.  Fortunately, the only applicable question that included numeric 
responses was the question of income.  To correct this, the income levels were given a 
short name that corresponded to the stereotype described above.  These names were: 
 I1  <40K 
 I2 40–75K 
 I3 75–150K 
 I4 >150K 
b. Rerunning the Case Files with Corrections to Surveys 
Finally, in order to proceed, the case files needed to be regenerated using 
the new and improved survey data.  Beneficially, with the opportunity to rerun the tool, 
the surveys were reexamined, and several prudent changes were made.  In addition to the 
changes made to generate new case files, the question Q2a that was rated as a top three 
question above was reevaluated and converted into a new question.  Originally, the 
question asked to what degree a respondent was satisfied or dissatisfied with the job of 
President Obama.  It was felt that the responses from that question, which were ―Very 
strongly‖ and ―Not so strongly,‖ by themselves, were not applicable to the overall 
question of national satisfaction.  They needed to be included in their context, so a new 
question was created to combine whether a respondent was satisfied or dissatisfied with 
President Obama and to what extent.  For example, if a respondent was satisfied with the 
President but not very strongly, then the new question, called Q2Combo, would be 
answered ―SatisfiedNotSoStrongly.‖  Also, it was determined to run the training data and 
the entire survey data in the tool and generate case files for each.  This was done for 
purely comparative purposes regarding the ultimate output from the CG model 
After removing Q2a and replacing it with Q2Combo, the survey tool was 
run with both the modified training data set and the entire modified survey data set.  New 
top three questions emerged in both.  For the training set, the top three questions were: 
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 Q20GovEffect:  How much effect do you think the federal government’s activities 
—such as the laws passed and so on—have on your day-to-day life?  Do they 
have a great effect, some effect, or no effect?  
 Q23TaxBurden:  Considering what you get from the federal government, do you 
think you pay more than your fair share of taxes, less than your fair share, or 
about the right amount? 
 What do you personally feel is the bigger problem with government?  Government 
has the wrong priorities, OR government has the right priorities but runs 
programs inefficiently? 
o This was labeled Q22GovProblem with responses of Neither (problem is 
not with priorities or inefficiency), Priorities, Inefficient, and Both (both 
priorities and inefficiency are problems). 
For the entire survey, the top three questions were: 
 Q20GovEffect:  How much effect do you think the federal government’s activities 
—such as the laws passed and so on—have on your day-to-day life?  Do they 
have a great effect, some effect, or no effect?  
 How would you rate your own personal financial situation?  Would you say you 
are in excellent shape, good shape, only fair shape or poor shape financially? 
o This was labeled Q13PerFinances with responses indicating respondents‘ 
personal financial situation as Poor, Fair, Good, or Excellent. 
 Q23TaxBurden:  Considering what you get from the federal government, do you 
think you pay more than your fair share of taxes, less than your fair share, or 
about the right amount? 
As above, the case files were generated using these questions, as well as 
demographics and dynamic inputs to the survey data.  Figure 24 is an illustration of what 
a Bayesian network generated in Netica would resemble using the entire survey data; 
Figure 25 shows the network using the results from the training data set.   
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Figure 24.   Netica generated Bayesian network illustration given demographics, coded 
indexes, and top three questions for entire survey 
 
Figure 25.   Netica generated Bayesian network for Training Survey 
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9. Scenario Development—Preparing the Case Files and the CG Input 
Tables for Use in the Model 
In order to satisfactorily test the tool‘s effectiveness and its ability to generate 
sufficient case files, appropriate scenarios needed to be developed that could truly 
determine the worthiness of the tool‘s ability to instantiate the CG model.  The actual 
creation and instantiation of the input tables for CG is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
there are a few items that need highlighting. 
a. Survey Tool Scenario 
The initial input to the CG model using the case files was based on a 20 
agent setup.  These agents were ―hand-made,‖ meaning that they were specifically given 
certain stances on the top three questions from the survey tool results using the entire 
survey dataset and were deposited equally into one of four regions within the CG 
scenario.  These regions were based on actual survey regions (regions were denoted in 
the survey for each respondent).  These regions were South, Northeast, Midwest, and 
West.  The agents were developed in a manner that instantiating and running the model 
would lead to simpler debugging.  Essentially, this first iteration of the model run was 
conducted purely to ensure the proper execution of the model including proper injection 
of beliefs via the established Bayesian networks, sufficient communication between the 
agents, and noticeable changing of issue stances over time. 
Subsequent tests of the CG model included all the case files generated 
from the survey data.  There were 1,296 case files generated based on the demographics 
of the respondents.  Initially, for each of these case files, agents were developed and 
placed in the regions in comparable proportions to the actual survey demographics.  For 
the South region, two of each type agent was created; and one of each from the Midwest, 
West, and Northeast.  This resulted in a total of 6,482 agents in the CG model (at the time 
of this research, this was the most agents ever built in the model!).  However, this amount 
of agents proved to be too time consuming, as the model bogged down as all the possible 
connections between the agents (homophily) were created.  After several attempts to run 
the CG model with this many agents, it was decided, due to numerous system crashes and 
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excessive time requirements (nearly 20 hours to run only seven days of a 249-day 
scenario), to reduce the number of agents to match the number of stereotypes (1,296).  
All the agents were placed in the same region.  This was done for the sake of improved 
efficiency to allow more model runs. 
10. Methods of Analysis 
Several CG scenarios were developed and run.  Described in more detail in IV.A, 
these scenarios were incremental and involved a smaller agent run, a full run with the 
training survey data (10 row minimums for the case files), and full runs with the complete 
data sets (one without and one with the 10 row minimums).  The results of the CG model 
were analyzed to see if the Survey Data Development Tool generated case files of 
sufficient quality such that the CG model‘s output similarly compared to real world data.  
In this case, CG‘s results were compared to the actual survey data results gathered by the 
Pew Research Center.  To make this comparison, the satisfaction results from CG, which 
initially represented an agent‘s level of satisfaction, on a scale of zero to one, had to be 
transformed into the number of agents who responded ―satisfied‖ to the question of 
national satisfaction, thus matching the format of the Pew results used herein.  This was 
accomplished by designating agents with a satisfaction level greater than 50% (0.50) as 
―satisfied,‖ and those below as ―dissatisfied.‖  This allowed for simple math and 
spreadsheet manipulation functions within JMP Pro 9.0 Pro to compute the percentage of 
agents who were ―satisfied.‖  The main indicator of validated output was the direction of 
trends in satisfaction over time and how these directions compared to actual Pew data.  
Additionally, tests were done comparing CG output generated by case file inputs that had 
no minimum row restriction with output where the case files had a minimum row 
restriction of 10 rows.  This was done to determine if there was a significant difference in 
output generated by the different case file types.  Section IV.A describes the method of 
analysis and results from the testing of the survey tool. 
 
 57 
C. STANLEY RESEARCH METHODS 
This section provides a brief overview of the methodology that will be used in 
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Figure 26.   Research Methodology for Sandia‘s text analysis tool 
The methodology for the STANLEY tool analysis was similar in overall set up as 
the survey tool, but there were some significant differences.  It extends the research done 
by McKaughan et al (2011) by automating the document corpus generation via a web 
spider and looking for correlation between the documents and a real world situation by 
comparing document similarities.  The overarching goal of this portion of the thesis was 
to see if STANLEY could determine if there was a correlation between the sentiment 
expressed in the media regarding Middle East turmoil and changing U.S. oil prices.  
Particularly, in the early months of 2011, the Middle East witnessed significant civil 
uprising and protests with attempts at political reform, with varying degrees of success.  
During this same period of time, prices for oil increased over 33% (Ross, 2011).  Figure 
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27 tracks oil prices throughout the early months of 2011.  Figure 28 plots the oil prices 
specifically for early 2011.  This thesis attempted to see if STANLEY could identify a 
correlation between media coverage of Middle East unrest and oil prices.   
 
 
Figure 27.   WTI Cushing Price Index  
(From http://www.wtrg.com/daily/oilandgasspot.html) 
Time period of interest 
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Figure 28.   Early 2011 oil prices (WTI index) 
This issue defined the problem to solve and led to the following methodology in 
an attempt to provide an answer. 
1. Gathering Appropriate and Applicable Documents 
The first order of business, after determining the problem, was to gather the 
documents that STANLEY would analyze.  Figures 29 and 30 briefly generalize the 
process of gathering documents.  First, sample documents are gathered that are 
representative of the content desired among the remaining documents to be collected.  
Second, the sample documents are used to fetch other similar documents from various 
sources.  While there are several ways to go about this, including manually surfing the 
Internet and other resources and pulling down seemingly appropriate material, more user-
friendly and efficient methods are available.  For this thesis, a web spider, or crawler, 
developed by Sandia National Laboratories was used to scour the Internet and collect 
documents.  Lastly, the retrieved documents are placed in a directory, and matching 
scores are calculated.  These matching scores, using the cosine similarity function 
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discussed previously, rate the likeness of the retrieved document to the seed documents 
and were the principle source of analysis for the efficacy of STANLEY. 
 
 
Figure 29.   Brief summary of document collection process (After Baez, 2011) 
 
Figure 30.   Generalized STANLEY process using spider 
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a. Using a Web Spider, or Crawler, to Gather Documents 
A web spider, or crawler, is a computer program that browses the World 
Wide Web in a methodical, automated, and orderly fashion.  In general, it starts with a 
list of URLs (uniform resource locator) to visit or a body of pre-prepared documents, 
called the seeds.  As the crawler visits these URLs or is pointed to a specific set of URLs 
with the prepared documents as seeds, it identifies all the hyperlinks in the page and adds 
them to the list of URLs to visit, called the crawl frontier.  URLs from the frontier are 
recursively visited according to a set of policies (Pant, Srinivasan, & Menczer, 2011). 
Web spiders are some of the most powerful and useful tools developed for 
the Internet, and intentions for their use can be both good and bad.  A spider serves one 
major function–Data Mining.  The way a typical spider (like Google) works is by 
crawling a website one page at a time, gathering and storing the relevant information 
such as e-mail addresses, meta-tags, hidden form data, URL information, links, etc.  The 
spider then crawls all the links in that page, collecting relevant information in each 
following page and so on.  After a time, the spider has crawled thousands of links and 
pages gathering bits of information and storing it into a database.  This web of paths is 
where the term ―spider‖ is derived.  Figure 4 (section I.B) graphically depicts the process 
of crawling to gather and process documents.  The spider also has the ability to load the 
downloaded data into a search engine (very similar to Google) which allows the 
downloaded documents to be searched. 
For this research, the spider was seeded with documents manually gleaned 
from the Internet that were specific in their accounting of the turmoil and uprising in the 
Middle East in the first third of 2011.  The documents used to seed the spider were pieced 
together from the following websites:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482680; 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/middleeast/middle-east-hub.html.  Seed 
documents were also gathered pertaining to the increase in oil prices.  The websites used 





middle-eastern-protests-have-on-the-world-economy/.  Finally, a list of URLs was also 
used to seed the spider.  These sites included http://www.forbes.com, 
http://onlinewsj.com, http://thestreet.com, http://bloomberg.com, and http://nytimes.com.  
The spider was run at Sandia‘s laboratory in Albuquerque, NM under the cognizance of 
Mr. JT McClain, the technical lead for the STANLEY tool. 
The spider took on average three to five days to complete a crawl given a 
particular URL.  It produced the following output (generically): 
 
1. A .csv file which lists URLs and their similarity to source documents in rank 
order 
2. A folder with the following directories (this can be quite large) 
a. DB – Contains an H2 database which contains the following: 
i. The list of URLs and similarity score 
ii. Query results from Bing (or Google) 
iii. Visits to the same URL (the spider does not revisit a URL, but it 
records when it sees the same URL again) 
b. XML – Contains XML files which contain text extracted from the 
documents, as well as other metadata.  See Appendix E for example. 
c. Files – Contains the actual downloaded files 
 
Analyses on the returned results done by the STANLEY tool took an 
additional one to two days.  These calculations included overall similarity scoring, 
average monthly similarity scores, as well as the median, mode, maximum, and minimum 
of the similarity scores for a particular month.  While the initial spider results were quite 
large (forbes.com alone initially returned over 70,000 files, greater than 100GB), once a 
method to remove imagery and extract dates was applied, the numbers were reduced to 
more manageable levels.  For example, the forbes.com results were reduced to 1,800, or 
roughly 2.5% of the initial total return.   
2. Developing the Classifiers 
Probably the most significant aspect of effectively utilizing a tool like STANLEY 
lies in the building of the classification documents, or classifiers.  This was noted in the 
conclusions of the work by McKaughan et al. (2011).  They note 
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The need for classifiers that are orthogonal cannot be stressed enough.  
The classifiers need to be as specific as possible to the categories they are 
attempting to represent.  As was shown, when the classifiers were well 
defined…STANLEY was very accurate in classifying the documents.  
When there existed some ambiguity between texts…the tool was less 
effective. (pp. 6–7) 
Generally, SME input is desired in the development of classification documents.  
No SMEs were available for the execution of this research, so best guesses were made as 
to applicable documents with which to seed the spider and which results from the spider 
would be used in the development of classifiers.  The sample documents used to seed the 
spider are included in Appendix C. 
3. Setting up and Executing STANLEY 
Unlike earlier tests with STANLEY (McKaughan, Alt, Heath, and McClain, 
2011), the results of which can be seen in Appendix B, this research utilized the tool as it 
operates in conjunction with the web spider.  Essentially, the spider sits on top of the 
STANLEY program, and once the spider results are returned, the tool calculates scores 
and statistical information for use in analysis.  The set up and execution of the tool was 
accomplished at Sandia‘s laboratory in Albuquerque, NM based on the research questions 
addressed in this thesis.  Given the question at hand and the list of seed URLs and 
documents, Mr. McClain instantiated and executed the tool and forwarded the results for 
analysis. 
4. Establishing the Document Corpus 
The document corpus used to determine a correlation between Mid-East turmoil 
and U.S. oil prices was formed from the results of the spider and tested for similarity 
against the seed documents.  To simplify the analysis, and ease the manner of comparing 
the oil price data with the document scores, a date extraction method was utilized to glean 
the dates of the articles from the various websites.  The period of interest was from 




dating for all the results, it was able to provide moderately sufficient results for analysis.  
For the results where dates were returned, the date extraction was only accurate to the 
month and year. 
5. Scoring the Documents 
Using the cosine similarity function discussed in II.D, the results from the spider 
were scored against the seed documents (Pant, Srinivasan, & Menczer, 2011).  The 
website pages were processed individually to extract dates and compare the results to a 
statistical model of the source documents (Bauer et al., 2005).  These scores were initially 
calculated for every returned document.  The date extraction algorithm used two 
approaches to extracting dates.  It first checked for server assigned dates, such as ―last 
modified‖ or ―server expiration‖ dates.  If no dates were found (and generally there were 
not), entity extraction was used to extract dates from the unstructured text of the page.  
After date extraction reduced the number of results and the documents were binned by 
month, the scores calculated were the monthly average (mean), mode, median, minimum, 
and maximum values for the documents returned for a given month.  It was these values, 
particularly the mean and median, which were used in the analysis of the tool‘s 
effectiveness.  Confidence was also calculated and tracked based on the percentage of the 
total number of documents obtained for a given month.  These calculations, returned 
from STANLEY in .csv format in Excel, were organized by month and transferred to 
JMP Pro 9 for analysis and comparison with the oil price data. 
6. Methods of Analysis 
The primary mode of analysis for STANLEY used JMP Pro 9 statistical software 
to determine the correlation coefficient between the real-world oil prices and the 
similarity scores calculated by the tool.  These scores were entered into one Excel 
spreadsheet where they were organized into individual website sheets and a sheet 
containing the combined and average scores for all websites.  They were then compared 
with the oil price data.  Correlation matrices and pair-wise correlation factors were 
determined from the results, and simple linear regressions were conducted to compute the 
fit of the scores. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
For each tool, the results of the applications needed to be analyzed in order to 
provide some manner of validation for the tool and justify its use as a potential agent 
instantiator for social simulations.  Unless otherwise noted, the tool for analyzing and 
comparing the data was JMP Pro 9.  This software, developed by the SAS Institute, is a 
potent statistical and analytical tool that enables the user to interact with the data in 
powerful ways.  It also allows for graphical representation of the data in manners that 
spreadsheets cannot (JMP, 2011).  The methods of investigation, overall, were relatively 
straight forward.  Simple statistical analysis was used to determine the accuracy of the 
survey tool‘s CG results for national satisfaction and correlation for the STANLEY tool‘s 
test with oil prices and Middle East turmoil  
A. SURVEY DATA DEVELOPMENT TOOL  
The main purpose of this portion of the thesis was to determine if the Survey Data 
Development Tool could produce effective case files that could be used to create agents 
for use in populating social simulations.  In the case of this research, the CG model was 
populated using agents developed from case files generated from surveys conducted by 
the Pew Research Center.   
The first area that needed to be verified was to determine if the case files 
generated by the tool could in fact instantiate the tool and initialize the Bayesian 
networks.  This was done by creating five ―hand-made‖ case files based on the data in the 
actual case files.  This smaller batch of case files was used to generate agents within the 
CG model that ―resided‖ in each of four regions.  One of each stereotype was placed in 
each region (the regions corresponded to the regions defined in the survey and explained 
in III.A.9.a.) resulting in a 20 agent system.  The test was run for one replication 
constituting a period of 90 ―days.‖  The purpose of this mini-test of the model was to 
check that the agents were communicating with one another, that satisfaction was 
changing over time, and that sentiments were affected as stimuli were injected at various 
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times in the model run.  These stimuli were changes to any of the oil price, 
unemployment, or consumer economic confidence indexes.   
Figure 31 consists of a generic version of Figures 24 and 25.  It is a graphical 
depiction of what happens to an individual agent within CG when an indicator is changed 
at a given time in the model run.  Each of the regions represents an agent‘s belief network 
at a time in the run where an indicator change occurs.  (In the full model runs, these times 
correspond to actual survey dates.)  The gray arrows represent a stimulus injection at the 
particular time changing one or more of the indicators (noted in the arrow).  
―IssueStance‖ signifies the issue in question in the network (national satisfaction).  
―Belief‖ represents the agents‘ beliefs and responses to survey questions.   
 
Figure 31.   Illustration of BN changes due to indicator shifts (best viewed in color) 
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As an indicator changes (i.e., from ―NegTrend‖ to ―PosTrend‖), its value in the 
BN becomes 100% for whichever trend is perceived.  The levels (probabilities) for 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction within ―IssueStance‖ increase or decrease accordingly 
(based on Bayes‘ Rule) and are reported in the CG output.  This is illustrated in the 
networks by the regions in the figure.  Region 1 represents initial conditions in the model, 
and each subsequent region shows the changes to the probabilities affected by an 
indicator change.  In very simple terms, after the issue stance is updated, the networks 
essentially ―reset‖ at the new probabilities (a new initial condition) and are ready for the 
next change in an indicator.  Over the course of the model run, the affects of the changing 
indicators on the agents‘ issue stances are cumulative, resulting in a continuum of change 
in satisfaction over time.  It should be noted that the changes seen in Figure 31 are 
simulated and do not represent the actual probabilities in the study.   
The tests conducted with the 20 agents proved that the agents were 
communicating and the CG model was responding predictably (expected output) based 
on the provided input.  In other words, the agents‘ satisfaction was increasing and 
decreasing over time.  They also showed that the established Bayesian networks were set 
up correctly and appropriately feeding the model.  Figure 32 shows the preliminary 
results from this small run.  The vertical reference lines indicate where stimuli in the form 
of an index change occurred.  The three lines plotted in the chart represent a small 
example of the numerous changes to indicators throughout the simulation runs.  Note that 
there are shifts in agent satisfaction at these locations which correspond to the direction 
of the indicator changes.  For example, at time 36, the oil price index decreased (i.e., 
there was a shift from a ―PosTrend‖ to a ―NegTrend‖).  Agents responded by decreasing 
satisfaction.  This was an encouraging result, as it showed that the model was responding 
to the environment.  With these results, full model tests were set up and conducted using 
the complete set of case files created by the tool for both the training and full survey data 
sets.   
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Figure 32.   Twenty agent test results with reference lines showing index changes 
Also of note from the 20 agent survey was the discovery of which of the six 
demographics had the most significant impact on satisfaction or dissatisfaction within the 
agents.  While not critical to this research, it demonstrates an important aspect of CG, in 
that it can allow an analyst to determine which demographics are most relevant to survey 
results.  It can also certainly be applicable to future analysis, and thus it is included here.  
After some investigation with all the combinations of satisfaction among demographics, 
Age, Race, and Income were the most relevant to the satisfaction level, from a purely 
demographic standpoint.  Figure 33 shows graphically these relationships.  For an agent 
to be ―satisfied,‖ it had to have a satisfaction score, as returned in the CG output as 
probability of satisfaction, greater than 0.50 (50%).  The shaded regions in the lower 
three sections of the figure indicate the number of ―dissatisfied‖ agents in a particular 
demographic set (as a fraction of total agents in that demographic set).  The frequency 
counts indicate the number and fraction of agents represented by the shaded regions. 
 69 
 
Figure 33.   Relationship of most relevant demographics to satisfaction 
Three scenarios were developed for the full model run.  Each was run for five 
replications of 260 days.  Historical knowledge of the CG model, coupled with results 
from recent applications, yield that after more than five replications, the long term results 
tend to be very similar, so for the sake of time, the number of replications was limited to 
five.  Figure 34 shows this phenomenon.  Note how all the replications are nearly 
identical.   
The first scenario developed, hence referred to as CG1, utilized case files 
generated from the training set of survey data.  The second and third scenarios (CG2 and 
CG3, respectively), contained the full set of survey data.  CG2 used the original case files 
generated by the tool (no minimum number of rows), and CG3 used case files with 10 
rows minimum of data (additional rows created by sampling with replacement).  The CG 
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results, unless stated as ―normalized,‖ are percentages of satisfaction for each agent, on a 
scale of zero to one, where one is completely satisfied.  This is how the satisfaction 
results from the CG model are measured.  When a satisfaction score is termed 
―normalized‖ or it is compared directly with the Pew data, it represents the percentage of 
the population (agents) which responded ―satisfied‖ to the question of national 
satisfaction, since this is how the Pew results were represented in the final reports 
generated by the Pew Research Center. 
 
 
Figure 34.   Satisfaction over time for CG2 for all replications (best viewed in color) 
As a point of interest, Figure 35 plots the satisfaction over time for each agent in 
CG2.  This is included to show that each agent does in fact react differently to the stimuli 
throughout the simulation run.  Note the periods of flat lines.  These indicate the time in 
between stimuli injection points within the scenario run and show that the model is not 
creating any additional behaviors within the agents except at those times specifically 
designated in the input tables.  It also proves that the assumption of index change alone 
being sufficient to alter satisfaction was initially valid.  (There was a seven-day 
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―memory‖ period for each agent, so there were actions up to seven days after a 
designated injection, but nothing occurred after that until the next specified time.) 
 
 
Figure 35.   Plot of satisfaction over time for each agent (CG2) (best viewed in color) 
CG1 tested the model‘s behavior after a three ―month‖ training period and was 
compared to the Pew results.  Figure 36 shows the trained model satisfaction over time, 
and Figure 37 shows the model‘s results and the actual Pew results over the time period 
of the study, with satisfaction percentages normalized representing agents‘ and 
respondents‘ satisfaction.  Figure 38 shows how CG2 and CG3 compare over time.  The 
significant difference between the two was the inclusion of a minimum row per case file 
requirement for CG3.  The overall similarity in the lines indicates that in this case, the 
minimum row requirement did not significantly affect the outcome.  JMP analysis 
comparing the differences of the means of CG2 and CG3 over time (using nonparametric 
tests for means) confirms the observation.  Figure 39 shows the results of this test.  
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Figure 36.   Trained CG model satisfaction over time 
 
Figure 37.   Trained CG model vs. Pew results over time (best viewed in color) 
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Figure 38.   Aggregated satisfaction over time for full model run (CG2 & CG3) (best 
viewed in color) 
 
Figure 39.   Statistical analysis on significant differences between CG2 and CG3 
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CG3 was then compared against CG1 and the Pew data to check the models‘ long 
term behavior.  From these full tests, plots were generated of satisfaction over time with 
which to compare the actual Pew survey results.  This comparison was done visually and 
showed that the satisfaction overtime was somewhat similar in shape for the sets of 
results.  See Figure 40.  Of particular note, the areas of interest are where the different 
lines trend in the same direction following stimuli injection.  CG output matched the Pew 
data in direction of sentiment towards satisfaction as the model progressed, but at the 
start of the simulation, there were significant variations between the two results.  To bring 
the sets of results to the same scale, the percentages for the Pew satisfaction and CG 
results were then normalized and plotted again.  This allowed a much closer look at how 
the sets of data trend over time.  It was quite apparent that there were some issues 
affecting the models‘ output during the first 60 days or so of the run, as they diverge 




Figure 40.   Respondent/Agent Satisfaction percentages for CG1, CG3, and Pew Data sets 
(best viewed in color) 
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Figure 41.   Aggregated satisfaction percentages (normalized) (best viewed in color) 
B. DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS  
As mentioned earlier, the primary means of comparing the results involved 
examining the trends over time of the CG output to Pew data.  When the plots are 
analyzed, it is obvious that the CG and Pew results initialize at different levels of 
satisfaction.  They then diverge until about March (see Figures 37, 40, and 41).  From 
March on, the results exhibit more similar behavior until the end of the simulation run, 
where they tend to diverge yet again.  The numbered regions in Figure 41 highlight the 
trend analysis.  Region 1 shows where the results diverged.  There are several possible 
causes for this.  First, there may have been some warm up time needed for the agents to 
begin behaving predictably.  Second, the potential warm up may have led to some 
artifacts generated that CG handled in a particular way.  These artifacts, present until the 
model has warmed up, could cause unpredictable behavior.  Third, and perhaps most 
applicable, no real world events, short of the three indexes discussed, were applied to CG.  
One of the underlying assumptions was that changes in the three indexes would be 
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sufficient to shift an agent‘s satisfaction.  February of 2010 was a time of much political 
debate in the country, as Congress debated President Obama‘s health care legislation 
(―2010 Current Events,‖ 2010).  This was not accounted for in the model, and lends that 
the assumption that the three indexes alone would cause appropriate changes in 
satisfaction could be insufficient.  Regions 2 and 3 show where the trends follow in the 
direction of each other.  There is some divergence in Region 3, but that may be due, in 
part, to the British Petroleum oil spill that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico during this time 
period.  Overall, these are encouraging and expected results.   
Despite the stated divergences in the plots and the possible causes for these 
phenomena, the CG model results show and the analysis confirms that the Survey Data 
Development Tool does in fact create case files that can be used to populate the CG 
model, and social simulations in general.  Additionally, preliminary inspection indicates 
that the minimum row requirement for each case file does not significantly alter the 
output of the model.  It should be noted that there were some limitations to the survey 
data that might have affected this result.  Not all questions included in the Pew survey 
data used for this thesis had responses, so the sampling with replacement done by the tool 
on these case files may have resulted in redundant rows in the case file.  In fact, a quick 
inspection of several case files revealed this.  It appears that the minimum row 
requirement and the sample with replacement method might be more effective given a 
more diverse response set.  This is an area for future examination. 
C. STANLEY  
The text analysis tool from Sandia was tested to see if it could aid in determining 
the existence of a correlation between the 2011 ―Arab Spring,‖ the name given to the 
turmoil and political change present in Middle Eastern and North African nations in early 
2011, and the rise in U.S. oil prices during that same time.  The tool automatically scored 
the results, based on the cosine similarity function, against the seed set.  These scores, 
which included the mean, median, mode, maximum, minimum, and range of scores of a 
website‘s returns, were normalized (using equation 1.4) and compared to normalized oil 
prices across the same period of time.  An assumption regarding these scores stated that 
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scores of zero (0) indicated an inability to score a document, thus those scores were 
removed from the results.  As mentioned previously, a current limitation of the tool is 
that the date extracted by the spider is only reliable to the month and year.  This 
unfortunate limitation resulted in only six data points for analysis, although there were 
five websites returned which added to the sample number. 
       (1.4) 
 
Where Max is the maximum value in a given column, Min is the minimum value in the 
column, and Val is the value of interest. 
 
Once the data and scores were entered into JMP Pro 9, several methods were used 
to explore the results.  Initially, simple graphs were made in which the normalized oil 
prices were plotted with the mean document scores against time (see Figure 42).  This 
figure is busy, and while it does not show any clear correlation between the oil prices and 
the document similarity scores, it does show that the scores for www.forbes.com and the 
mean scores for all sites (consisting of averages for all the scores of all five sites and 
henceforth known as ―All‖) more closely follow the trends of oil prices than the other 
sites.  Figure 43 shows this relationship more clearly.  (www.thestreet.com only returned 
data for one month, so it was excluded from the results.)  Since www.forbes.com and the 
scores for ―All‖ appeared to have a stronger visual correlation than the other sites, they 
were the two references used for comparison with the oil prices.  Additionally, mean and 




Figure 42.   Oil prices and spider scores over time (normalized) (best viewed in color) 
 




Figure 44.   Mean and median scores with oil prices over time (normalized) (best viewed 
in color) 
The plots do a good job of visualizing the correlation that exists between the 
narratives about the ―Arab Spring‖ and the increase in U.S oil prices during that time.  
Even though only five sites were examined, it can be seen that the similarity scores and 
oil prices peak at the same time, in April.  Furthermore, they all tend to trend in the same 
direction over the period of interest, except for the first two months (January and 
February).  It is unknown what led to this small divergence.  It is more than likely due to 
the fact that the uprising and turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa had not yet 
really spread and become more broadly reported on, nor were the effects on oil prices 
realized yet. 
After the plots were created, a multivariate analysis was conducted.  Multivariate 
scatterplots were generated consisting of the oil prices and document scores (mean and 
median, normalized) from www.forbes.com and the combined results from all sites 
(Figure 45).  These results show a correlation range of 0.446 to 0.644 for the scores of 
interest.  Pair-wise correlation tests were conducted (Figure 46) as well as simple linear 
regression analysis to look at oil prices versus similarity scores (the means in this case, as 
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they had higher correlations).  The results are shown in Figures 47 and 48.  The fit of the 
lines generated R-squared values of 0.415 (Forbes) and 0.229 (All).  These indicate that 
between 22.9% and 41.5% of the variation in oil prices is explained by the sentiment 
expressed by documents gleaned from the sites explored in this research.  (Compared 
with the results shown in Appendix E, these are significantly improved and lend 
credibility to the assumption that led to the disregarding of zero value scores.) 
 
 
Figure 45.   Scatterplot matrix showing correlations of oil price to similarity scores 
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Figure 46.   Pair-wise correlations among oil prices and similarity scores 
 




Figure 48.   Summary of fit results for oil prices and Forbes and ―All‖ mean similarity 
scores (combined) 
D. DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS 
While the graphical and analytical results indicate some correlation between the 
scored results and oil prices (0.644 for Forbes mean and 0.478 for ―All‖ mean), an 
insufficient number of data points makes it impractical to definitively state whether these 
results would hold true for a larger sample size, or if this was just a random occurrence 
given the particular conditions experienced in this study.  While it cannot be said whether 
or not the tool is successful analyzing and forecasting sentiment, the results gathered 
here, especially given the assumption that zero score documents can be removed, indicate 
that the tool has potential, particularly if it operates under certain caveats.  R-squared 
values from the summary of fit for the individual indexes (Forbes and ―All,‖ Figure 47) 
and the combination of the indexes (Figure 48), while too low to suggest an obvious 
relationship between the oil prices and sentiment, are high enough to prompt continued 
investigation into better ways to maximize the tool‘s capabilities given its current 
limitations (limitations that can hopefully be remedied). 
Another point of discussion involves the variability in the similarity scores.  The 
scores varied dramatically for each site used in this study.  For example, 
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www.forbes.com had scores ranging from near zero (zero scores were removed) to 0.252 
while www.bloomberg.com had a maximum score of 0.292 and www.nyt.com had a 
maximum of 0.321.  Figure 49 plots the maximum similarity scores for four of the sites, 
and Figure 50 plots the means of the scores.  These plots show the wide range and 
disparity of returned scores for the sites across the period of interest.  Still, the similarity 
scores were quite low overall.  The maximum value returned among the websites crawled 
was 0.321.  McKaughan, et al. (2011), in their previous experimentation with STANLEY, 
routinely saw similarity scores over 0.6, with some as high as 0.9.  This may reflect on 
the lack of strength and orthogonality of the classifiers for this study, as well as the less 
focused results returned by the spider.  Whether these score levels are particular to the 
time period investigated here or if they would be similar given the seed documents and a 
larger time period is for future research.  These issues with the tool and the data it 
returned significantly impacted the study and the ability to draw any conclusive opinions 
about the effectiveness of the tool.  
 
 
Figure 49.   Maximum similarity scores of websites over time (best viewed in color) 
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Figure 50.   Mean scores of websites over time (best viewed in color) 
However, not all is lost.  A low sample size resulting from the tool‘s inability to 
more specifically determine dates was the greatest single inhibitor to the success of the 
research.  Had the tool been more capable in its date extraction, the results may have been 
significantly different.  The very limited results shown by the correlation matrices and 
regression models lead one to believe that with more data points, a stronger correlation 
and higher R-squared could have been discovered.  This is certainly an area for future 
research. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, counterinsurgency operations and 
irregular warfare have become a major facet of U.S. military and Department of Defense 
engagements.  While the nation has not neglected major combat operations, as threats are 
emerging in various parts of the globe, the currently pressing matters involve localized 
conflicts against ideology and extremism.  The keys to victory are in winning the hearts 
and minds of the local populations where these extremists exist.   
The Cultural Geography model, like other social simulations, attempts to model 
the responses, behaviors, and actions of a local population, given various operations or 
accomplishments completed upon said population.  By understanding how a society 
might respond, commanders and planners can shape their actions to maximize the 
positive impacts on local groups while achieving strategic and tactical objectives.  The 
key to creating viable models is to populate the simulations with data that is truly 
representative of a group of people to the greatest extent possible.  This thesis looked at 
survey data and narratives as methods of representing a society.  Furthermore, this thesis 
examined the potential of using particular tools to process and prepare these types of data 
in order to minimize the resources and cost accrued through analyst input often required 
in the preparation and set-up of the input tables used to instantiate the CG model.  These 
tools were the Survey Data Development Tool (or the Survey Data Case File Generator) 
developed by TRAC-MTRY and Sandia‘s Text ANaLysis Extensible librarY 
(STANLEY) document comparison tool.  
The overarching question that this thesis attempted to answer involved the 
effectiveness of automating the process of agent population in social simulations.  Both 
tools were analyzed with this question in mind, and to varying extents, both tools showed 
promise in this area.  The survey data tool successfully produced case files that could 
instantiate the CG model.  STANLEY, while producing results that were less 




forecasting and, through some additional experimentation and focused study, could be an 
effective implement to aid analysts in instantiating agents‘ beliefs and issue stances in 
social simulations. 
A. SURVEY DATA DEVELOPMENT TOOL CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The survey tool, described in II.B, develops case files from survey data for use in 
the CG model.  The tool reads surveys, ranks survey questions or responses based on a 
target question in order of significance, and writes case files based on user definitions of 
particular terms.  The tool was a work in progress from the beginning, but after early 
testing, and the aforementioned changes made by Mr. Greg Sullivan, the tool proved 
capable of developing case files with relative ease.  Obviously there may be some 
modification of the survey data itself to meet the requirements of the tool or the Bayesian 
network generation software (Netica or Weka), but the tool was able to provide suitable 
case files that were successful in instantiating the CG model.  The model behaved as 
expected, validating the case files and thus the tool.   
B. FUTURE WORK WITH THE SURVEY DATA DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
While this research focused primarily on the ability of the tool to produce case 
files for use in social simulations, and in particular the CG model, in addition to those 
mentioned throughout the thesis, there are several other potential areas of research and 
testing that can be done on and with the tool to further its uses. 
 The tool ranks the terms based on Chi-square and variance, depending on 
data type.  Are these the best methods for comparing results?  Is there 
another analytical comparison that can be used?  The responses in the 
surveys used in this thesis were string responses.  How does the tool 
behave with respect to scoring and ranking if the survey data is mixed 
numerical and string?  This would require some recoding of the source 
material for the tool, but if a more efficient and effective method of 
scoring the survey results can be found, this could perhaps increase the 
effectiveness of the social simulation output. 
 It is critical that the tool be used in an application of the CG model using 
the full extent of CG‘s capabilities.  A discussion of the full abilities of 
CG was beyond the scope of this study, but needless to say it is a powerful 
and competent tool capable of handling a variety of inputs to affect agent 
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behaviors.  The assumptions made to hold model behavior distributions 
constant in order to gain deterministic results and that only changes to the 
three indicators (oil prices, unemployment, etc.) would affect agent 
behavior were made to limit model in its reactions and output and only 
check the affect of the tool generated case files.  While this thesis‘ main 
focus was to determine if the tool could produce suitable case files, and a 
level of verification was done to that effect, a fuller and more robust test 
of the CG model will further validate the tool as a viable alternative to 
SME utilization in case file development.  Furthermore, a cost benefit 
analysis should be accomplished to quantify the benefits automating the 
case file generation process. 
 Since there was some disparity at the initial period of the model runs with 
the actual Pew results attributed to a possible warm up period, it is 
advisable to rerun the scenario with a 30–60 day acclimation period for the 
agents.  Once that period is over, start the simulation at day Zero and 
check the output against what was analyzed in this research. 
 At the time of this writing, the tool was still undergoing modification.  Mr. 
John Ruck, a software developer for Rolands and Associates contracted to 
TRAC-MTRY, was working on a change to the code and interface to 
allow the user to select the order of the stereotypes in the naming of the 
case files.  This is important because order matters in case file names in 
the CG model.  All future uses of the tool should include these changes. 
C. STANLEY TOOL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Previous work with STANLEY (McKaughan, Alt, Heath, & McClain, 2011) 
yielded results that were less than desirable, but demonstrated the potential of the tool 
given that precise and specific classifiers were developed and utilized.  This thesis took a 
different approach with the tool, and one that would appear to be more in line with its 
potential use in the population of social simulations than the previous study.  In fact, 
TRAC-MTRY, in conjunction with Sandia National Laboratories, is investigating the 
total automation of STANLEY to provide sentiment analysis without the use of seed 
documents and classifiers.  Until that is explored and realized, the research results 
indicate that it can be efficient to seed a web spider with a series of documents and a list 
of websites (the classifiers) and rely on the analysis tool that rides underneath the spider 
to handle the scoring and categorization of the results.  This semi-automation of the 
process, as analyzed here, seems promising.  The tool was able to show a correlation 
between the events of the ―Arab Spring‖ and the increase in domestic oil prices.  The 
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correlation values and regression results were not strong enough, nor were they backed 
up by sufficient sample sizes, for any definitive statement to be made regarding a 
relationship, but if certain thresholds are established to limit the range of documents 
returned and the limitations of the tool noted herein are corrected, then specific and 
appropriate documents corpus can be generated that will beneficially instantiate Bayesian 
networks and populate social simulations. 
D. FUTURE WORK WITH STANLEY 
This thesis examined the text analysis tool in a limited and highly structured 
manner.  The scope of the classifiers was quite narrow, and the limitations of the tool 
with respect to date extraction were quite significant (and not known at the outset of the 
thesis research).  Yet the tool showed promise.  Therefore, there are several possible 
areas of future work with this tool. 
 Date extraction may or may not be important for any future work with this 
tool.  Regardless, since there is so much information available through the 
use of a web spider, it makes sense to be able to accurately date that data 
for whatever purposes the investigators might need.  In the development of 
issue stances and population sentiment, it would certainly be beneficial to 
see how those stances change over time.  Currently, SME input is required 
to develop those BVIs.  Automating that process would save valuable time 
and resources. 
 An investigation into the actual causes of similarity scores of zero should 
be accomplished to validate the assumptions made in this thesis.  The 
difference in the correlation and R-squared values between the different 
sets of STANLEY results varied by as much as nearly 300% in some 
cases.  This is significant and can greatly influence the effect of the tool on 
Bayesian network creation and agent instantiation. 
 Looking at a larger application, in the same vein as this research, might 
prove the concept initially sought after here.  Perhaps a study that 
examined the period of President Obama‘s term in office, and how various 
elections played out as a result.  For example, the mid-term elections of 
2010 saw a significant shift in power from the Democrats to the 
Republicans, especially in the House of Representatives.  A comparable 
study to this thesis could be conducted to see if STANLEY could predict 
the results of that election.  A 20 month archive of narratives gained from 
the Internet and elsewhere from January 2009 to November 2010 would 
ideally yield more robust results. 
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 Obviously the reason that TRAC-MTRY and the U.S. Army are looking at 
STANLEY is to ultimately be able to use it in issue stance prediction to 
create Bayesian networks to populate the CG model.  The research 
definitely needs to extend to that area.  A region specific scenario should 
be tested where narratives of particular populations of interest are 
analyzed and scored, the results fed into a Bayesian network generating 
tool such as Weka or Netica, and the created networks used to instantiate 
agents in a social simulation such as the CG model.  Using STANLEY to 
create Bayesian networks, while briefly touched upon by McKaughan, et 
al (2011), has not been explored deeply enough and needs to be for the 
tool to prove its worth. 
 After the fact, it was obvious that to get a firmer handle on the intricacies 
of how STANLEY operated, and to have a more direct say in how the 
research and experimentation were conducted, a visit to Sandia‘s lab 
should have been made.  It is highly recommended that any future 
research team travel to Sandia‘s laboratory in Albuquerque, NM to get 
hands-on with the tool, to learn how it is set up and run; or coordinate a 
visit from Sandia‘s personnel to visit and conduct a live demonstration of 
the tool.  To truly be able to harness the power and benefits of the tool, 
any potential user must be better educated on its range of uses, its 
capabilities, and its shortcomings. 
 90 
THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91 
APPENDIX A. SAMPLE PEW RESEARCH CENTER SURVEY 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 
MARCH 2010 POLITICAL SURVEY 
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
March 10, 2010 
 
LANDLINE INTRO: 
Hello, I am _____ calling for SRBI Survey Research. We are conducting a telephone opinion 
survey for leading newspapers and TV stations around the country.  I‘d like to ask a few questions of the 
[RANDOMIZE: ―YOUNGEST MALE, 18 years of age or older, who is now at home‖ AND 
―YOUNGEST FEMALE, 18 years of age or older, who is now at home?‖] [IF NO MALE/FEMALE, ASK:  
May I please speak with the YOUNGEST FEMALE/MALE, 18 years of age or older, who is now at 
home?]  GO TO MAIN INTERVIEW 
 
CELL PHONE INTRO: 
Hello, I am ___ calling for SRBI Survey Research. We are conducting a survey for leading 
newspapers and TV stations around the country.  I know I am calling you on a cell phone, as a small token 
of our appreciation for your time, we will pay all eligible respondents $5 for participating in this survey.   
 
This is not a sales call.  (IF R SAYS DRIVING/UNABLE TO TAKE CALL; Thank you. We will 
try you another time…). 
 
VOICE MAIL MESSAGE (LEAVE ONLY ONCE -- THE FIRST TIME A CALL GOES TO 
VOICEMAIL): I am calling for SRBI Survey Research. We are conducting a short national survey of cell 
phone users.  This is NOT a sales call.  We will try to reach you again. 
 
SCREENING INTERVIEW: 
S1. Are you under 18 years old, OR are you 18 or older? 
1 Under 18 
2 18 or older 
9 Don‘t know/Refused 
 
IF S1=2, CONTINUE WITH MAIN INTERVIEW 
IF S1=1,9 THANK AND TERMINATE: This survey is limited to adults age 18 and over.  I won‘t 
take any more of your time… 
 
READ TO ALL CELL PHONE 
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INTRODUCTION TO MAIN INTERVIEW:  We‘re interested in learning more about people with 
cell phones. This will only take about 20 minutes.  If you are now driving a car or doing any activity 
requiring your full attention, I need to call you back later. The first question is… 
 
INTERVIEWER:  
IF R SAYS IT IS NOT A GOOD TIME, TRY TO ARRANGE A TIME TO CALL BACK.  
OFFER THE TOLL-FREE CALL-IN NUMBER THEY CAN USE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY 
BEFORE ENDING THE CONVERSATION. 
  
RANDOMIZE Q.1 AND Q.2 
ASK ALL: 
Q.1 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? 
[IF DK ENTER AS DK.  IF DEPENDS PROBE ONCE WITH:  Overall do you approve or disapprove of 





9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
RANDOMIZE Q.1 AND Q.2 
ASK ALL:    
Q.2 All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country 




9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK FORM 1 ONLY: 
Q.3F1 What one word best describes your impression of Congress these days?  Just the first 
word that comes to mind? [OPEN END; PROBE ONCE IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS ―DON‘T 
KNOW.‖ ACCEPT MULTIPLE WORD RESPONSES BUT DO NOT PROBE FOR SECOND 
RESPONSE] {new} {QID:qid20100301q3f1} 
 
1 Answer given 
9 Don‘t know/Refused 
 
RANDOMIZE Q.4 AND Q.5 
ASK ALL: 
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Q.4 Do you approve or disapprove of the job the Republican leaders in Congress are doing? 
[IF DK ENTER AS DK.  IF DEPENDS PROBE ONCE WITH:  Overall do you approve or disapprove of 
the job the Republican leaders in Congress are doing?  IF STILL DEPENDS ENTER AS DK] {1–10} 
{QID:REPAPP} 
 
 1 Approve 
 2 Disapprove 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
RANDOMIZE Q.4 AND Q.5 
ASK ALL: 
Q.5 Do you approve or disapprove of the job the Democratic leaders in Congress are doing? 
[IF DK ENTER AS DK.  IF DEPENDS PROBE ONCE WITH:  Overall do you approve or disapprove of 
the job the Democratic leaders in Congress are doing?  IF STILL DEPENDS ENTER AS DK] {1–10} 
{QID:DEMAPP} 
 
 1 Approve 
 2 Disapprove 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
NO QUESTIONS 6–8 
 
ASK ALL: 
Thinking about some issues… 
Q.9 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling [INSERT ITEM, 
RANDOMIZE; OBSERVE FORM SPLITS] How about [NEXT ITEM]? [REPEAT INTRODUCTION AS 
NECESSARY] 
 
a. The economy {1–10} {QID:PRESECON} 
b. Health care policy {1–10} {QID:PRESHEALTH} 
c.F1 The nation‘s foreign policy {1–10} {QID:PRESFP} 









Q.10 As I name some traits, please tell me whether you think each one describes Barack 
Obama. First, [INSERT FIRST ITEM; RANDOMIZE] do you think of Barack Obama as [FIRST ITEM; 
RANDOMIZE] or not?  Do you think of Barack Obama as [NEXT ITEM] or not?  {trend for comparison 
to 11–08 voters and earlier 08 trends on RVs} 
 
a. Inspiring {11–08 voters, 10–08, 9–08, 4–08, 3–08 all RVs} {QID:qid45190} 
b. Arrogant {9–08, 4–08 RVs} {QID:qid20080401q15g} 
c. Decisive {new} {QID:qid20100301q10c} 
d. Detached {new} {QID:qid20100301q10d} 
 
RESPONSE CATEGORIES: 
1 Yes, describes Barack Obama 
2 No 
9 Don‘t Know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.11 Does Barack Obama make you feel [INSERT FIRST ITEM; RANDOMIZE] or not? 
Does Obama make you feel [NEXT ITEM] or not?  {trend for comparison to 11–08 voters, mod 3–08 
RVs} 
 
a. Hopeful {11–08 voters, 3–08 RVs} {QID:qid20081102q67a} 
b. Proud {11–08 voters, 3–08 RVs} {QID:qid20081102q67b} 
c. Angry {11–08 voters, 3–08 RVs} {QID:qid20081102q67c} 
d. Disappointed {new} {QID:qid20100301q11d} 
 
RESPONSE CATEGORIES: 
1 Yes, makes you feel this way 
2 No 
9  Don‘t Know/Refused (VOL.) 
 




Q.14 In dealing with important issues facing the country, are [RANDOMIZE; Democrats in 




1 Working together 
2 Not working together 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF ‗NOT WORKING TOGETHER‘ (Q.14=2): 
Q.14a Who do you think is most to blame for them not working together? [READ AND 
RANDOMIZE IN SAME ORDER AS Q.14] {new} {QID:qid20100301q14a} 
 
1 Democratic leaders in Congress [OR] 
2 Republican leaders in Congress 
3 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Both 
4 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Neither 
5 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Other (SPECIFY: ______) 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.15 Which political party has the higher moral and ethical standards? [READ AND 
RANDOMIZE] {new} {QID:qid20100301q15} 
 
1 The Democratic Party [OR] 
2 The Republican Party 
3 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Both 
4 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Neither 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
On another subject … 
Q.16 What do you think is more important – to protect the right of Americans to own guns, OR 
to control gun ownership? {4–09} {QID:x990516–19} 
 
1 Protect the right of Americans to own guns 
2 Control gun ownership 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 




RANDOMIZE Q.19-Q.20/Q.22-Q.23 IN BLOCKS: 
ASK ALL: 
Thinking now about the nation‘s economy… 
Q.19 How would you rate economic conditions in this country today… as excellent, good, only 




3 Only fair 
4 Poor 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.20 Which of the these best describes your opinion: [READ; READ CATEGORIES IN 
REVERSE ORDER FOR HALF THE SAMPLE]? {new} {QID:qid20100301q20} 
 
1 The economy is now recovering [OR] 
2 The economy is not yet recovering but will recover soon [OR] 
3 It will be a long time before the economy recovers 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
NO QUESTION 21 
 
RANDOMIZE Q.19-Q.20/Q.22-Q.23 IN BLOCKS: 
ASK ALL: 
Thinking now about your own personal finances... 
Q.22 How would you rate your own personal financial situation?  Would you say you are in 
excellent shape, good shape, only fair shape or poor shape financially? {12–09} {QID:x931205–14} 
  
1          Excellent shape 
2          Good shape 
3          Only fair shape 
4          Poor shape 




Q.23 Over the course of the next year, do you think the financial situation of you and your 
family will improve a lot, improve some, get a little worse or get a lot worse? {12–09} {QID:x940727–26} 
  
1          Improve a lot 
2          Improve some 
3          Get a little worse 
4          Get a lot worse 
5          Stay the same (VOL.) 




Q.24 Which of the following national economic issues worries you most? [READ AND 
RANDOMIZE] {new} {QID:qid20100301q24} 
 
1 Problems in the financial and housing markets 
2 The federal budget deficit 
3 Rising prices [OR] 
4 The job situation 
7 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Other 
8 [VOL. DO NOT READ] None / not worried about any 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
Now thinking about health care… 
Q.25 How much, if anything, have you heard about the bills in Congress to overhaul the health 
care system? Have you heard…[READ] {2–10} {QID:qid20090701q48} 
 
1 A lot 
2 A little [OR] 
3 Nothing at all 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.26 As of right now, do you generally favor or generally oppose the health care bills being 
discussed in Congress?  {2–10} {QID:qid20090701q49} 
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1 Generally favor 
2 Generally oppose 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK THOSE WHO OPPOSE HEALTH CARE BILLS (Q.26=2): 
Q.27 Would you prefer that Congress [INSERT OPTION, RANDOMIZE] or would you prefer 
that Congress [NEXT OPTION]? {new, trend for comparison to 2–10?} {QID:qid20100301q27} 
 
1 Begin working on new health care legislation 
2 Pass nothing and leave the current system as it is 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
 
NO QUESTIONS 28–30 
 
  
ASK FORM 1 ONLY: 
Q.31F1 If the health care bills being discussed in Congress are passed into law, do you think your 
health care costs would [RANDOMIZE: increase, decrease] or stay the same in the coming years? [IF 
INCREASE: Do you think they would increase a lot or a little?] {new} {QID:qid20100301q31f1} 
 
1 Increase, a lot 
2 Increase, a little 
3 Increase, don‘t know how much (VOL.) 
4 Decrease 
5 Stay the same 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK FORM 2 ONLY: 
Q.32F2 If no changes are made to the health care system, do you think your health care costs 
would [RANDOMIZE: increase, decrease] or stay the same in the coming years? [IF INCREASE: Do you 
think they would increase a lot or a little?] {new} {QID:qid20100301q32f2} 
 
1 Increase, a lot 
2 Increase, a little 
3 Increase, don‘t know how much (VOL.) 
4 Decrease 
5 Stay the same 
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9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
HEALTHINS Are you, yourself, now covered by any form of health insurance or health plan 
or are you not covered at this time? [READ IF NECESSARY: A health plan would include any private 
insurance plan through your employer or a plan that you purchased yourself, as well as a government 
program like Medicare or Medicaid] {1–10} {QID:qid20090601q59} 
 
1 Covered by health insurance 
2 Not covered by health insurance  
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 





3 Not employed 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF NOT EMPLOYED (EMPLOY=3): 
EMPLOY1 Are you currently looking for work, or not? {2–09} {QID:EMPLOY1} 
 
1 Yes, looking for work 
2 No, not looking 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
STUDENT Are you now enrolled in school, either full or part-time, or not? {5–09} 
{QID:STUDENT} 
 
1 Yes, full-time student 
2 Yes, part-time 
3 No 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 




Q.36 Thinking now about job opportunities where you live, would you say there are plenty of 
jobs available in your community or are jobs difficult to find? {10–09} {QID:x010617–20}  
 
1 Plenty of jobs available 
2 Jobs are difficult to find 
3 Lots of some jobs, few of others (VOL.) 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF EMPLOYED (EMPLOY=1,2) OR NOT EMPLOYED AND NOT CURRENTLY 
LOOKING FOR WORK (EMPLOY1=2,9) 
Q.37 Over the past 12 months, has there been a time when you or someone in your household 




9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.38 For each of the following, please tell me whether or not it is something that happened to 
you in the past year....Have you [INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE ITEMS a. THRU f. WITH ITEM g. 
ALWAYS LAST]? [IF RESPONDENT SAYS THIS DOES NOT APPLY, CODE AS NO]  {2–09, 1–08 
SDT, 8–99 Post/Kaiser} 
 
a.  Had trouble getting or paying for medical care for yourself or your family {2–09, 1–08, 
8–99} {QID:qid20090201q39a} 
b.  Had problems paying your rent or mortgage {2–09, 1–08, 8–99} 
{QID:qid20090201q39b} 
c.  Been laid off or lost your job {2–09, 1–08} {QID:qid20090201q39c} 
d. Gotten a pay raise at your current job or gotten a better job {2–09, 1–08, 8–99} 
{QID:qid20090201q39d} 
e. Had a mortgage, other loan, or credit card application denied {2–09} 
{QID:qid20090201q39e} 
f. Had problems with collection or credit agencies {2–09, 8–99} {QID:qid20090201q39f} 
ASK IF NOT LAID OFF (Q.38c=2,9): 







9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
ASK IF EMPLOYED (EMPLOY=1,2):  
Q.39 Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely is it that [INSERT FIRST ITEM; 
RANDOMIZE]? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely or not at all likely? What about [INSERT 
NEXT ITEM]? [IF NECESSARY: Is it very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely or not at all likely that 
(REPEAT ITEM)] {2–09} 
 
a. Your employer may go out of business or relocate to another city {2–09, 1–08} 
{QID:qid20090201q40a} 
b. You may have your health care benefits reduced or eliminated by your employer {2–09, 
1–08} {QID:qid20090201q40c} 
c. You may be asked to take a cut in pay {2–09, 1–08} {QID:qid20090201q40d} 
d. You may be laid off {2–09, 1–08} {QID:qid20090201q40f} 




1 Very likely 
2 Somewhat likely 
3 Not too likely 
4 Not at all likely 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
NO QUESTIONS 40–43 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.44 Thinking about gun laws… do you think state and local governments should or should 




2 Should not 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Thinking about Afghanistan… 
 102 
Q.45 How well is the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan going? [READ IN ORDER] {12–09} 
{QID:qid20080202Q80} 
 
1 Very well 
2 Fairly well 
3 Not too well 
4 Not at all well 




Q.46 Regardless of what you think about the original decision to use military force in 
Afghanistan, do you now believe that the United States will definitely succeed, probably succeed, probably 
fail, or definitely fail in achieving its goals in Afghanistan? {12–09} {QID:qid20090101q53} 
  
1 Definitely succeed 
2 Probably succeed 
3 Probably fail 
4 Definitely fail 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
NO QUESTIONS 47–48 
 
ASK ALL: 
Now thinking about Iraq… 
Q.49 How well is the U.S. military effort in Iraq going? [READ IN ORDER] {12–09} 
{QID:x030327-PRC5}  
 
1 Very well 
2 Fairly well 
3 Not too well 
4 Not at all well 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.50 Regardless of what you think about the original decision to use military force in Iraq, do 
you now believe that the United States will definitely succeed, probably succeed, probably fail, or 
definitely fail in achieving its goals in Iraq? {12–09} {QID:x060910–63F2} 
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1 Definitely succeed 
2 Probably succeed 
3 Probably fail 
4 Definitely fail 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
On a different subject …  
QCEN.1 Have you ever heard of the United States Census, or have you not heard of this? {1–10} 
{QID:qid20100101QC.1} 
 
1 Yes, have heard 
2 No, have not heard 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF HAVE NOT HEARD OF THE CENSUS (QCEN.1=2,9): 
QCEN.1a The Census is the count of all people who live in the United States. Have you 
ever heard of that before, or have you not heard of that? {1–10} {QID:qid20100101QC.2} 
 
1 Yes, have heard 
2 No, have not heard 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
ASK IF HEARD OF THE CENSUS (QCEN.1=1 OR QCEN1a=1): 
On a different subject …  
QCEN.2 Have you seen or heard anything recently–within the last month or so–about the Census, 
or have you not seen or heard anything recently? {1–10} {QID:qid20100101QC.2} 
 
1 Yes, have seen or heard recently 
2 No, have not seen or heard recently 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.3 How likely are you to participate in the 2010 Census? By participate, we mean fill out 
and mail in a Census form. Would you say you [READ]? [IF RESPONDENT SAYS THEY ALREADY 
RECEIVED AND FILLED OUT OR MAILED IN THE FORM, PLEASE CODE AS PUNCH 6] {1–10, 
slight mod to options 6 and 7} {QID:qid20100101QC.4} 
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1 Definitely will 
2 Probably will 
3 Might or might not 
4 Probably will not 
5 Definitely will not 
6 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Already filled out and mailed in form 
7 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Other, (SPECIFY:______) 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK IF MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT OR WILL NOT PARTICIPATE (QCEN.3=3,4,5): 
QCEN.4 How likely is it that someone else in your household will participate in the 2010 Census? 
Would you say someone else in your household [READ]?  [IF NECESSARY: By participate, we mean fill 
out and mail in a Census form.] [IF RESPONDENT SAYS SOMEBODY IN THEIR HOUSEHOLD 
ALREADY RECEIVED AND FILLED OUT OR MAILED IN THE FORM, PLEASE CODE AS PUNCH 
6] {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen4} 
 
1 Definitely will 
2 Probably will 
3 Might or might not 
4 Probably will not 
5 Definitely will not 
6 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Already filled out and mailed in form 
7 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Other, (SPECIFY:______) 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.5 How important do you think the Census is for the United States? Would you say it is 
[READ]? {1–10} {QID:qid20100101QC.5} 
 
1 Very important 
2 Somewhat important 
3 Not too important 
4 Not at all important 





QCEN.6 Do you believe that answering and sending back your Census form would personally 
benefit you in any way, personally harm you, or neither benefit nor harm you? {1–10, slight mod to add 
option 4} {QID:qid20100101QC.6} 
 
1 Personally benefit  
2 Personally harm 
3 Neither benefit nor harm 
4 Both benefit and harm (VOL.) 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.7 Do you believe that filling out your Census form would benefit your community, harm 
your community, or neither benefit nor harm your community? {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen7} 
 
1 Benefit  
2 Harm 
3 Neither benefit nor harm 
4 Both benefit and harm (VOL.) 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.8 Do you think filling out the Census form will take too much time, or don‘t you think so? 
{new} {QID:qid20100301qcen8} 
 
1 Yes, will take too much time 
2 No, don‘t think so 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.9 Do you think conducting the 2010 Census will cost too much money, or don‘t you think 
so? {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen9} 
 
1 Yes, will cost too much money 
2 No, don‘t think so 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
 106 
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.10 Do you think the Census Bureau will keep personal information confidential, or 
don‘t you think so? {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen10} 
 
1 Yes, will keep personal information confidential 
2 No, don‘t think so 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
  
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.11 Do you think the Census asks for more personal information than the 
government really needs, or don‘t you think so? {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen11} 
 
1 Yes, asks for more personal information than the government really needs 
2 No, don‘t think so 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.12 Do you think participating in the Census is a civic responsibility, or don‘t you 
think so? {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen12} 
 
1 Yes, participating in the Census is a civic responsibility 
2 No, don‘t think so 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.13 Do you think the results of the Census help one political party more than the 
other, or don‘t you think so? {new} {QID:qid20100301qcen13} 
 
1 Yes, helps one political party more than the other 
2 No, don‘t think so 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
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ASK IF YES (QCEN.13=1): 
QCEN.13a Which political party do you think the Census helps more? [OPEN END. 
SINGLE RESPONSE. USE PRECODES AS APPROPRIATE. ACCEPT ONLY ONE RESPONSE.] 
{new} {QID:qid20100301qcen13a} 
 
(PRECODES – DO NOT READ) 
1 Republican Party  
2 Democratic Party  
3 Other, (SPECIFY:______) 
4 None 
9 Don‘t know/Refused  
 
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.14 As far as you know, is the Census used to decide how many representatives each 
state will have in Congress, or is it not used for this? {1–10} {QID:qid20100101QC.8} 
 
1 Yes, used for this 
2 No, not used for this 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
  
RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QCEN.8 THROUGH QCEN.15: 
ASK ALL: 
QCEN.15 As far as you know, is the Census used to determine whether someone is in this 
country legally, or is it not used for this? {new, for comparison to Pew Hispanic March Omnibus} 
{QID:qid20100301qcen15} 
 
1 Yes, used for this 
2 No, not used for this 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Now thinking about another topic… 
Q.52 Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal, or not? {new, Gallup 10–09} 
{QID:qid20100301q52} 
 
1 Yes, legal 
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2 No, illegal 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.53 Do you favor or oppose your state allowing the sale and use of marijuana for medical 




9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.54 Do you think that allowing medical marijuana makes it easier for people to get marijuana 
even if they don‘t have a real medical need, or doesn‘t it make a difference?  {new} 
{QID:qid20100301q54} 
 
1 Yes, makes it easier 
2 Doesn‘t make a difference 
9 Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK IF EASIER (Q.54=1): 
Q.55 Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned 
about this? [READ] [REPEAT IF NECESSARY: That allowing medical marijuana makes it easier for 
people to get marijuana even if they don‘t have a real medical need?] {new} {QID:qid20100301q55} 
 
1 Very concerned 
2 Somewhat concerned 
3 Not too concerned 
4 Not at all concerned 




Q.56 How concerned, if at all, would you be if a store that sold medical marijuana opened up 
near other stores in your area? [READ] {new} {QID:qid20100301q56} 
 
1 Very concerned 
2 Somewhat concerned 
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3 Not too concerned 
4 Not at all concerned 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
Q.57 Keeping in mind that all of your answers in this survey are confidential, have you, 




9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
Now, just a few questions for statistical purposes only. {QID:SEX} 






AGE What is your age? {QID:AGE} 
 
  ________  years 
 97 97 or older 
 99  Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
EDUC What is the last grade or class that you completed in school? [DO NOT READ] 
{QID:EDUC} 
 
 1 None, or grade 1–8 
 2 High school incomplete (Grades 9–11) 
 3 High school graduate (Grade 12 or GED certificate) 
 4 Technical, trade, or vocational school AFTER high school 
 5 Some college, associate degree, no 4-year degree 
 6 College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree) 
 7 Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college  
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  (e.g., toward a master‘s Degree or Ph.D.; law or medical school) 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
  
ASK RANDOM ONE HALF-SAMPLE HISP2, OTHER HALF-SAMPLE HISP3  
[NOTE: DO NOT SPLIT BY FORM]: 
HISP2 Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino [PAUSE] or not? {QID:HISP2} 
 
1 Yes  
2 No  
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.)  
 
ASK RANDOM ONE HALF-SAMPLE HISP2, OTHER HALF-SAMPLE HISP3  
[NOTE: DO NOT SPLIT BY FORM]: 
HISP3 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin [PAUSE] or not? {QID:HISP3} 
 
 1 Yes  
 2 No  
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
RACE1 Which of the following describes your race? You can select as many as apply. 
{QID:RACE1} 
[READ LIST. RECORD UP TO FOUR RESPONSES IN ORDER MENTIONED] 
 
1 White  
2 Black or African-American 
3 Asian or Asian-American  
4 Or some other race 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL: 
MARITAL Are you currently married, living with a partner, divorced, separated, widowed, 
or have you never been married? [IF R SAYS ―SINGLE,‖ PROBE TO DETERMINE WHICH 








6 Never been married 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
HH1 How many people, including yourself, live in your household?  
INTERVIEWER NOTE: HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO THINK OF 
THIS HOUSEHOLD AS THEIR PRIMARY PLACE OF RESIDENCE, INCLUDING THOSE WHO 
ARE TEMPORARILY AWAY ON BUSINESS, VACATION, IN A HOSPITAL, OR AWAY AT 
SCHOOL. THIS INCLUDES INFANTS, CHILDREN AND ADULTS. {QID:HH1} 
 
ENTER NUMBER (RANGE 1–50) 
99 Don‘t know/Refused 
 
  
ASK IF MORE THAN ONE PERSON IN HH (HH1=2–50): 
HH2 How many of these are children under the age of 18? {QID:HH2} 
 
ENTER NUMBER (RANGE 0–50) 
99 Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
RELIG What is your present religion, if any? Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, 
Orthodox such as Greek or Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, agnostic, 
something else, or nothing in particular? {QID:RELIG} 
 
[INTERVIEWER: IF R VOLUNTEERS ―nothing in particular, none, no religion, etc.‖ BEFORE 
REACHING END OF LIST, PROMPT WITH: And would you say that‘s atheist, agnostic, or just nothing 
in particular?] 
 
1 Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Non-denominational, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, 
Episcopalian, Reformed, Church of Christ, Jehovah‘s Witness, etc.) 
2 Roman Catholic (Catholic) 
3 Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints/LDS) 
4 Orthodox (Greek, Russian, or some other orthodox church) 
5 Jewish (Judaism) 
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6 Muslim (Islam) 
7 Buddhist 
8 Hindu 
9 Atheist (do not believe in God) 
10 Agnostic (not sure if there is a God) 
11  Something else (SPECIFY:______) 
12 Nothing in particular 
13 Christian (VOL.) 
14 Unitarian (Universalist) (VOL.) 
99 Don‘t Know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF SOMETHING ELSE OR DK/REF (RELIG=11, 99): 
CHR Do you think of yourself as a Christian or not? 
IF R NAMED A NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN PREVIOUS QUESTION (e.g., Native 




9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF CHRISTIAN (RELIG=1–4, 13 OR CHR=1): 
BORN Would you describe yourself as a ―born again‖ or evangelical Christian, or not? 
{QID:BORN} 
 
1 Yes, would 
2 No, would not 




INCOME Last year, that is in 2009, what was your total family income from all sources, 
before taxes?  Just stop me when I get to the right category. [READ] {QID:INCOME} 
 
1 Less than $10,000 
2 10 to under $20,000 
3 20 to under $30,000 
4 30 to under $40,000 
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5 40 to under $50,000 
6 50 to under $75,000 
7 75 to under $100,000 
8 100 to under $150,000 
9 $150,000 or more 
10 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
REGIST These days, many people are so busy they can‘t find time to register to vote, or move 
around so often they don‘t get a chance to re-register.  Are you NOW registered to vote in your precinct or 
election district or haven‘t you been able to register so far? [INSTRUCTION: IF RESPONDENT 
VOLUNTEERS THAT THEY ARE IN NORTH DAKOTA AND DON‘T HAVE TO REGISTER, 
PUNCH 1 FOR REGIST AND REGICERT] {QID:REGIST} 
 
1 Yes, registered 
2 No, not registered 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED ‗1‘ YES IN REGIST: 
REGICERT Are you absolutely certain that you are registered to vote, or is there a chance that 
your registration has lapsed because you moved or for some other reason? {QID:REGICERT} 
 
1 Absolutely certain 
2 Chance registration has lapsed 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? 
{QID:PARTY} 
 
1 Republican  
2 Democrat  
3 Independent  
4 No preference (VOL.) 
5 Other party (VOL.) 




ASK IF ANSWERED 3, 4, 5 OR 9 IN PARTY: 





9 Other/Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK ALL: 
IDEO In general, would you describe your political views as... [READ] {QID:IDEO} 
 
1 Very conservative 
2 Conservative 
3 Moderate 
4 Liberal, OR 
5 Very liberal? 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused 
 
ASK IF AGE>29: 





3 Other arrangement (VOL.) 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF AGE<30: 
HOME2 Do you own your home, rent, live in a dorm or live with your parents? {2–10 PST} 
{QID:OWNRENT30} 
 
 1 Own 
 2 Rent 
 3 Live in a dorm 
 4 Live with parents 
 5 Other arrangement (VOL.) 
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
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ASK IF HISPANIC (HISP2=1 or HISP3=1): 
BIRTH_HISP Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United States, or in another 
country? 
  {2–10; Do not show in Topline} {QID:BIRTH_HISP} 
 
  1 Puerto Rico 
  2 U.S.  
  3 Another country 
  9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.)  
 
  
ASK IF HISPANIC (HISP2=1 or HISP3=1) AND IF BORN IN U.S. (BIRTH_HISP=2): 
MOTHER_HISP Was your mother born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United States, or in 
     another country? {2–10; Do not show in Topline} 
{QID:MOTHER_HISP} 
 
 1 Puerto Rico 
 2 U.S.  
 3 Another country  
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.)  
 
ASK IF HISPANIC (HISP2=1 or HISP3=1) AND IF BORN IN U.S. (BIRTH_HISP=2): 
FATHER_HISP Was your father born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United States, or in 
another 
     country?  {2–10;Do not show in Topline} 
{QID:FATHER_HISP} 
 
  1 Puerto Rico 
  2 U.S.  
  3 Another country 
  9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.)  
 
ASK ALL LANDLINE SAMPLE: 
L1. Now thinking about your telephone use… Do you have a working cell phone?  {QID:L1} 
 
1 Yes, have cell phone 
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2 No, do not 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF NO CELL PHONE AND MULTI-PERSON HOUSEHOLD (L1=2,9 AND HH1>1): 
L1a. Does anyone in your household have a working cell phone? {QID:L1a} 
 
1 Yes, someone in household has cell phone 
2 No 
9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF DUAL REACHED ON LANDLINE AND SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD (L1=1 
AND HH1=1): 
L2. Of all the telephone calls that you receive, do you get [READ AND RANDOMIZE 
OPTIONS 1 AND 3—KEEP 2 ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE]? {QID:L2} 
 
1 All or almost all calls on a cell phone 
2 Some on a cell phone and some on a regular home phone 
3 All or almost all calls on a regular home phone 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
 
  
ASK IF DUAL REACHED ON LANDLINE AND MULTI-PERSON HOUSEHOLD ((L1=1 OR 
L1a=1) AND HH1>1)): 
L3. Now thinking about all the people in your household, including yourself, of all the 
telephone calls that your household receives, are [READ AND RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 AND 3—
KEEP 2 ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE]? {QID:L3} 
 
1 All or almost all calls on a cell phone 
2 Some on a cell phone and some on a regular home phone 
3 All or almost all calls on a regular home phone 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL CELL PHONE SAMPLE: 
C1. Now thinking about your telephone use… Is there at least one telephone INSIDE your 
home that is currently working and is not a cell phone? {QID:C1} 
 
1 Yes home telephone 
2 No, home telephone 
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9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.) 
 
ASK IF DUAL REACHED ON CELL PHONE AND SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD (C1=1 
AND HH1=1): 
C2. Of all the telephone calls that you receive, do you get [READ AND RANDOMIZE 
OPTIONS 1 AND 3—KEEP  2 ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE]? {QID:C2} 
 
1 All or almost all calls on a cell phone 
2 Some on a cell phone and some on a regular home phone 
3 All or almost all calls on a regular home phone 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
 
ASK IF DUAL REACHED ON CELL PHONE AND MULTI-PERSON HOUSEHOLD (C1=1 
AND HH1>1): 
C3. Now thinking about all the people in your household, including yourself, of all the 
telephone calls that your household receives, are [READ AND RANDOMIZE OPTIONS 1 AND 3—
KEEP 2 ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE]? {QID:C3} 
 
1 All or almost all calls on a cell phone 
2 Some on a cell phone and some on a regular home phone 
3 All or almost all calls on a regular home phone 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL: 
ZIPCODE What is your zipcode? {QID:ZIPCODE} 
 
_____ Enter Zipcode 
9 Don‘t know/Refused 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
 
  
ASK ALL CELL PHONE SAMPLE: 
MONEY  That‘s the end of the interview. We‘d like to send you $5 for your time. Can I please 
have your full name and a mailing address where we can send you the money?  [INTERVIEWER NOTE: 
If R does not want to give full name, explain we only need it so we can send the $5 to them personally.] 
{QID:MONEY} 
  
 1 [ENTER FULL NAME] – INTERVIEWER: PLEASE VERIFY SPELLING 
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2 [ENTER MAILING ADDRESS] 
3 [City] 
4 [State] 
5 CONFIRM ZIP from above 
9 (VOL.) Respondent does not want the money 
 
ASK ALL: 
Thank you very much for your time. This survey is being conducted by the Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press, which will be issuing a report on the results of this survey on their website, 
peoplepress dot ORG, in the coming weeks.  
 
THANK YOU again for you help! Have a nice day/evening. 
 





 1 Male 
 2 Female 
 
INTERVIEWER RACE: 
IHISP1 Are you, yourself, of Hispanic origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 
or some other Spanish background? {QID:IHISP1} 
 
 1 Yes 
 2 No  
 9 Don‘t know/Refused (VOL.)  
 
IRACE1 Which of the following describes your race? You can select as many as apply.  
[READ LIST. RECORD UP TO FOUR RESPONSES IN ORDER MENTIONED] 
{QID:IRACE1} 
 
1 White  
2 Black or African-American 
3 Asian or Asian-American  
4 Or some other race 
 119 
9 [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don‘t know/Refused  
  
  
[PLEASE MAKE THE FOLLOWING TEXT AVAILABLE TO INTERVIEWERS ANYTIME A 
RESPONDENT ASKS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER]The Pew Research 
Center for the People & the Press is an independent nonpartisan public opinion research organization that 
studies attitudes toward politics, the press and issues facing the nation. The Center has no connection to the 
government, political parties, or any campaigns. Reports about its surveys are made available free of charge 
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APPENDIX B. PRELIMINARY WORK WITH STANLEY 
Prior to conducting the tests with oil prices, STANLEY was experimented with 
using a library of online works of literature.  The purpose of this early analysis was to 
become familiar with the tool and develop a baseline standard procedure for set up and 
operation.  The below text is an excerpt from the paper by McKaughan, Alt, Heath, and 
McClain (2011).   
A. EARLY TESTS WITH STANLEY 
This section provides an illustrative application of the tool and a methodology to 
generate a Bayesian network describing the likelihood of a document in the corpus being 
classified as ―accepting‖ or ―unaccepting‖ of violence given its classification in three 
factors.   
B. CASE STUDY 
This case study used Project Gutenberg to test the application of the STANLEY 
tool in the generation of a Bayesian Belief Network.  Project Gutenberg is an online 
repository of over 33,000 books and pieces of literature with the goal of the creation and 
distribution to the masses of eBooks (www.gutenberg.org/wiki/mainpage).  The Project 
contains all manners of genres and styles of texts, ranging several centuries up to the 
early 1900s.   
The question that this portion attempted to answer was the likelihood that a 
document supports a statement that violence is unacceptable.  From the Project, four 
variables/classifiers were chosen into which the texts were separated and against which 
the corpus was tested.  The test texts were drawn from a larger collection of texts about 
which the details (genre, author gender, etc.) were known.  The four test classifiers were 
genre (biography, cookery, horror with 14 texts per genre), gender of author (14 female 
authors, 14 male), time period written (1700s and earlier, 1800s, 1900s with eight texts in 
each) and violence (acceptable or unacceptable, with 14 texts each).  To test the accuracy 
of the classifiers and STANLEY‘s ability to categorize effectively, all the texts from the 
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original collection were used as the document corpus (182 texts total).  To help ensure 
solid variable texts for our violence classifiers, all texts for the ‗unacceptable‘ classifier 
were children‘s stories, while the ‗acceptable‘ category contained horror, crime, and war 
texts. 
Once the variables were set and the corpus established, STANLEY was run under 
various configurations to give an idea of how well the tool was performing.  The various 
configurations allow the analyst to specify which categories classifications can be more 
stringent than others.  For violence to be accepted in this case, the text had to have an 
overall document score for violence of 0.80, a score for ‗acceptable‘ of 0.85, and a delta 
score from the ‗unacceptable‘ variable option of 0.05.  Bayesian Networks were then 
developed to determine the probabilities of violence being OK, based on the genre, time 
period, and author gender.  Weka, an open source data mining software tool developed by 
the University of Waikato was used to generate the BN‘s.   
C. RESULTS 
The results for this particular test with STANLEY were mixed.  STANLEY did 
an extremely accurate job of classifying the ‗cookery‘ genre (22 classified out of 22 
actual).  However, it had more difficulty with correctly classifying the other two genres.  
Eleven of 21 biographies were correctly classified, and 147 texts were classified as 
horror, when there were only 25 actual horror texts in the corpus.  Two texts were labeled 
unknown (scores not high enough to meet threshold criteria for genre).  The reason for 
the high horror count is quite obvious.  With only three genres from which to choose and 
classify, the tool categorized each text based on the comparisons between the 
configuration file and the highest variable score.  The horror genre was scored highest in 
those texts that were categorized as horror when they in fact were some other genre.  The 
biography genre was under classified for a similar reason.  There was too much similarity 
(cosine similarity) in the concept vectors between the actual horror and biography texts.  
This phenomenon illustrates the need for clearly defined, specific, orthogonal classifiers 
to successfully utilize the tool.   
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STANLEY did have quite a bit of difficulty correctly categorizing gender and 
time period (see Table 8 for specifics on gender and time period).  Of the 172 texts for 
which a gender classification was scored (10 texts failed to meet gender thresholds), only 
25 were classified as written by male authors, when in fact, the number of male authors 
was 114.  For female authorship, STANLEY classified 147 when in fact there were only 
51.  Similarly, for time period written, STANLEY classified 28 as UNKNOWN, 13 of 11 
as 1700s and before, 76 of 54 as 1800s, and 65 of 77 as 1900s.  There are perhaps several 
reasons for this, but most likely the main reason is similar to the cause for the 
misclassification of the horror and biography genres.  Again, the classifiers were not 
specific enough (‗cookery‘ was very specific with good results) and there was not a large 
enough differential in the cosine similarity to distinguish between variables, too much 
similarity in word. 
Table 7.   STANLEY results for number of documents and percentages for author gender 
and time period written.   
 
 
Note:  There were 17 UNKNOWN gender texts and 40 UNKNOWN time period texts in 
the reference (classifier) corpus. 
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For the question regarding the acceptability of violence, the test document corpus 
claimed 150 of 182 acceptable, 22 unacceptable, and 10 unknown (failed to meet 
threshold criteria).  This corresponds closely to the number of documents within the 
corpus known to be unacceptable of violence with a false positive rate for unacceptable 
less than 1%.  The difference in results is not surprising given the relative strength of the 
classifiers used and continues to highlight the need for orthogonal classifiers.  Figure 51 
shows the Bayesian Network generated by Weka and the conditional probabilities of 
violence being acceptable or unacceptable based on the three other classifiers.  The 
relationship shown in this network is the dependency of violence on the other classifiers.  
In other words, the acceptability or unacceptability of violence is determined by the 
probability distributions within the classifiers. 
 
 
Figure 51.   Weka generated Bayesian Network showing the dependency of violence given 
genre, time written, and author gender 
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D. LESSONS LEARNED, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE WORK 
There are several key conclusions and lessons learned were drawn from this study 
and applied to subsequent uses of STANLEY in this thesis.  The primary lesson learned 
was that there is potential for a tool like STANELY in the area of social simulation 
development.  The need for classifiers that are orthogonal cannot be stressed enough.  
The classifiers need to be as specific as possible to the categories they are attempting to 
represent.  As was shown, when the classifiers were well defined, as was the case with 
the ‗cooking‘ genre, STANLEY was very accurate in classifying the documents.  When 
there existed some ambiguity between texts, as could have been the case with the horror 
and biography genres, the tool was less effective.   
There are other problems that can occur with the way that STANLEY classifies 
documents This initial implementation using STANLEY was based on classifiers that 
match based on the statistical use of concepts.  This means that a classifier could be more 
likely to match two documents discussing two different categories using the same style or 
similar word packets (words, phrases, etc.) than two documents discussing the same 
subject but using two different styles.  To account for different types of documents an 
ensemble classification method using several different classification technologies in a 
voting scheme may be more appropriate.  The number and type of selected documents 
used to generate the classification profiles will also be very important and further 
research is needed to quantify these data needs.  Further research is also needed to 
explore how to best gather and weight the corpus of documents to be classified.  It may 
be that certain types of documents expressing particular points of view may be more 
prevalent than what is actually observed on the ground due to a media bias or general 
media access limitations.  Some documents may also be deemed more important or 
credible than others.  A mechanism needs to be put in place to resolve these issues. 
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APPENDIX C. SEED DOCUMENTS FOR SPIDER RUNS 
This appendix includes all the documents used to seed the spider.  Particularly, 
these documents established the classifier list with which the spider scored the documents 
it retrieved.  Included are articles relating to the countries involved in the Middle East 
Turmoil and articles about the rising oil prices in the U.S.  They are included in the 
format in which they were copied from the Internet (references in section III.B.1) 
Algeria  
After 19 years, the government officially lifted a state of emergency in February 
following strikes and protests.  But protest marches, which were not allowed under the 
state of emergency, continue to be banned in the capital, Algiers.  Some viewed the move 
as a ―ruse‖ to placate protesters, who continue to turn out for demonstrations that are 
quickly broken up by large numbers of police.  President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has 
pledged political reforms.  On April 12, thousands of students marched in Algiers to 
demand the education minister step down and were blocked by police when trying to 
reach government headquarters. 
Bahrain  
After a violent crackdown on protesters in the capital, Manama, that killed seven people, 
the crown prince in February called for a national dialogue between the Sunni-led 
government and the mostly Shiite protesters.  Demonstrators were skeptical of the 
government‘s offer, and they continued to stage daily marches, with many calling for the 
ouster of the monarchy.  Following fighting between protesters and police, a military 
force from Saudi Arabia and neighboring Gulf states entered Bahrain at the royal 
family‘s request on March 14.  A day later, the king declared a three-month state of 
emergency. 
In the crackdown on dissent that followed, security forces cleared demonstrators from the 
Pearl traffic circle in Manama, imposed a curfew and arrested opposition activists.  The 
government also demolished the monument in the middle of the Pearl roundabout that 
had become a symbol of the opposition.  At least 30 people have been killed since the 
protests began.  On April 14, Bahrain said it was seeking court approval to disband Al 
Wefaq, the country‘s biggest Shiite party, for ―threatening peace.‖ 
Egypt  
Protesters took to Egypt‘s streets in January, demanding the ouster of President Hosni 
Mubarak.  Mubarak supporters clashed with demonstrators in Tahrir Square, which 
became the focal point of protests in the capital, Cairo.  Hundreds were killed in the 
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uprising.  Although Mubarak pledged not to run again, fired his government and 
appointed a vice president for the first time in his three decades of rule, the protests 
intensified until Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that the president had handed 
over power to the military. 
Protesters have continued to demand that the military rulers carry out reforms.  The 
military government has said it will lift the country‘s three-decades-old state of 
emergency before parliamentary elections scheduled for September.  Presidential 
elections are slated to be held by November.  On April 12, Mubarak was hospitalized 
after he collapsed during questioning by prosecutors looking into corruption allegations 
and the deaths of protesters during the uprising.  Once he was declared stable, the 
questioning resumed, and a day later, Egypt‘s prosecutor general announced that 
Mubarak and his two sons would be detained for 15 days.  Mubarak may remain 
hospitalized for the duration.  On April 14, the military government promised to review 
the cases of young protesters detained in the wake of Mubarak‘s ouster. 
Iran  
Tens of thousands of demonstrators turned out Feb. 14 for the biggest protests the 
country had seen since the aftermath of the disputed re-election of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2009.  After clashes between security forces and the protesters, hard-line 
lawmakers called for opposition leaders to be put on trial and put to death.  On March 1, 
protesters rallied in Tehran to demand the release of opposition leaders Mir Hossein 
Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi, who supporters said had been moved from house arrest to 
prison.  Riot police used tear gas and batons to break up the demonstrations, according to 
witnesses and opposition websites.  Seven people were arrested at the funeral for 
Mousavi‘s father on March 31, according to the Iranian reformist website kaleme.com.  
The country‘s official IRNA news agency reported April 11 that students threw 
firebombs at the Saudi embassy to protest Saudi Arabia‘s involvement in Bahrain. 
Iraq  
Small, scattered protests, focusing on unemployment, corruption and a lack of services, 
began taking place in Iraq in early February.  Protests intensified in the city of 
Sulaimaniyah—where demonstrators oppose the leaders of Kurdistan, the 
semiautonomous region in northern Iraq—and in Basra, where the governor resigned.  A 
nationwide ―Day of Rage‖ called for Feb. 25 turned violent in Mosul and other cities, 
leading to the deaths of more than a dozen protesters.  Protesters have continued to turn 
out in Baghdad and other cities.  On April 11, a leading human rights group criticized the 
response to the protests, saying the government in Baghdad and the government of the 




Protesters have been gathering on Fridays to demand more of a voice in government—
some want the power to elect their prime minister and Cabinet officials.  King Abdullah 
II fired his Cabinet in February and appointed a new prime minister tasked with carrying 
out reforms.  On March 15, the king set a three-month deadline for agreement on reforms 
by a committee of government officials and opposition leaders.  Hundreds of protesters 
set up camp in a main square in Amman on March 24, saying they would remain there 
until the prime minister left and other demands were met.  The following day, 
government supporters clashed with the protesters in the capital.  One person died and 
120 were injured.  On April 12, the leader of an ultraconservative Muslim group said a 
planned protest had been called off after Jordan released four of its members. 
Kuwait  
More than 1,000 protesters turned out in Kuwait City on March 8 to call for political 
changes—including a new prime minister.  No violence was reported, but police had 
blocked off a central square and forced protesters into a parking lot across from a 
government building.  On March 31, the country‘s official news agency said the Cabinet 
had resigned over regional turmoil.  The move appeared to be an attempt by three 
ministers to avoid being questioned about why Kuwait did not send troops to Bahrain as 
part of a Saudi-led force. 
Libya 
Protests challenging leader Moammar Gadhafi led to a bloody crackdown in February.  
Amid clashes between opposition forces and troops loyal to Gadhafi, thousands fled 
Libya, with many crossing borders into Egypt and Tunisia.  Rebels quickly took control 
of much of eastern Libya, with their base in the city of Benghazi, where the anti-Gadhafi 
uprising began Feb. 15.  After weeks of fighting, the regime had consolidated its power in 
much of the west and was advancing in the east when the U.N. Security Council 
approved the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya on March 17. 
An international coalition soon began launching airstrikes and cruise missiles to take out 
Gadhafi‘s air defenses and other military targets.  Rebels have made gains since the 
airstrikes began but, lacking in training and equipment, they have been pushed back 
several times when confronted by Gadhafi‘s forces.  U.S., British and French officials 
have said arming the anti-government forces is a possibility.  Rebels have urged the 
United States to resume a more central role in the campaign now led by NATO.  
International groups have warned of a humanitarian crisis in Misrata, the only major 





On Feb. 20, demonstrations were called by a coalition of youth groups, labor unions and 
human rights organizations demanding greater democracy in the North African kingdom.  
Several thousand people marched through the capital, Rabat—one of several cities across 
the country where protests were held.  Five people were killed in violence linked to the 
demonstrations.  On March 20, thousands again turned out around the country to press for 
reforms.  King Mohammed VI has announced a plan to revise the country‘s constitution 
and says the project will be put to voters in a referendum.  The king granted pardons or 
lightened sentences for 190 prisoners on April 14. 
Oman 
Protests began in the seaside town of Sohar in late February, resulting in deadly clashes 
with police.  Groups of protesters around the country have since pressed for economic 
and political reforms.  Oman‘s ruler, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, has ordered 50,000 new 
jobs and a monthly stipend for the unemployed, and has reshuffled his Cabinet.  On 
March 13, he granted lawmaking powers to officials outside the royal family.  One 
person was killed when protesters clashed with police on April 1. 
Saudi Arabia  
Police opened fire to disperse a protest March 10 in the eastern city of Qatif.  Three 
protesters and one officer were wounded.  Hundreds had gathered to demand the release 
of political prisoners in a second day of protests in the east, home to the country‘s Shiite 
minority.  Demonstrations have continued in the east, but wider protests called for in the 
capital, Riyadh, failed to materialize amid a massive show of police force.  Protests are 
officially banned in the mainly Sunni kingdom.  King Abdullah has promised to spend 
billions of dollars on a benefits package that includes money for home loans, new 
apartments and payments to government workers, students and the unemployed.  The 
country also plans to hold municipal elections in April after a delay of a year and a half. 
Syria  
Security forces fired on protesters who had gathered in the southern city of Daraa on 
March 18, killing five people and fueling mass demonstrations.  Angry protesters burned 
government buildings, and the government fired the governor of Daraa province, whom 
residents had accused of corruption.  The protests have grown steadily, and a violent 
crackdown across the country has killed at least 200 people, activists said—including 37 
killed on April 8.  A U.S. State Department spokesman said April 14 that there was 
―credible information‖ that Iran was helping Syria crack down on protests. 
In response to the push for reforms, the Cabinet resigned in late March, and a new 
government was formed.  President Bashar Assad, who has blamed the dissent on armed 
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gangs, is facing increasing international criticism over the bloodshed.  On April 14, he 
ordered the release of hundreds of demonstrators who have been detained. 
Tunisia  
The unrest in this North African nation began in December, apparently after a 26-year-
old man committed suicide when police confiscated the fruits and vegetables he was 
selling.  Anger at a lack of employment and at a leadership viewed as corrupt exploded 
into demonstrations and clashes with police.  A United Nations mission says at least 219 
were killed in the weeks of protests.  President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi 
Arabia on Jan. 14.  In late February, Mohamed Ghannouchi, who served as prime 
minister for 11 years, bowed to protesters‘ demands and resigned after clashes between 
demonstrators and riot police.  The interim president, Fouad Mebazaa, has called for 
elections July 24 to pick representatives to write a new constitution. 
Yemen  
Yemen first saw protests in January, with more sustained demonstrations beginning in 
February.  Demonstrators are calling for the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who 
has ruled for more than 30 years.  The government intensified its crackdown in March, 
with police firing on demonstrators and government supporters clashing with crowds.  
More than 40 people were killed in clashes on March 18. 
Saleh‘s support has crumbled since then, with more than a dozen top military officials—
including some from his own tribe—joining the opposition, along with lawmakers, 
diplomats and governors.  Saleh has warned that the country could slide into civil war.  
The Parliament put in place emergency laws in March that suspend the constitution and 
give security forces greater powers of arrest and detention.  A mediation proposal from 
neighboring Gulf nations sparked demonstrations across the country on April 12 because 
it offered Saleh immunity from prosecution.  On April 13, one person was killed when 
gunmen attacked forces loyal to Saleh‘s rival, Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.  At least 
one other was killed in clashes between protesters and security forces in Aden 
Libya 
An uprising against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi‘s rule on 16 February has developed into 
an armed conflict pitting rebels against government forces and drawing in a Nato-led 
coalition with a UN mandate to protect civilians.  
At least several thousand people have been killed and many more have been injured as 
the two sides battle for control over territory. 
The country‘s vital coastal cities are now roughly split between pro-Gaddafi forces 
controlling the capital, Tripoli, and the west, and rebels controlling Benghazi in the east. 
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Coalition operations have been largely confined to air attacks.  These were initially aimed 
at imposing a no-fly zone but have latterly included strikes on government armoured 
forces.  The UN‘s Resolution 1973 authorises ―all necessary measures short of 
occupation.‖ 
Col Gaddafi‘s government has accepted an African Union peace proposal to end the 
eight-week conflict, and the plan is now being submitted to the rebels in Benghazi.  
In power since 1969, Col Gaddafi is the longest-serving ruler in Africa and the Middle 
East, and also one of the most autocratic.  He and his allies face an International Criminal 
Court investigation into alleged crimes against humanity. 
The UN believes at least 335,000 people have fled Libya since the beginning of the 
conflict, including at least 200,000 foreign nationals. 
Morocco  
King Mohammed VI promised ―comprehensive constitutional reform‖ in response to 
nationwide protests in February but unrest has continued. 
Protesters want some of the king‘s powers to be handed over to a newly elected 
government.  
While there have been deaths, notably when five people died at a bank that was set on 
fire, security forces appear to have made an effort to avoid violent confrontations. 
The main opposition group has warned the ―autocracy‖ will be swept away unless the 
government responds to the people‘s demands. 
Morocco has been facing severe economic problems.  It has announced an increase in 
state subsidies to try to counter commodity price rises.  
Like Jordan, the country is a monarchy with strong support among sections of the public. 
Algeria 
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been under pressure to change the constitution and 
limit presidential terms after protests that have continued since January. 
Strikes, opposition protests and riots have prompted concern among the ruling elite that 
the country may succumb to popular unrest. 
Attempts by protesters to march through the capital, Algiers, have been broken up by 
huge numbers of riot police. 
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The trigger for the unrest appears to be mainly economic - in particular sharp increases in 
the price of food. 
Algeria‘s government has considerable wealth from its oil and gas exports and is trying to 
tackle social and economic complaints with a huge public spending programme.  
Mr. Bouteflika has been president since 1999.  He was re-elected for a third term in April 
2009 after winning more than 90% of the vote. 
The downfall of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who quit office in January after 
weeks of protests against poverty and corruption, inspired pro-democracy activists across 
the Arab world.  
He was forced out of power after nearly a quarter of a century. 
Public anger had been sparked by the suicide of a young, unemployed man, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, who set fire to himself on 17 December after officials had blocked his attempts 
to make a living selling vegetables. 
Since the exit of Mr. Ali, who later suffered a stroke, an interim government of 
technocrats has been set up pending elections on 24 July. 
One key reform already enacted is the dissolution of the notorious political police and 
state security apparatus, which was blamed for many human rights abuses. 
Egypt 
The military have been running the country since President Hosni Mubarak, in power for 
three decades, resigned on 11 February following weeks of protests in the capital, Cairo, 
and other cities. 
They are meant to oversee the country‘s transition to a genuine democracy this summer 
and Essam Sharaf, a popular former transport minister who sided with the protesters, has 
been appointed caretaker prime minister. 
While much of the country has returned to normal, the protesters have staged weekly 
Friday demonstrations in Cairo‘s Tahrir Square to keep pressure on the military to deliver 
a swift transition to democracy. 
The opposition Muslim Brotherhood group is expected to do well in any free and fair 
election, but fears of a lurch towards Islamist rule is the main worry for Western powers 
and Israel. 
Mr. Mubarak has been summoned by the state prosecutor for questioning over alleged 
corruption and killings of protesters - accusations which he denies.  Mr. Mubarak, his 
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sons and their wives have been banned from leaving the country and their assets have 
been frozen. 
Much of the unrest was driven by poverty, rising prices, social exclusion and anger at 
corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite, as well as a demographic 
bulge of young people unable to find work. 
Almost 400 people died and more than 6,000 were injured during the protests. 
Jordan 
Unrest has been simmering since January but while protesters have clashed with security 
forces, the country saw nothing like the deadly violence in Syria and Egypt until 25 
March, when a man was killed in the capital, Amman. 
Protesters have been demanding better employment prospects and cuts in food and fuel 
costs, as well as electoral reforms that would see the prime minister directly elected and 
more powers granted to parliament. 
King Abdullah II has replaced his prime minister with Marouf al-Bakhit, a former general 
and ambassador to Israel, together with a new cabinet.  
However, a powerful Islamist opposition group, the Islamic Action Front, has called for 
the dissolution of parliament and criticised the king‘s efforts to initiate reform. 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a small country with few natural resources, but it 
has played a pivotal role in the struggle for power in the Middle East.  
Syria 
The wave of popular unrest sweeping the Arab world came late to the state run by 
President Bashar al-Assad, one of the region‘s most authoritarian rulers. 
Rights activists say about 200 Syrians have died since the protests broke out in mid-
March at the city of Deraa, before spreading. 
After four weeks, demonstrations spread to the cities of Homs and Baniyas, and the 
government branded them ―an armed insurrection.‖ 
Protesters have been demanding greater political freedom, an end to corruption, action on 
poverty and the end of an emergency law imposed since 1963.  
There have been promises of reform in response to the unrest, but Mr. Assad has been 
making similar pledges to little effect since 2000, when he inherited power from his 
father Hafez.  
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Events in Syria, one of Israel‘s most bitter enemies and a strong ally of Lebanon‘s 
Hezbollah militants, could impact on the wider Middle East 
Saudi Arabia 
The challenge for the rulers of one of the region‘s wealthiest and most conservative 
nations has been to address pressure for reform while combating a growing problem of 
Islamist violence.  
The kingdom, home to some of Islam‘s most sacred places, has seen no mass pro-
democracy protests and opposition movements are banned. 
However, there have been some small demonstrations by the Shia Muslim minority in 
solidarity with protesters in Bahrain. 
King Abdullah, 82, is regarded in the Arab world as a supporter of wider Arab interests.  
If the Saudis have played a role in the ―Arab spring‖ at all, it has perhaps been to support 
fellow governments under pressure: Saudi soldiers were sent to Bahrain to help shore up 
the government and it was to Saudi Arabia that Tunisia‘s ousted leader, Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali, fled in January.  
Yemen 
Scores of people have been killed in violence between security forces and demonstrators 
since protests against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh began on 11 February. 
Mr. Saleh, in power for more than three decades, has announced he will not seek another 
term in office, but his current mandate does not expire until 2013 while protesters 
demand he surrenders power immediately. 
After at least 45 people were killed and 270 injured on 18 March, when protesters came 
under fire in the capital, Sanaa, the president announced a national state of emergency. 
A slew of ministers and ambassadors resigned following the 18 March shootings and Mr. 
Saleh announced he was sacking the entire cabinet. 
Both the U.S. and France have condemned the mounting violence and urged the president 
to allow peaceful protest. 
Mr. Saleh has already rejected several calls for him to resign.  
Yemen is the Arab world‘s most impoverished nation and, even before the current 
protests, it was becoming increasingly chaotic, with both al-Qaeda and separatist 
challenges to the government‘s authority. 
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Oman 
Unprecedented protests erupted at the beginning of March, with the deaths of several 
people. 
The Gulf state, with its large and youthful population, had previously been regarded as 
stable. 
It appears the protesters were not demanding radical political change but specific steps 
such as job creation and controls on food prices, as well as greater power for the semi-
elected parliament and checks on corruption. 
The oldest independent state in the Arab world, Oman has been ruled by Sultan Qaboos 
since he seized power from his father, Sultan Said bin Taimur, in 1970. 
The oil-rich country is a popular tourist destination and a long-standing ally of the U.S. 
and UK. 
Bahrain 
Unrest in the tiny island state, which started on 14 February and has left more than 25 
people dead, has been making headlines because of its status as a key U.S. ally, its 
previous image of stability and its unusual sectarian divide. 
Predominantly Shia Muslim protesters have been demanding action to tackle economic 
hardship, the lack of political freedom and discrimination in jobs in favour of the 
governing Sunni Muslim minority. 
Bahrain, home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, is unusual because, like Iraq, it is one of the few 
Arab states with a Shia majority and, as such, is seen by some as vulnerable to influence 
from Iran.  
For weeks, the demonstrators occupied the centre of the capital, Manama. 
King Hamad clamped down hard on 16 March, clearing the protesters‘ camp in a show of 
force condemned by the UN as ―shocking‖. 
He imposed a state of emergency and used hundreds of Saudi and UAE soldiers to beef 
up his security.  
Rights groups say the government has detained more than 400 people - including human 
rights activists, doctors, bloggers and opposition supporters - since the unrest started.  
Several Shia activists have complained of being tortured while in custody.  
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The monarchy has offered talks with representatives of the Shia community, but it 
rejected key opposition demands such as the sacking of his prime minister, a fellow 
member of the ruling family.  
Iran 
Long-simmering unrest over the disputed 2009 presidential election boiled over again on 
14 February. 
Thousands of people heeded calls by the two main opposition leaders to rally in the 
capital Tehran in solidarity with pro-democracy protests across the Middle East. 
Security forces cracked down on the protest.  Two people were killed and many more 
injured.  Further protests on 20 February and 1 March were also suppressed.  
Supporters of the government have been calling for the opposition leaders, Mehdi 
Karoubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, to be executed.  They have been placed under house 
arrest. 
Iran‘s complex and unusual political system combines elements of a modern Islamic 
theocracy with democracy.  Its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is a hardliner who has 
vowed to put down any protests. 
Iran‘s burgeoning nuclear programme has long been regarded with suspicion in Israel and 
the West, as has its support for militant groups in the Middle East.  
Syria—Protests (2011) 
Updated: April 20, 2011 
Syria‘s harsh and stagnant dictatorship at first seemed immune to the wave of unrest that 
swept through most of the Arab world after the revolution in Tunisia in January 2011.  
But in mid-March, demonstrations broke out in several cities, and grew rapidly after 
security forces fired on protesters. 
The country‘s president is Bashar al-Assad, the son of Hafez al-Assad, who ruled with an 
iron hand for three decades before his death in 2000.  The Assads belonged to the 
Allawite sect, a minority that came to hold most of the top positions in the government 
and military.  Under Hafez al-Assad, Syria was reviled in the West for its support of 
terrorist groups and generally isolated even from more moderate Arab countries.  Bashar 
al-Assad from time to time made gestures toward greater openness.  But it remained one 
of the region‘s most repressive regimes. 
In February 2011, after the fall of Egypt‘s strongman, Hosni Mubarak, a handful of 
demonstrations were called in Syria.  But the demonstrators were always outnumbered by 
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the police, and were quickly arrested or dispersed.  Large protests began in March in the 
southern town of Dara‘a, where citizens were outraged by the arrest of more than a dozen 
schoolchildren for writing graffiti.  More protests followed, in Dara‘a and other parts of 
the country; after a few days, the regime responded with force.  By April 18, human 
rights groups said they had documented more than 200 deaths of protesters. 
The widening defiance in Syria comes after months of challenge to the autocrats of the 
Arab world that confronts them with a stark choice: either they can step down, as the 
leaders of Tunisia and Egypt were forced to do, or they can protect their own power with 
varying degrees of force, like the rulers of Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, at the risk of ever 
greater violence. 
In Syria, the quandary seems particularly acute, with the authorities veering between 
offers of concessions and crackdowns.  On April 16, Mr. Assad pledged to meet one of 
the demonstrators‘ main demands by lifting the emergency law.  But just four days later, 
his government threatened to use the provisions of that same law to punish defiance. 
Protest Timeline 
April 19 The beleaguered government bluntly warned its people to end more than a 
month of demonstrations, just hours after it marshaled police, army and other forces to 
crush one of the biggest gatherings yet by protesters bent on staging an Egyptian-style sit-
in in the country‘s third-largest city.  The warning by the Interior Ministry—forbidding 
protests ―under any banner whatsoever‖—suggested that the government was prepared to 
escalate a crackdown on dissent.  The statement followed another crackdown by 
government forces on protests, this time in Homs, an industrial city near the Lebanese 
border, as security forces fired on a crowd of thousands of demonstrators in the city‘s 
central square.  At the same time, the government announced it would lift a decades-old 
state of emergency among other reforms that ostensibly granted civil liberties, curbed the 
power of the police and abolished draconian courts. 
April 18 More than 10,000 people occupied a central square in the Syrian city of Homs 
after funeral processions for some of the 14 people reported killed a day earlier ignited 
renewed protests. 
April 17 Rejecting the Syrian president‘s latest effort to mollify them, thousands of 
protesters took to the streets in cities and towns, using a national holiday commemorating 
the end of French colonialism to widen their challenge to his family‘s iron-fisted 
autocracy.  Security officers responded with deadly force, witnesses reported, including 
live ammunition fired at a funeral and the seizure of critically wounded demonstrators 
from a hospital. 
April 16 President Bashar al-Assad of Syria addressed his nation on in a televised speech 
aimed at appeasing a two-month-old protest movement that has posed an unprecedented 
challenge to his family‘s four decades of rule, according to human rights groups.  As he 
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swore in a new cabinet, Mr. Assad announced a raft of new legal proposals, including a 
pledge to end the country‘s 48-year-old emergency law within days, and he expressed 
sorrow for deaths that have taken place since antigovernment unrest began. 
April 15 Protesters turned out again in large numbers in cities across Syria to demand 
reforms, defying a nationwide crackdown in which dozens of demonstrators have been 
killed by security forces.  The marches on Friday were met with tear gas, beatings and 
reports of gunfire.  Seeking to tamp down the unrest, the government of President Bashar 
al-Assad had announced several measures that were meant to mollify demonstrators. 
April 13 Syria‘s growing protest movement broadened as Aleppo, one of Syria‘s largest 
cities, had its first demonstrations against the government of President Bashar al-Assad, 
and a group of women from the coastal village of Bayda, where hundreds were detained 
this week, marched to demand the release of their husbands and sons. 
April 11 Syrian security forces and pro-government gunmen killed four protesters in the 
Syrian port city of Banias.  The army had sealed off the city as hundreds of protesters 
gathered, undaunted by the government‘s use of force to quell more than three weeks of 
unrest, witnesses said.  Pro-democracy protests in Syria spread for the first time to a 
university campus and were violently suppressed, as the government made clear there 
would be ―no more room for leniency or tolerance.‖ 
April 9 Syrian security forces fired live ammunition at protesters in two cities, a day after 
the single bloodiest day of Syria‗s three-week antigovernment uprising.  In Dara, the 
security forces fired to disperse a funeral march for some of the 37 people killed in 
protests across the country a day earlier, a human rights group said. 
April 8 Gunfire erupted after prayers in the southern city of Dara‘a as security forces 
across Syria moved to counter a third week of protests against the government of 
President Bashar al-Assad. There were conflicting reports of the number of dead.  More 
than 10,000 protesters took to the streets of several cities, including the capital, 
Damascus, and a suburb where at least 15 protesters were killed last Friday in clashes 
with security forces. 
April 6 President Bashar al-Assad‗s government offered several unusual gestures 
intended to earn it good will among Sunnis and Kurds.  It announced that Syria‘s first and 
only casino, which had enraged Islamists when it opened on New Year‘s Eve, would be 
closed.  It also said that schoolteachers who had been dismissed in 2010 for wearing the 
niqab, a type of face veil, would be allowed back to work. 
April 4 The government announced that President Bashar al-Assad had appointed Adel 
Safar, the minister of agriculture for the past eight years, as the new prime minister.  
Meanwhile, thousands of Syrians marched through the shuttered streets of Douma, just 
outside Damascus, chanting antigovernment slogans as they buried at least eight victims 
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of the crackdown on protests held April 1.  Human rights groups put the death toll from 
the protests at over 100 and scores of arrests continue. 
April 1 Thousands of protesters took to the streets in cities around Syria to chants of ―We 
want freedom‖ and security forces responded with tear gas, electrified batons, clubs and 
bullets, activists and residents said in telephone interviews.  The protests, organized via 
social networking sites and using Friday prayers as a meeting point, appeared to pose a 
critical test of the strength of the movement, which in a little more than two weeks has 
presented an unprecedented challenge to the four-decade iron rule of President Bashar al-
Assad and his family. 
March 31 The government announced that it was creating committees to address the 
protesters‘ concerns but failed to promise immediate action and the move appeared 
unlikely to quell the rising tide of unrest. 
March 30 In his first address to the nation after bloody protests and calls for reform, 
President Basher al-Assad blamed a broad conspiracy from beyond his borders for 
Syria‗s turmoil and offered no concessions to ease his authoritarian regime‘s grip on 
public life. He acknowledged that ―Syrian people have demands that have not been met,‖ 
but said that those grievances were ―used as a cover to dupe the people to go to the 
streets.‖  He added that ―some of them had good intentions.‖ 
March 29 President Bashar al-Assad accepted the resignation of his cabinet as tens of 
thousands of government supporters took to the streets of the capital in an effort to 
counter a rising tide of pro-democracy protests in several cities.  The cabinet resignation 
marked a rare moment of responsiveness to public pressure by the Syrian government, 
which has taken a carrot-and-stick approach to a deepening political crisis. 
March 28 Syrian forces fired into the air to disperse hundreds of protesters in Dara‘a 
calling for an end to emergency laws, but demonstrators regrouped despite a heavy troop 
deployment, a witness said. 
March 26 President Bashar al-Assad of the ruling Baath Party began the day in what 
appeared to be a gesture intended to ease the crisis, when he announced the release of as 
many as 200 political prisoners.  But by sunset, Baath Party offices were burning in at 
least two cities, the military was deployed in Latakia and once again government forces 
opened fire with live rounds, witnesses said.  Human rights groups put the confirmed 
death toll in protests so far at 61. 
March 25 Military troops opened fire during protests in the southern part of Syria and 
killed peaceful demonstrators, according to witnesses and news reports, hurtling the 
strategically important nation into turmoil.  Tens of thousands took to the streets in 
protest around the nation, defying a state that has once again demonstrated its willingness 
to use lethal force. 
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March 23 Security forces began a crackdown in Dara‘a, after the Syrian Army reinforced 
the police presence and confronted a group of protesters who had gathered in and around 
the Omari mosque in the city center.  Mr. Assad promised increased freedoms for 
discontented citizens and increased pay and benefits for state workers.  High-ranking 
aides said that the army would not shoot peaceful demonstrators and spoke of lifting the 
50-year-old state of emergency. 
March 21 Demonstrators in Dara‘a set fire to the ruling Baath Party‗s headquarters and 
other government buildings.  Police officers fired live ammunition into the crowds, 
killing at least one and wounding scores of others, witnesses said.  Mr. Assad made some 
conciliatory gestures, but crowds continued to gather in and around the Omari mosque in 
Dara‘a, chanting their demands: the release of all political prisoners; trials for those who 
shot and killed protesters; the abolition of Syria‘s 48-year emergency law; more 
freedoms; and an end to pervasive corruption. 
Background to Protests 
The country‘s last serious stirrings of public discontent had come in 1982, when 
increasingly violent skirmishes with the Muslim Brotherhood prompted Hafez al-Assad 
to move against them, sending troops to kill at least 10,000 people and smashing the old 
city of Hama.  Hundreds of fundamentalist leaders were jailed, many never seen alive 
again. 
Syria has a liability not found in the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt—it is a 
majority Sunni nation that is ruled by a religious minority, the Alawite sect of Shiite 
Islam.  Hafez Assad forged his power base through fear, cooption and sect loyalty.  He 
built an alliance with an elite Sunni business community, and created multiple security 
services staffed primarily by Alawites.  Those security forces have a great deal to lose if 
the government falls, experts said, because they are part of a widely despised minority, 
and so have the incentive of self-preservation. 
Foreign Policy 
Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Syria was once again vilified as a 
dangerous pariah.  It was linked to the 2005 killing of a former Lebanese prime minister, 
Rafik Hariri.  In 2007, Israeli jets destroyed buildings in Syria that intelligence officials 
said might have been the first stage in a nuclear weapons program.  And the United States 
and its Arab allies mounted a vigorous campaign to isolate Damascus, which they 
accused of sowing chaos and violence throughout the middle east through its support for 
militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. 
President Obama came into office pledging to engage with Syria, arguing that the Bush 
administration‘s efforts to isolate Syria had done nothing to wean it from Iran or 
encourage Middle East peace efforts.  So far, however, the engagement has been limited.  
American diplomats have visited Damascus, but have reiterated the same priorities as the 
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Bush administration: protesting Syria‘s military support to Hezbollah and Hamas, and its 
strong ties with Iran. 
Secret State Department cables obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to several 
news organizations show that arms transactions involving Syria and Hezbollah continue 
to greatly concern the Obama administration.  Hezbollah‘s arsenal now includes up to 
50,000 rockets and missiles, including some 40 to 50 Fateh-110 missiles capable of 
reaching Tel Aviv and most of Israel, and 10 Scud-D missiles. 
―Syria‘s determined support of Hizballah‘s military build-up, particularly the steady 
supply of longer-range rockets and the introduction of guided missiles could change the 
military balance and produce a scenario significantly more destructive than the July-
August 2006 war,‖ said a November 2009 cable from the American chargé d‘affaires in 
Damascus. 
According to cables, Syrian leaders appeared to believe that the weapons shipments 
increased their political leverage with the Israelis.  But they made Lebanon even more of 
a tinderbox and increased the prospect that a future conflict might include Syria. 
The Hariri Case 
Also looming is potential new trouble in Lebanon, where a United Nations-backed 
international tribunal is expected to indict members of Hezbollah in the death of Mr. 
Hariri.  Hezbollah and its allies—including high-ranking Syrian officials—have warned 
that an indictment could set off civil conflict. 
The United States withdrew its ambassador in 2005 after Mr. Hariri was killed in a car 
bombing in Beirut along with 22 others.  Syria was widely accused of having 
orchestrated the killing, though it has vehemently denied involvement.  The Bush 
administration imposed economic sanctions on Syria, as part of a broader effort to isolate 
the government of President Bashar al-Assad. 
The current chill is a significant change from the situation a few years ago, when Mr. al-
Assad showed signs of wanting warmer relations with the West than his father, Hafez al-
Assad, had ever pursued.  President Nicolas Sarkozy of France led the way with a visit in 
September 2008.  King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who was said to be furious at the 
Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, welcomed him warmly in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in 
March 2009.  And Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel hinted at a revival of talks on the 
Golan Heights -- a prospect that faded when Mr. Olmert was succeeded by the more 
conservative Benjamin Netanyahu.  
Libya, an oil-rich nation in North Africa, has been under the firm, if sometimes erratic, 
leadership of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi since he seized power in 1969.  But in February 
2011, the unrest sweeping through much of the Arab world erupted in several Libyan 
cities.  Though it began with a relatively organized core of antigovernment opponents in 
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Benghazi, its spread to the capital of Tripoli was swift and spontaneous.  Colonel Qaddafi 
lashed out with a level of violence unseen in either of the other uprisings, but an inchoate 
opposition cobbled together the semblance of a transitional government, fielded a 
makeshift rebel army and portrayed itself to the West and Libyans as an alternative to 
Colonel Qaddafi‘s erratic control. 
Momentum shifted quickly, however, and the rebels faced the possibility of being 
outgunned and outnumbered in what increasingly looked like a mismatched civil war.  As 
Colonel Qaddafi‘s troops advanced to within 100 miles of Benghazi, the rebel stronghold 
in the west, the United Nations Security Council voted to authorize military action, a 
risky foreign intervention aimed at averting a bloody rout of the rebels by loyalist forces.  
On March 19, American and European forces began a broad campaign of strikes against 
Colonel Qaddafi and his government, unleashing warplanes and missiles in a military 
intervention on a scale not seen in the Arab world since the Iraq war. 
The attacks prompted two of Colonel Qaddafi‘s sons to float a proposal that would 
remove him from power, which the rebels rejected.  Meanwhile, their ragtag forces 
surged forward and back, unable to make progress against the army despite the help from 
above but no longer in grave peril.  In mid-April, Britain, France and Italy said they 
would send military liaison officers to help the rebels, a tacit admission that the airstrikes 
had failed to disable the government‘s forces. 
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS: 
April 20 The French and Italian governments said that they would join Britain in sending 
a small number of military liaison officers to support the ragtag rebel army in Libya, 
offering a diplomatic boost for the insurgent leader, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, as he met with 
President Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris. 
April 19 Britain will send experienced military officers to Libya to advise rebels fighting 
forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The soldiers marching orders are to help the 
rebels‘ makeshift force ―improve their military organizational structures, communications 
and logistics,‖ Britain‘s foreign secretary, William Hague, said in a statement. 
April 15 Forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, surrounding Misurata and vowing to 
crush the rebellion there, fired into residential neighborhoods with heavy weapons, 
including cluster bombs, which were banned by much of the world. And divisions in 
NATO over the intensity of the air campaign emerged again on the second day of a 
gathering of foreign ministers.  While the British foreign secretary said efforts to 
persuade more countries to adopt a tougher military posture toward the forces of Colonel 
Qaddafi were ―making a bit of progress,‖ the Italian defense minister said his country 
would not order its pilots to open fire over Libya. 
April 14 NATO foreign ministers gathered to wrestle with increasingly complex 
questions raised by the stalled conflict in Libya, seeking a formula for political progress 
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in the absence of any decisive military gains.  Pentagon officials disclosed that American 
warplanes had continued to strike targets there even after the Obama administration said 
the United States was stepping back from offensive missions and letting NATO take the 
lead. 
April 13 NATO, Arab and African ministers met with Libya‗s rebels here in a show of 
support for insurgents who are seeking to overthrow Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi against a 
backdrop of division over the pace of coalition air attacks on pro-Qaddafi forces. France 
and Britain have openly called on the alliance and its partners to intensify airstrikes on 
Libyan government troops to protect civilians, prompting an unusual public retort from 
NATO‘s command. 
April 11 African Union negotiators faced a chilly reception upon arriving in eastern 
Libya to try brokering a cease-fire with Libyan rebels, a day after Col. Muammar el-
Qaddafi‗s military forces appeared to falter in their assault against the rebel side in the 
battle for the strategic city of Ajdabiya. 
April 9 Military forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi pressed a coordinated ground 
attack on Ajdabiya, bringing the front lines of the battle with Libyan opposition forces 
back to the doorstep of this strategically vital rebel city. 
April 6 Stung by criticism from rebel leaders, NATO officials said that the pace of 
attacks on the forces of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi was increasing, after a slight 
slowdown as the coalition handed off responsibility earlier in the week. Gen. Abdul 
Fattah Younes, the head of the rebel army, had lashed out at his Western allies during a 
news conference in Benghazi, accusing NATO of tardiness and indecision. 
April 5 Forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi battered rebel fighters on the road 
outside the strategic oil town of Brega with rocket fire, mortars and artillery, driving them 
many miles to the north and leaving them in disarray. Colonel Qaddafi‘s son, Seif al-
Islam, promised in a television interview to usher in a new era of constitutional 
democracy in which his father would be a mere figurehead ―like the queen of England.‖ 
April 4 The United States began to remove its warplanes from front-line missions in 
Libya and focus on a support role there.  The changeover came as diplomatic 
maneuvering quickened with Turkey announcing efforts to secure a cease-fire and Italy 
saying it was recognizing the rebels seeking to oust Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, only the 
third country to do so.  The Obama administration also dropped financial sanctions 
against Moussa Kousa, the top Libyan official who fled to Britain, saying it hoped the 
move would encourage other senior aides to abandon Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the 
country‘s embattled leader. 
April 3 At least two sons of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi are proposing a resolution to the 
Libyan conflict that would entail pushing their father aside to make way for a transition 
to a constitutional democracy under the direction of his son Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi. At 
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the same time, as the struggle with Colonel Qaddafi threatened to settle into a stalemate, 
the rebel government here was showing growing strains that imperil its struggle to 
complete a revolution and jeopardize requests for foreign military aid and recognition. 
April 1 A senior aide to one of Col Muammar el-Qaddafi‗s sons held secret talks in 
London with British authorities, adding to the confusion swirling around the Tripoli 
regime.  East of Brega, the Libyan rebels prepared for a further attempt to wrest the 
momentum of ground fighting away from Colonel Qaddafi‘s forces after days of see-
sawing advances and retreats.  In Washington, President Obama‗s top two national 
security officials signaled that the United States was unlikely to arm the rebels.  Members 
of the NATO alliance said they had sternly warned the rebels not to attack civilians.  
Timeline: Qaddafi 
March 31 Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi‘s forces pushed rebels into a panicked retreat and 
seized valuable oil towns they ceded just days ago under allied airstrikes.  Libya‗s foreign 
minister, Moussa Koussa, defected to London, dealing a blow to Colonel Qaddafi‘s 
government even as his forces made military advances.  American officials revealed that 
the Central Intelligence Agency has inserted clandestine operatives into Libya to gather 
intelligence for military airstrikes and to contact and vet the beleaguered rebels. 
March 30 Leaders of four dozen countries meeting in London agreed that Col. Muammar 
el-Qaddafi would have to relinquish power, even though regime change is not the stated 
aim of the United Nations resolution authorizing military action against his forces.  With 
the momentum of ground combat tilting in favor of forces loyal to Colonel Qaddafi, 
rebels seeking to oust him embarked on a large-scale withdrawal from the coastal oil 
town of Brega, falling back toward the strategically located city of Ajdabiya.  The Obama 
administration engaged in a fierce debate over whether to supply weapons to the rebels, 
with some fearful that providing arms would deepen American involvement in a civil war 
and that some fighters may have links to Al Qaeda. 
March 29 In his first major address since ordering American airstrikes, President Obama 
defended the American-led military assault in Libya, saying it was in the national interest 
of the United States to stop a potential massacre and that the assault would be limited.  
An array of diplomats and public figures gathered in London to shape their political 
vision of a post-Qaddafi era.  In Libya, rebels seeking the ouster of Colonel Quaddafi 
traded rocket fire with loyalist forces, who have blunted the insurgents‘ westward 
advance.  At the same time, American warplanes appeared to have opened a new line of 
attack on pro-Qaddafi forces, firing on three Libyan vessels off the contested western port 
of Misurata. 
BACKGROUND 
Colonel Qaddafi took power in a bloodless coup in September 1969 and has ruled with an 
iron fist, seeking to spread Libya‘s influence in Africa.  He has built his rule on a cult of 
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personality and a network of family and tribal alliances supported by largess from 
Libya‘s oil revenues. 
The United States withdrew its ambassador from Libya in 1972 after Colonel Qaddafi 
renounced agreements with the West and repeatedly inveighed against the United States 
in speeches and public statements. 
After a mob sacked and burned the American Embassy in 1979, the United States cut off 
relations.  But the relationship did not reach its nadir until 1986, when the Reagan 
administration accused Libya of ordering the bombing of a German discothèque that 
killed three people.  In response, the United States bombed targets in Tripoli and 
Benghazi. 
The most notorious of Libya‘s actions was the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103 
over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people.  Libya later accepted responsibility, 
turned over suspects and paid families of victims more than $2 billion. 
After a surprise decision to renounce terrorism in 2003, Colonel Qaddafi re-established 
diplomatic and economic ties throughout Europe.  He had also changed with regard to 
Israel.  The man who once called for pushing the ‗‗Zionists‘‘ into the sea advocated the 
forming of one nation where Jews and Palestinians would live together in peace. 
Rather than trying to destabilize his Arab neighbors, he founded a pan-African 
confederation modeled along the lines of the European Union.  On Feb. 2, 2009, Colonel 
Qaddafi was named chairman of the African Union.  His election, however, caused some 
unease among some of the group‘s 53-member nations as well as among diplomats and 
analysts.  The colonel, who has ruled Libya with an iron hand, was a stark change from 
the succession of recent leaders from democratic countries like Tanzania, Ghana and 
Nigeria. 
The most significant changes had been the overtures Colonel Qaddafi has made toward 
the United States.  He was among the first Arab leaders to denounce the Sept. 11 attacks, 
and he lent tacit approval to the American-led invasion of Afghanistan.  To the 
astonishment of other Arab leaders, he reportedly shared his intelligence files on Al 
Qaeda with the United States to aid in the hunt for its international operatives.  He had 
also cooperated with the United States and Europe on nuclear weapons, terrorism and 
immigration issues. 
In August 2009, Colonel Qaddafi embarrassed the British government and drew criticism 
from President Obama with his triumphant reaction to the release from prison of Abdel 
Basset Ali al-Megahit, the only person convicted in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.  
Mr. Megrahi was given a hero‘s welcome when he arrived in Libya, and Colonel Qaddafi 
thanked British and Scottish officials for releasing Mr. Megrahi at a time that they were 
trying to distance themselves from the action. 
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Colonel Qaddafi, born in 1942, is the father of many sons who are now jockeying to 
succeed him.  Experts say his eldest, Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, is the current leader.  
Educated in Britain, well-dressed and fluent in English, he has been a bridge between the 
Libya power centers and the West. 
Prior to the 2011 unrest, the only hint of potential change in Libya came from Seif al-
Islam el-Qaddafi, who spoke of dismantling a legacy of Socialism and authoritarianism 
introduced by his father 40 years ago.  Seif Qaddafi proposed far-reaching ideas: tax-free 
investment zones, a tax haven for foreigners, the abolition of visa requirements and the 
development of luxury hotels. 
Seif Qaddafi liked to boast that his country could be ―the Dubai of North Africa,‖ he said, 
citing Libya‘s proximity to Europe (the flight from London to Tripoli is under three 
hours), its abundant energy reserves and 1,200 miles of mostly unspoiled Mediterranean 
coastline.  Libya is wealthier than debt-ridden, oil-poor Dubai.  Its $15,000 gross 
domestic product per person ranks it above Poland, Mexico and Chile, according to the 
World Bank.  The government‘s sovereign fund, a reserve of oil revenues, boasts $65 
billion.  And the government has announced plans to invest $130 billion over the next 
three years to improve infrastructure. 
But the reality of daily life in Tripoli remained far removed from those lofty notions.  The 
streets were strewn with garbage, there were gaping holes in the sidewalks, tourist-
friendly hotels and restaurants were few and far between.  And while a number of seaside 
hotels were being built, the city largely ignored its most spectacular asset, the 
Mediterranean. 
Unemployment is estimated as high as 30 percent and much of the potential work force is 
insufficiently trained. 
Uprising in Libya 
In February 2011, protests broke out in several parts of Libya on a so-called Day of Rage 
to challenge Colonel Qaddafi‘s 41-year-old iron rule—the region‘s longest.  Thousands 
turned out in the restive city of Benghazi; in Tripoli; and at three other locations, 
according to Human Rights Watch.  The state media, though, showed Libyans waving 
green flags and shouting in support of Colonel Qaddafi. 
Trying to demonstrate that he was still in control, Colonel Qaddafi appeared on television 
on Feb. 22, 2011, speaking from his residence on the grounds of an army barracks in 
Tripoli that still showed scars from when the United States bombed it in 1986.            
Colonel Qaddafi, who took power in a military coup, has always kept the Libyan military 
too weak and divided to rebel against him.  About half of Libya‘s relatively small 50,000-
member army is made up of poorly trained and unreliable conscripts, according to the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
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Many of its battalions are organized along tribal lines, ensuring their loyalty to their own 
clan rather than to top military commanders—a pattern evident in the defection of 
portions of the army to help protesters take the eastern city of Benghazi.  Some Libyans 
and scholars outside the country say this system of tribal alliances, long Colonel 
Qaddafi‘s most potent weapon, is now emerging as perhaps a potential vulnerability. 
His own clan dominates the air force and the upper level of army officers, and they are 
believed to have remained loyal to him, in part because his clan has the most to lose from 
his ouster. 
Distrustful of his own generals, he built up an elaborate paramilitary force—accompanied 
by special segments of the regular army that report primarily to his family.  It is designed 
to check the army and in part to subdue his own population.  At the top of that structure is 
his roughly 3,000-member revolutionary guard corps, which mainly guards him 
personally. 
But perhaps the most significant force that Colonel Qaddafi has deployed against the 
current insurrection is one believed to consist of about 2,500 ruthless mercenaries from 
countries like Chad, Sudan and Niger that he calls his Islamic Pan African Brigade. 
The Ongoing Conflict 
On Feb. 25, security forces loyal to Colonel Qaddafi used gunfire to try to disperse 
thousands of protesters who streamed out of mosques after prayers to mount their first 
major challenge to the government‘s crackdown in Tripoli.  Rebel leaders said they were 
sending forces from nearby cities and other parts of the country to join the fight. 
The ring of rebel control around Tripoli tightened, but in a sign that the fight was far from 
over, armed government forces massed around the city. 
The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Colonel 
Qaddafi and his inner circle of advisers, and called for an international war crimes 
investigation into ―widespread and systemic attacks‖ against Libyan citizens. 
On March 2, rebels in the strategic oil city of Brega repelled an attack by hundreds of 
Colonel Qaddafi‘s fighters.  The daylong battle was the first major incursion by the 
colonel‘s forces in the rebel-held east of the country since the Libyan uprising began. 
Air power proved to be Colonel Qaddafi‘s biggest advantage, and rebels were unable to 
use bases and planes they captured in the east.  Planes and helicopters gave the Qaddafi 
forces an additional advantage in moving ammunition and supplies, a crucial factor given 
the length of the Libyan coast between the rebel stronghold of Benghazi and Tripoli. 
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As Colonel Qaddafi‘s forces tried to retake a series of strategic oil towns on the east coast 
of the country, which fell early in the rebellion to antigovernment rebels, the West 
continued to debate what actions to take. 
Western Involvement  
After days of often acrimonious debate played out against a desperate clock, the Security 
Council authorized member nations to take ―all necessary measures‖ to protect civilians, 
diplomatic code words calling for military action.  Benghazi erupted in celebration at 
news of the resolution‘s passage. 
A military campaign against Colonel Qaddafi, under British and French leadership, was 
launched less than 48 hours later.  American forces mounted a campaign to knock out 
Libya‘s air defense systems, firing volley after volley of Tomahawk missiles from nearby 
ships against missile, radar and communications centers.  Within a week allied air strikes 
had averted a rout by Colonel Qaddafi of Benghazi and established a no-fly zone over 
Libya. 
The campaign, however, was dogged by friction over who should command the 
operation, with the United States eventually handing off its lead role to NATO, and by 
uncertainty over its ultimate goal.  Western leaders acknowledged that there was no 
endgame beyond the immediate United Nations authorization to protect Libyan civilians, 
and it was uncertain whether even military strikes would force Colonel Qaddafi from 
power. 
In a nationally televised speech March 28, President Obama defended the American-led 
military assault, emphasizing that it would be limited and insisting that America had the 
responsibility and the international backing to stop what he characterized as a looming 
genocide.  At the same time, he said, directing American troops to forcibly remove 
Colonel Qaddafi from power would be a step too far, and would ―splinter‖ the 
international coalition that has moved against the Libyan government. 
The question of the opposition‘s capabilities is likely to prove decisive to the fate of the 
rebellion, which no longer appears outmatched by government forces or troubled by 
tribal divisions that the government sought to exploit. 
But as they seek to capitalize on the damage from Western airstrikes, rebel forces in 
Libya are fired more by enthusiasm than experience.  The political leadership has 
virtually begged the international community to recognize it, but it has yet to impose its 
authority in regions it nominally controls. 
Meanwhile, the American military warned that the insurgents‘ rapid advances could 




Yemen is a poor, deeply divided country that has been in turmoil since January 2011, 
when the example of the Tunisian revolution set off mass demonstrations against 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Mr. Saleh, who has been in power since 1978, responded 
alternately with conciliatory measures, including a promise including an offer not to seek 
reelection, and violent crackdowns, 
As demonstrations continued, Mr. Saleh‘s support began to crumble, as some army 
commanders and tribal leaders called for his ouster.  The United States, which had long 
supported Mr. Saleh, even in the face of the protests, quietly shifted positions after 
concluding that he is unlikely to bring about the required reforms and must be eased out 
of office.  On April 7, an organization of oil-rich Persian Gulf states joined the increasing 
number of international voices calling for a transfer of presidential powers in which Mr. 
Saleh would hand power to a government of national unity. 
The turning point appears to have come on March 18 in a bloody but failed attempt to 
break the back of the protest.  As tens of thousands of demonstrators raised from their 
noon prayers, security forces and government supporters opened fire.  At least 50 people 
were killed and more than 100 injured, dwarfing the level of violence in previous clashes, 
but it failed to disperse the crowd.  Mr. Saleh declared a state of emergency shortly after 
the violence, and denied that security forces had been involved in any shooting. 
As the demonstrations continued, Mr. Saleh fired his cabinet.  On March 21, five army 
commanders and one of the country‘s most important tribal leaders threw their support 
behind the protesters, calling for Mr. Saleh‘s immediate ouster.  A stream of Yemeni 
officials resigned from the government, including the mayor of the restive southern city 
of Aden, a provincial governor and at least one of the country‘s ambassadors. 
Yemen‘s opposition coalition, the Joint Meetings Parties, proposed a plan under which 
Mr. Saleh would leave at the end of 2011, and he agreed.  But protesters then rejected the 
plan and called for Mr. Saleh‘s immediate ouster.  Opposition leaders said they would 
travel to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, at the end of April to meet with Gulf Cooperation 
Council officials about an initiative discussed earlier in the month.  It calls for Mr. Saleh 
to transfer presidential powers to his deputy and leave office.  The draft agreement also 
gives the president and his family immunity from prosecution, presumably to head off a 
situation similar to that in Egypt, where the military has detained former President Hosni 
Mubarak and his two sons. 
Meanwhile, protests and deadly clashes with security forces continue, and rival military 
factions allied with the government and the rebels fought in Sana on April 13.  More than 




Home to one of the world‘s oldest civilizations, Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab 
world as well as a haven for Islamic jihadists and the site of what amounts to a secret 
American war against leaders of a branch that Al Qaeda has established there. 
Until the protests, the world‘s attention had mainly been focused on fears that the country 
could become Al Qaeda‗s next operational and training hub, rivaling the lawless tribal 
areas of Pakistan.  Yemen‘s stability was of increasing concern to the United States, 
which has provided $250 million in military aid in the past five years.  The Obama 
administration was nurturing enduring ties with Mr. Saleh‘s government to prod him to 
combat Al Qaeda.  The U.S. military was conducting airstrikes even before the Christmas 
Day 2009 attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound jet by a 23-year-old Nigerian man who 
later claimed that Qaeda leaders in Yemen had trained and equipped him. 
The delicate position of the United States in dealing with Mr. Saleh now seems as evident 
in Yemen as it is in Bahrain, where pro-American leaders have cracked down on 
adversaries on the street clamoring for the monarchy to make way for democratic change. 
Diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to several news 
organizations offered an intimate view of the wily, irreverent and sometimes erratic 
Yemeni autocrat.  Mr. Saleh has sometimes accommodated and other times rebuffed 
American requests on counter terrorism. 
History 
With its location at the southwestern end of the Arabian Peninsula, the land of ancient 
Yemen became rich from the spice trade.  So rich that the Romans called the land Arabia 
Felix—Happy Arabia—and Augustus Caesar tried, but failed, to annex it.  That 
prosperity overlapped with the rule of an Islamic caliphate in the 7th century.  When the 
caliphate broke up, Islamic imams exerted control, sowing the seeds of a theocratic 
political system that would survive for centuries. 
Northern Yemen became part of the Ottoman Empire.  Southern Yemen was in the hands 
of the British after 1839, when they built a protectorate around their port of Aden.  North 
Yemen would become independent of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and declare itself a 
republic in 1962; it was not until 1967 that the British withdrew from southern Yemen. 
When Marxists took over the government of southern Yemen in 1970, many people fled 
to the north, and a civil war raged for two decades.  The conflict became a proxy conflict 
in the cold war, with the Soviet Union aiding South Yemen, and the United States 
bolstering the north. 
Though north and south were unified as the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990, the 
violence and internecine conflict did not end.  The country‘s extreme topography—with 
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dramatically rugged mountains and remote deserts—helped create impenetrable 
fortresses for warring tribes, which have long attacked government officials and foreign 
tourists, as well as one another. 
Today Yemen faces a violent separatist movement in the south and an intermittent 
rebellion in the northwest, though President Saleh has expertly played Yemen‘s various 
tribes and factions against one another for decades.  When one of the country‘s most 
prominent tribal sheiks, Hussein al-Ahmar, resigned from the ruling party, it was a deeply 
troubling sign for the regime. 
Al Qaeda in Yemen 
Much of the violent tribal feuds, banditry and kidnapping in Yemen appear beyond the 
control of the central government.  Yemen has the region‘s largest arms market: the 
country, with roughly 20 million people, is said to have at least 20 million guns. 
Yemen did not become a special concern for the United States until 2000, when Qaeda 
operatives blasted a hole in the American destroyer Cole, killing 17 sailors.  After the 
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, Yemen joined in a counterterrorism partnership with the 
United States, and its American-trained forces had some successes in fighting jihadists, 
even as terrorist attacks on foreign targets continued sporadically. 
The jihadists claiming allegiance to Al Qaeda appear to have reorganized and become 
more methodical, releasing more propaganda materials on the Internet and carrying out 
more attacks.  In July 2007, suicide bombers killed seven Spanish tourists in eastern 
Yemen, and there were two unsuccessful attacks on oil installations.  In September 2008, 
10 people were killed (none of them Americans) when two car bombs were detonated 
outside the American embassy in Sana, the capital. 
Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric now hiding in Yemen, is perhaps the most 
sophisticated ideological opponent the United States has faced since 2001.  Several 
former Guantánamo detainees fled in 2009 to Yemen from Saudi Arabia and pledged to 
mount attacks on Saudi Arabia and other countries from their Yemeni redoubt. 
Despite the American airstrike campaign, the leadership of Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula survives, and there is little sign the group is much weaker.  Attacks by Qaeda 
militants in Yemen have conducted several deadly assaults on Yemeni army convoys.  Al 
Qaeda‘s Yemen branch regularly puts out its first English-language online magazine, 
Inspire, complete with bomb-making instructions. 
An Uncertain Future 
Whether or not Mr. Saleh is forced from power, the political crisis in Yemen will likely 
remain acute, not only because of its tribal culture and topography, but also because of its 
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deep poverty, high illiteracy and birth rates, and deeply entrenched government 
corruption.  Its economy is precariously tied to oil resources, which are declining rapidly. 
The governing elite mainly come from the Sunni majority, which makes up 55 percent of 
the population and is concentrated in the more developed coastal regions of the south and 
southwest.  A Shiite movement, based in the mountainous north, declared independence 
and its intermittent rebellion has left thousands of people dead since it began in 2004. 
The government is also deeply unpopular in the remote provinces where Al Qaeda 
militants have sought sanctuary.  The tribes there tend to regularly switch sides, making it 
difficult to depend on them for information about Al Qaeda.  ―My state is anyone who 
fills my pocket with money,‖ goes one old tribal motto. 
The current democracy protesters may mark a change from that mindset.  During 
February‘s protests in Taiz, long been a bastion of opposition sentiment, a local cleric 
preached to the crowds of men and women sitting on the pavement. 
―This is not a revolution against a person, a family or a tribe,‖ he said over a loudspeaker 
to the gathering, which stretched over blocks and blocks of the city‘s streets.  ―This is a 
revolution against oppression and corruption.‖ 
For years, Mr. Saleh managed tribal-dominated Yemen by propping up scores of 
carefully chosen tribal leaders, giving them money and weapons and placing them in 
important positions in government.  The loyalty of these empowered sheiks largely 
guaranteed the loyalty of their followers. 
But tribesmen from rural areas made up the majority of the tens of thousands spending 
day and night at the demonstration in Sana.  With large numbers of them unemployed, 
their vow to stay at Sana‘s encampment until Mr. Saleh steps down carried weight. 
Tunisia 
Until January 2011 Tunisia was known mostly as the most European country of North 
Africa, with a relatively large middle class, liberal social norms, broad gender equality 
and welcoming Mediterranean beaches.  But now it has taken center stage as the 
launching pad of a wave of revolt that has swept through the Arab world and beyond. 
For all its modern traits, Tunisia had one of the most repressive governments in a region 
full of police states, and levels of corruption among its elite that became intolerable once 
the economic malaise that has gripped southern Europe spread to the country. 
In what became known as the Jasmine Revolution, a sudden and explosive wave of street 
protests ousted the authoritarian president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled with 
an iron hand for 23 years.  On January 14, Mr. Ben Ali left the country, after trying 
unsuccessfully to placate the demonstrators with promises of elections.  According to 
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government figures issued later, 78 protesters died and 94 were injured during the 
demonstrations. 
Interim Government and Continued Protest 
The prime minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, created a government of unity, bringing in 
members of the official opposition, to serve as an interim government until elections 
could be held in mid-year.  But turmoil continued, with new rounds of protests, streams 
of refugees leaving Tunisia for Europe or entering from Libya.  On Feb. 27, Mr. 
Gannouchi resigned in response to complaints that he was too closely tied to Mr. Ben Ali. 
Some protesters have called for the complete eradication of the old ruling party, while 
complaining that outlawed parties like the once powerful Islamist groups or the Tunisian 
Communists—battle-scarred stalwarts of the long dissident fight against Mr. Ben Ali‘s 
23-year-rule—were still barred from participating.  That movement‘s potential 
reincarnation is perhaps the most significant variable in Tunisia‘s post-revolutionary 
future—yearned for by legions of working-class and rural Tunisians, viewed with just as 
much apprehension by the cosmopolitan coastal elite. 
The revolution, as Tunisians call it, also has created a power vacuum, and Tunisia faces 
enormous challenges in rebuilding its political system.  The country‘s caretaker 
government has been confronted with nearly daily protests by a variety of groups, the 
police force has been badly weakened by mass desertions and the firing of top officials, 
and provincial government offices remain dysfunctional.  The judicial system is hobbled 
by its links to the ousted regime. 
The head of a Tunisian government commission on political reform warned on Feb. 22 
that the country risked falling into ―anarchy‖ as it passed through what he described as a 
very dangerous post-revolutionary transition toward multiparty democracy. 
Birth of a Movement 
The Tunisian revolution began in December 2010, after a college-educated street vendor 
burned himself to death in protest of his dismal prospects amid Tunisia‘s poverty.  A 
wave of violent demonstrations spread, of the kind not seen since Mr. Ben Ali came to 
power 23 years ago in a bloodless coup.  Dozens died as security forces fired on 
protesters. 
The protesters came together after circulating calls to rally over social networks like 
Facebook and Twitter.  Many were unemployed college graduates, and they angrily 
demanded more jobs and denounced what they called the self-enrichment of Tunisia‘s 
ruling family. 
It is not religion, nor the adventures of a single leader, nor wars with Israel that have 
energized Tunisia, the subsequent uprising in Egypt and elsewhere in the region.  Across 
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the Middle East, a somewhat nostalgic notion of a common Arab identity, intersecting 
with a visceral sense of what amounts to a decent life, is driving protests that have bound 
the region in a sense of a shared destiny. 
A remarkable two-year collaboration gave birth to a new force in the Arab world—a pan-
Arab youth movement dedicated to spreading democracy in a region without it.  Young 
Egyptian and Tunisian activists brainstormed on the use of technology to evade 
surveillance, commiserated about torture and traded practical tips on how to stand up to 
rubber bullets and organize barricades. 
They fused their secular expertise in social networks with a discipline culled from 
religious movements and combined the energy of soccer fans with the sophistication of 
surgeons.  Breaking free from older veterans of the Arab political opposition, they relied 
on tactics of nonviolent resistance channeled from an American scholar through a Serbian 
youth brigade—but also on marketing tactics borrowed from Silicon Valley. 
Rulers’ Lavish Lifestyles Fueled Anger 
Protesters seemed to direct much of their anger at the great wealth and lavish life of 
President Ben Ali‘s second wife, Leila Trabelsi, a former hairdresser, and their extended 
family, most notably their son-in-law, the billionaire businessman Mohamed Sakher El 
Materi. 
A gracious dinner at Mr. Materi‘s home was detailed in a cable from the American 
ambassador to Tunisia that was released by the anti-secrecy organization WikiLeaks and 
fueled at least some of the outrage: a beachfront compound decorated with Roman 
artifacts; ice cream and frozen yogurt flown from St. Tropez, France; a Bangladeshi 
butler and South African nanny; and a pet tiger in a cage. 
State television reported the arrests for ―crimes against Tunisia‖ of 33 members of Mr. 
Ben Ali‘s family.  The government also said its prosecutors had opened an investigation 
into the family‘s overseas assets, while the Swiss government moved to freeze their 
assets in Swiss banks. 
Dismantling a Repressive Regime 
On Feb. 22, 2011, the head of a Tunisian government commission, which is tasked with 
dismantling the repressive laws of the Ben Ali government, warned that the country faced 
a dangerous transition as it struggled toward multiparty democracy. 
Yadh Ben Achour, a prominent lawyer who is the head of the country‘s Higher Political 
Reform Commission, said Tunisia would miss the two-month deadline stipulated in its 
Constitution for a presidential election to replace Mr. Ben Ali.  It would be impossible to 
organize elections before the March 15 deadline, he said. 
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Tunisians cannot agree whether to change the current Constitution or discard it and elect 
a constitutional assembly that would write a new one, he said.  The commission may also 
help draft a new constitution, a process, he said, that risked being bogged down by 
politicians focusing on narrow interests and not the future of the country. 
Egypt News—Revolution and Aftermath 
Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, erupted in mass protests in January 
2011, as the revolution in Tunisia inflamed decades worth of smoldering grievances 
against the heavy-handed rule of President Hosni Mubarak. After 18 days of angry 
protests and after losing of the support of the military and the United States, Mr. Mubarak 
resigned on Feb. 11, ending 30 years of autocratic rule.  The military stepped forward and 
took power.  It quickly suspended unpopular provisions of the constitution, even while 
cracking down on continuing demonstrations.  On March 19, a set of constitutional 
amendments that pave the way for elections was overwhelmingly approved in a 
referendum that drew record numbers of voters.  But anger over what many 
demonstrators saw as the military‘s loyalty to the core of Mr. Mubarak‘s government and 
the slow pace of change led to new mass protests and violence in April. 
April 16 Egypt‗s Supreme Administrative Court officially relegated the once-supreme 
National Democratic Party to history, ruling that the party would be dissolved and its 
assets seized by the government. 
April 13 Egyptian authorities said the former president and his two sons were being 
detained for 15 days for questioning about corruption and the abuse of power during Mr. 
Mubarak‘s three-decade rule. 
April 11 Former President Mubarak spoke for the first time since being deposed in an 
audiotape, denying that he and his family had amassed wealth overseas and defending his 
honor and legacy.  An Egyptian blogger was sentenced to three years in prison for 
criticizing the military in what human rights advocates called one of the more alarming 
violations of freedom of expression since the beginning of the revolution. 
April 9 Egypt‘s security forces shot and killed at least two protesters and injured dozens 
more in a predawn attempt to disperse peaceful demonstrators spending the night in the 
capital‘s iconic Tahrir Square, according to government security officials and witnesses.  
The crackdown was the most brutal since the overthrow of former President Mubarak on 
Feb. 11 and since the military started running the country. 
April 8 Tens of thousands gathered in Cairo‘s central Tahrir Square, waving flags and 
demanding the prosecution of the ousted president, Hosni Mubarak, and his family in a 
sign of Egyptians‘ growing anger with the slow pace of change under the new military 
rulers.  The protest was being called the ―Friday of Warning.‖  In government ministries, 
factories and especially universities, daily protests have focused on those viewed as Mr. 
Mubarak‘s surrogates.  Demonstrators complain that the dreaded secret police vetted 
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every candidate for an important job under Mr. Mubarak, and that now the country 
deserves a clean slate. 
March 31 Egypt‘s military rulers announced a new interim constitution replacing the one 
suspended when President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on Feb. 11, incorporating the 
amendments approved by voters in the March 19 referendum.  In addition the 18-member 
ruling council said it would hand over legislative powers after the parliamentary election 
in September 2011, and that executive powers would be transferred after the presidential 
election, which will be held by November. 
March 29 The military command announced that parliamentary elections would not be 
held until September 2011, meeting the demands of opposition leaders who wanted more 
time to organize political parties.  The presidential election, scheduled for August, was 
also postponed.  The command also revealed that the ousted president, Hosni Mubarak, 
has been prohibited from leaving the country, and that it would soon lift the detested 
emergency law, among a number of announcements intended to shore up diminishing 
support for the armed forces council ruling the nation. 
March 20 Egyptian voters overwhelmingly approved a referendum on constitutional 
changes that will usher in rapid elections, with the results underscoring the strength of 
established political organizations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
weakness of emerging liberal groups. More than 14.1 million voters, or 77.2 percent, 
approved the constitutional amendments; 4 million, or 22.8 percent, voted against them.  
The turnout of 41 percent among the 45 million eligible voters broke all records for 
recent elections, according to the Egyptian government. 
Background 
Egypt is a heavyweight in Middle East diplomacy, in part because of its peace treaty with 
Israel, and as a key ally of the United States.  The country, often the fulcrum on which 
currents in the region turn, also has one of the largest and most sophisticated security 
forces in the Middle East. 
Mr. Mubarak has been in office since the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat on Oct. 16, 
1981, whom he served as vice president.  Until the recent unrest, he had firmly resisted 
calls to name a successor.  He had also successfully negotiated complicated issues of 
regional security, solidified a relationship with Washington, maintained cool but correct 
ties with Israel and sharply suppressed Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism—along 
with dissent in general. 
The government has maintained what it calls an Emergency Law, passed first in 1981 to 
combat terrorism after the assassination of Mr. Sadat.  The law allows police to arrest 
people without charge, detain prisoners indefinitely, limit freedom of expression and 
assembly, and maintain a special security court. 
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 In 2010, the government promised that it would only use the law to combat terrorism and 
drug trafficking, but terrorism was defined so broadly as to render that promise largely 
meaningless, according to human rights activists and political prisoners. 
From Apathy to Anger 
While Mr. Mubarak‘s regime had become increasingly unpopular, the public long 
seemed mired in apathy.  For years, the main opposition to his rule appeared to be the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was officially banned but still commanded significant 
support. 
In 2010, speculation rose as to whether Mr. Mubarak, who underwent gall bladder 
surgery that year and appeared increasingly frail, would run in the 2011 elections or seek 
to install his son Gamal as a successor.  Mr. El Baradei, the former director of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, publicly challenged Mr. Mubarak‘s autocratic rule, 
but the Mubarak political machine steamrolled its way to its regular lopsided victory in a 
parliamentary vote. 
The anger fueling the street protests was not new.  It had been seething beneath the 
surface for many years, exploding at times, but never before in such widespread, 
sustained fury.  The grievances are economic, social, historic and deeply personal.  
Egyptians often speak of their dignity, which many said has been wounded by Mr. 
Mubarak‘s monopoly on power, his iron-fisted approach to security and corruption that 
has been allowed to fester.  Even government allies and insiders have been quick to 
acknowledge that the protesters have legitimate grievances that need to be addressed. 
In the last few years, Egypt has struggled through a seemingly endless series of crises and 
setbacks.  The sinking of a ferry left 1,000 mostly poor Egyptians lost at sea, an 
uncontrollable fire gutted the historic Parliament building, terrorists attacked Sinai 
resorts, labor strikes affected nearly every sector of the work force and sectarian-tinged 
violence erupted. 
And in nearly every case, the state addressed the issue as a security matter, deploying the 
police, detaining suspects, dispersing crowds.  That was also true in 2010, even as 
evidence mounted of growing tension between Egypt‘s Muslim majority and a Christian 
minority that includes about 10 percent of the approximately 80 million Egyptians. 
A Police State 
Egypt‘s police bureaucracy reaches into virtually every aspect of public life here, and 
changing its ways is no easy task, everyone concedes.  Police officers direct traffic and 
investigate murders, but also monitor elections and issue birth and death certificates and 
passports.  Every day, 60,000 Egyptians visit police stations, according to the Interior 
Ministry.  In a large, impoverished nation, the services the police provide give them 
wide—and, critics say, unchecked—power. 
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The Egyptian police have a long and notorious track record of torture and cruelty to 
average citizens.  One case that drew widespread international condemnation involved a 
cell phone video of the police sodomizing a driver with a broomstick.  In June 2010, 
Alexandria erupted in protests over the fatal beating by police of beating Khaled Said, 28.  
The authorities said he died choking on a clump of marijuana, until a photograph 
emerged of his bloodied face.  In December 2010, a suspect being questioned in 
connection with a bombing was beaten to death while in police custody.  Abuse is often 
perpetrated by undercover plainclothes officers like the ones who confronted Mr. Said, 
and either ordered or allowed by their superiors, the head investigators who sit in every 
precinct. 
The government denies there is any widespread abuse and frequently blames rogue 
officers for episodes of brutality.  Even so, for the past 10 years, officers from the police 
academy have attended a human rights program organized by the United Nations and the 
Interior Ministry. 
Bahrain News—The Protests (2011) 
Bahrain is a small desert island kingdom in the Persian Gulf, an oil-producing nation of 
about 1 million that serves as a banking hub and as the base for the United State‘s Fifth 
Fleet. 
In February 2011, the wave of unrest sweeping the Arab world reached Bahrain, 
producing a month of swelling demonstrations by the country‘s marginalized Shiite 
majority.  For a time, euphoric crowds appeared on the verge of shaking serious 
concessions from the monarchy.  Thousands filled Pearl Square in Manama, the capital, 
to listen to a cacophony of speeches calling for freedom.  
But after a series of swings between violence and conciliation, King Hamad bin Isa al-
Khalifa cracked down hard. 
On March 14, the king invited in 2,000 troops, including 800 from the United Arab 
Emirates, and 1,200, backed by tanks, from Saudi Arabia, which lies across a causeway 
from Bahrain.  King Khalifa declared an emergency, and security forces cleared Pearl 
Square using bullets and tear gas.  The next week, the government tore down the 
monument at the square‘s center. 
Since then, Bahrain has taken on the likeness of a police state.  There have been mass 
arrests, mass firings of government workers, reports of torture and the forced resignation 
of the top editor of the nation‘s one independent newspaper. 
Emergency laws give the security forces the right to search houses at will without a 
warrant and dissolve any organization, including legal political parties, deemed a danger 
to the state.  Even two members of the national soccer team were arrested, despite 
apologizing on television for attending antigovernment rallies. 
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The Obama administration, which considers Bahrain a crucial ally, has issued tempered 
criticisms of the crackdown but has not pressed for a change in government. 
In response, a once joyous but splintered opposition has been forced to come up with new 
strategies.  The intensity of the repression is pushing some toward militancy, while others 
are holding back, at least for now. 
The protesters were inspired by the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, but their struggle and 
challenges were different.  They are predominantly Shiites, who make up 70 percent of 
the population, in a country whose monarchy and much of the business elite are Sunnis.  
While their struggle is tinged by ethnic animosity, their chief opponents in the streets are 
an army and security force who are predominantly foreigners, principally Pakistani, 
Yemeni, Iraqi and Jordanian. 
The demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of people in March have given way to 
small marches and protests at funerals.  The centers of rebellion are now in villages 
outside Manama like Saar and Shahrakkan, where residents have set up barricades of 
stones and bricks so police officers on patrol need to leave their armored cars and walk 
through the narrow stone pathways.  Every night at 10, residents climb to their roofs and 
anonymously cry in protest, ―God is great!‖ 
The government and pro-government media have celebrated the relative calm in 
downtown Manama as a return to the kind of normality that has made this tiny island 
nation an important banking center and regional tourist destination.  They charge that the 
predominantly Shiite opposition is inspired and even aided by Iran, although most 
Bahraini Shiites are Arabs, unlike Iranians, and associate themselves more closely with 
Iraqi Shiites. 
The Bahraini government had originally appeared willing to compromise with the 
opposition, particularly the more moderate faction that wants the country to evolve into a 
true parliamentary monarchy that gives elected lawmakers more power.  At one point last 
the king even apologized for the deaths of demonstrators on television, and government 
officials say they are still open to reform. 
 By the accounts of Bahraini human rights activists, 26 people have been killed, most in 
the past three weeks since Pearl Square was cleared.  More than 300 have been 
imprisoned, and at least 35 people are missing. 
Here is a chronology of the month of protests: 
March 18 The Bahraini government tore down the protest movement‘s defining 
monument, the pearl at the center of Pearl Square, a symbolic strike that carried a sense 
of finality.  The official news agency described the razing as a facelift. 
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March 17 The Bahraini government, which sought in February to mollify protesters 
clamoring for democratic reform, decisively shifted tactics to forceful repression.  A day 
after aggressively clearing Pearl Square of protesters, authorities arrested several major 
opposition figures, including Hassan Mushaima, a Shiite and Islamist dissident politician.  
State television said the leaders were arrested for having ―communicated with foreign 
countries‖ and because they ―incited killing of citizens and destruction of public and 
private property.‖ 
March 16 Two days after the king of Bahrain brought in 2,000 troops from Saudi Arabia 
and other neighboring allies, and the day after he declared martial law, his security forces 
rolled into Pearl Square, the stronghold of the antigovernment protest movement, taking 
it from the protesters who had moved in a month ago. Plumes of black smoke choked the 
central city landscape as troops repeatedly fired tear gas canisters, rubber bullets and 
what sounded like live ammunition, igniting fires in tents, trees and brush.  Most of the 
hundreds in the square fled from the huge display of military might.  There was no 
immediate word on casualties. 
March 15 Hours after the king of Bahrain declared a three-month state of emergency, 
doctors said two protesters had been killed and some 200 wounded and injured in clashes 
with riot police in the suburban village of Sitra, a stronghold of antigovernment activists 
six miles south of the capital.  The violence contrasted starkly with a large protest in 
downtown Manama, where more than 10,000 protesters marched peacefully on the Saudi 
Arabian Embassy to denounce a military intervention by Persian Gulf countries the day 
before. 
March 14 Troops crossed from Saudi Arabia into Bahrain to help quell unrest there, a 
move Bahraini opposition groups denounced as an ―occupation,‖ while pro-government 
legislators called for the imposition of martial law.  The Iranian government, which has 
supported the protests led by the Shiite majority, branded the move ―unacceptable.‖ 
March 13 Thousands of antigovernment protesters in Bahrain blocked access to the 
financial district in Manama, the capital, preventing workers from getting to their offices 
and pushing back police officers who tried to disperse them.  It was the most serious 
challenge to the royal family that rules Bahrain since protests began last month.  
Witnesses said the police used tear gas and fired on the protesters with rubber bullets. 
March 12 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned this tiny kingdom‘s ruling family 
that ―baby steps‖ toward reform would not be enough to meet the political and economic 
grievances sweeping the region.  Mr. Gates also cautioned Bahrain‘s king and crown 
prince during two hours of meetings in Manama, Bahrain‘s capital, that if the reform 
process was prolonged, the United States feared that Iran would become involved and 
create more chaos. 
March 6 The leaders of Bahrain‘s opposition movement said that they would not be 
mollified by offers of money and jobs, raising the prospect of a protracted standoff 
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between protesters and the embattled government of this strategically important Persian 
Gulf island nation. 
March 4 Thousands of Shiite protesters converged on the state television headquarters 
outside the capital, Manama, The Associated Press reported.  The latest protest came a 
day after brief clashes between groups of Sunnis and Shiites in the town of Hamad that 
again highlighted the sectarian divisions that have been driving demonstrations in the tiny 
Persian Gulf nation. 
Feb. 27 The leader of a banned opposition party, Hassan Mushaima, returned from exile 
and exhorted a crowd of tens of thousands of antigovernment protesters to continue 
demonstrating until they achieved a ―successful revolution.‖  Mr. Mushaima, a dissident 
who has long demanded fundamental changes in what is effectively an absolute 
monarchy, appeared to be trying to move into a leadership role in the opposition 
movement. 
Feb. 25 Pro-democracy demonstrations on a scale that appeared to dwarf the largest ever 
seen in the tiny Persian Gulf nation blocked miles of downtown roads and highways in 
Manama, overflowing from Pearl Square for the second time in a week.  For the first time 
however, it was the country‘s Shiite religious leaders, rather than the political opposition, 
who called for people to take to the streets.  Although some of the chants and symbols 
had a religious cast, protesters‘ demands remained the same, emphasizing a nonsectarian 
call for democracy and the downfall of the government. 
Feb. 22 More than a hundred thousand protesters poured into Pearl Square in an 
unbroken stream stretching back for miles along a central highway in the biggest 
antigovernment demonstration yet seen in this tiny Persian Gulf kingdom.  Security 
forces were nowhere to be seen along the demonstration route.  The protesters streaming 
into the square on Tuesday joined thousands of others who have camped out in order to 
occupy the area after the military pulled out following a deadly crackdown last week.  
The sheer size of the gathering was astonishing, and the new arrivals were likely to 
overflow into the area surrounding the square. 
Feb. 21 The organizers of the Bahrain Grand Prix announced that the Formula One race 
which was scheduled to run March 13 at the Sakhir circuit, outside the capital, Manama, 
had been canceled because of the political unrest in the country.  Bahrain has held the 
race since 2004 at a purpose-built circuit about 50 kilometers, or 30 miles, from the 
capital city.  But the majority of the teams, media and foreign spectators stay in hotels in 
the center of the city, many of them near Pearl Square, which has been the central 
meeting point of the demonstrations. 
Feb. 20 Teachers, lawyers and engineers again marched into Pearl Square, joining an 
emboldened opposition whose political leaders demanded that King Hamad Bin Isa al-
Khalifa dissolve the government and fire his uncle, who has held the post of prime 
minister for 40 years, before they agree to enter into talks. The crown prince, Salman bin 
 163 
Hamad al-Khalifa, continued to call for a national dialogue and period of mourning as a 
step toward reconciliation.  But officials with the leading opposition party said that with 
six people dead, hundreds injured and many still missing, the king would first have to 
convince them that he was willing to compromise after repeatedly unleashing his security 
forces on civilians. 
Feb. 19 Thousands of jubilant protesters surged back into Pearl Square, the symbolic 
heart of Bahrain, after the government withdrew its security forces, calling for calm after 
days of violent crackdowns.  The shift was at least a temporary victory for the Shiite 
protesters, who had rejected a call to negotiate from Bahrain‘s Sunni monarch until the 
authorities pulled the military off the streets.  A review of administration statements 
shows that American officials overlooked recent complaints about human rights abuses in 
the strategically important kingdom. 
Feb. 18 Government forces opened fire on hundreds of mourners marching toward Pearl 
Square.  A Western official quoted a witness as saying that the shooters were from the 
military, not the police, indicating a hardening of the government‘s stance against those 
trying to stage a popular revolt.  Video: Bahrain: A Diplomatic Puzzle 
Feb. 17 Hundreds of heavily armed riot police officers rushed into Pearl Square, firing 
shotguns, tear gas and concussion grenades at the thousands of demonstrators who were 
sleeping there.  At least five people died, and at least 200 were wounded, according to 
medical personnel.  At the main hospital following the violence, thousands gathered 
screaming, crying and collapsing in grief. 
Feb. 16 Thousands of protesters poured into this nation‘s symbolic center, Pearl Square, 
in a raucous rally mirroring the unrest convulsing, if not transforming, governments of 
the Middle East.  The crowd grew bolder as it grew larger, and modest concessions from 
the government seemed only to raise expectations among the protesters. 
A Troubled History 
Though the al-Khalifa family has ruled since the 18th century, Bahrain has been a 
politically troubled nation for generations. 
The kingdom gained independence from Britain in 1971.  Soon after, the price of oil 
spiked during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.  Bahrain‘s oil reserves were small compared 
to its neighbors‘, but provided fuel for rapid development. 
For a period, the island kingdom was hailed as a model of reform in the Arab world.  
King Hamad ended a 25-year state of emergency in 1999 and promised to turn Bahrain 
into a constitutional monarchy with a newly elected Parliament. 
But in 2001, he reneged on his promise and imposed a constitution establishing a second, 
appointed legislative house that significantly curtailed the power of the elected one.  
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Gerrymandering ensured a Sunni advantage in the elected house, too, prompting the 
predominantly Shiite opposition to boycott elections in 2002. 
In the years since, Bahrain‘s Shiites have been marginalized.  They allege that the 
government has backed Sunni Islamists and encouraged increasingly sectarian politics.  
Activists in the country say they have uncovered a systematic effort to naturalize Sunnis 
from other Arab countries as well as from Southeast Asia. 
Shiites are all but banned from the military and security forces—certainly from command 
positions—one of their primary grievances.  The police force is staffed primarily by 
foreigners: Syrians, Iraqis, Jordanians, almost anyone who happens to be a Sunni and is 
eager to earn a Bahraini passport. 
Background 
There has long been tension between the Sunni Muslim king, Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa, 
the royal family and ruling elites, and the approximately 70 percent of the local 
population that is Shiite.  About half the residents of Bahrain are foreign workers. 
Since late 2009, Shiites in villages around the nation have been holding regular protests, 
burning tires in the road and demanding the release of dozens of political prisoners. 
In February 2011, skirmishes broke out between young protesters and heavily armed 
government forces in villages around Manama, the capital.  The clashes appeared to have 
rattled the leadership into trying both enticement and fear.  King Hamad announced that 
the state was giving every Bahraini family the equivalent of $2,700 in cash, and he filled 
the streets with heavily armed riot police. 
Tens of thousands of demonstrators filled Pearl Square in Manama, camping out in an 
almost carnival-like atmosphere and calling on the king for reforms. 
The pro-democracy protests in this island nation have followed the pattern of those in 
Egypt and Tunisia, with cell phones and Facebook posts propelling the movement and a 
botched, deadly crackdown by security forces serving to embolden the demonstrators. 
Yet those who lead and take part in the nearly daily demonstrations say they fear at least 
one key difference: The United States may not be fully on their side. 
Unlike in the case of Egypt, where President Obama promised to ―stand up for 
democracy‖ and called for a change of power ―now,‖ Washington has backed the royal 
family in Bahrain with statements supporting the country‘s still-undefined proposal for 
dialogue with the opposition. 
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Obama administration officials say they believe the royal family has earned the right to 
try to navigate this period, after heeding the United States‘ plea to call off the security 
forces who shot the protesters, killing seven of them. 
Jordan 
Jordan, one of America‘s most important allies in the Middle East, was hit in late January 
2011 by the waves of unrest that have spread across the Arab world in the wake of the 
revolution in Tunisia.  On Feb. 1, King Abdullah II dismissed his cabinet and prime 
minister in a surprise move meant to calm street protests that have also been fueled by the 
country‘s worst economic crisis in years. 
The royal palace announced that the king had dismissed Prime Minister Samir Rifai and 
replaced him with Marouf al-Bakhit, who has served before in the post and is a former 
general and a onetime ambassador to Israel and Turkey widely viewed as clean of 
corruption. 
The rest of the new government was sworn in on Feb. 9.  The 27-member cabinet 
included a number of holdovers—notably the foreign, interior and economy ministers—
as well as a few leftists.  The opposition Muslim Brotherhood, which declined an 
invitation to be part of the government, said it was less interested in who held the 
portfolios than what they would do. 
Demonstration and counter-demonstrations followed but remained peaceful until March 
24, when at least one man died when government supporters attacked a tent camp that 
pro-democracy protesters had set up in the center of Amman, the Jordanian capital, in 
conscious imitation of Tahrir Square in Cairo.  The violence stopped when security forces 
intervened, and a week later a new round of demonstrations went off peacefully. 
Changing cabinets is not new for King Abdullah.  In his 12 years on the throne, he has 
done so eight times.  But this was the first time that he had done so in reaction to public 
pressure, seeking to undermine a growing protest movement across a broad spectrum of 
society and to pre-empt further unrest.  It came after four weeks of unusual public 
demonstrations. 
Buffeted by the forces at play across the region—rising prices, a bulging underemployed 
youth population, the rapid spread of information and resentment, an unaccountable 
autocracy—Jordan is on edge.  The promises made by the king when he fired his cabinet 
seem to have bought him some time.  But many question whether the promises will be 
fulfilled, and whether such steps will in any case be enough to calm the rising tide of 
frustration. 
What is most striking right now in Jordan is that the very system of the monarchy seems 
open to question.  This is partly because of what is happening elsewhere in the region but 
also because of growing discontent with King Abdullah and his wife, Queen Rania.  King 
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Abdullah‘s father, King Hussein, who ruled for 46 years, enjoyed near adoration of his 
people. 
The concerns and complaints of the different constituencies in Yemen are not only 
distinct, they are often contradictory, and the monarchy faces little risk of opponents 
coalescing into the kind of mass movements seen in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Jordan‘s main constituencies are the so-called East Bankers or tribes, and the Palestinians 
who constitute a majority of the nation‘s six million people.  East Bankers, the country‘s 
original inhabitants, dominate the civil service, especially the security forces, while the 
Palestinians rule in the private sector.  Economic reform to bring Jordan in line with the 
global marketplace has tended to benefit the Palestinians, while the East Bankers—the 
core of the monarchy‘s support—rely on the government payroll. 
In addition, the king maintains his distance from the complaints by allowing blame to fall 
on government ministers, whom he replaces at will. 
Jordan is a highly literate and largely stable country, with well-developed security and 
intelligence operations.  But it has a fundamental vulnerability in the large number of 
Palestinians living there.  Refugees arrived in large numbers from the West Bank and 
Jerusalem after the war in 1967, and more arrived from Kuwait after President Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq invaded that country in 1990.  They and their descendants make up nearly 
half the country‘s population of six million. 
The recent demonstrations in Jordan were the first serious challenge to the rule of King 
Abdullah, a crucial American ally who is contending with his country‘s worst economic 
crisis in years. 
On Jan. 28, thousands took to the streets in the capital, Amman, as well as several other 
cities shouting, ―We want change!‖  Because direct criticism of the king is banned, the 
focus has been on his government.  Banners decried high food and fuel prices and 
demanded the resignation of the prime minister, appointed by the king. 
Journalists, students and retired generals have taken the unusual step in recent months of 
attacking corruption, restrictions on freedom of political expression and reductions in 
government subsidies. 
The mass protests on Jan. 28 were led by the Islamic Action Front, but included leftists 
and trade unions.  Earlier that week, thousands marched in a similar protest, demanding 
the right to elect the prime minister, who is currently appointed by the king. 
The demonstrators also protested economic hardship, a common refrain across the region.  
In a bid to tamp down some of the frustration, the king announced $125 million in 
subsidies for basic goods and fuel and an increase in civil servant pay. 
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In November 2010, parliamentary elections were held but were boycotted by the Islamic 
Action Front, which said the king had gerrymandered the parliamentary districts to 
increase the representation of the rural areas where he finds his strongest support. 
The campaign was dominated by widespread anger at the stalled Middle East peace talks 
and concerns about the rising poverty rate.  The pro-American kingdom has struggled for 
years to balance a measure of democracy with the need to check a powerful Islamist 
movement and a large, restive Palestinian population. 
Abdullah‘s ascension to the throne in 1999 came as a surprise: his father named Abdullah 
as his successor only two weeks before his death.  The next king was supposed to be 
Crown Prince Hassan, youngest brother of King Hussein.  Prince Abdullah had a 
reputation as a bit of a lightweight, a Prince Hal with a vaguely Falstaffian cast of friends 
who drove fast cars and enjoyed the company of women.  But a year after ascending the 




Oil above $112 amid Mideast turmoil, weak dollar 
 (AP)  SINGAPORE (AP)—Oil prices fell slightly to above $112 a barrel Monday in 
Asia as traders eyed fresh Middle East tension and a wobbly U.S. dollar. 
 
Benchmark crude for May delivery was down 42 cents at $112.37 a barrel at late 
afternoon Singapore time in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange.  
On Friday, the contract jumped $2.49 to $112.79, the highest since September 2008. 
 
In London, Brent crude for May delivery was down 62 cents to $126.03 a barrel on the 
ICE Futures exchange. 
 
Oil prices have soared about 33 percent since mid-February as traders worry political 
violence in the Middle East and North Africa could disrupt crude supplies. 
 
Violence escalated last week between Palestinians in Gaza and Israel.  Since Thursday, 
Palestinians have fired more than 120 rockets and mortar shells into southern Israel, 
prompting Israeli reprisals that have killed 19 Palestinians, the most intense fighting 
between Israel and Gaza militants since January 2009. 
 
Meanwhile, Egyptian soldiers Saturday attacked protesters calling for an investigation of 
former President Hosni Mubarak for embezzlement, killing at least one person and 
injuring 71 others.  Several hundred protesters remained barricaded at Cairo‘s Tahrir 
Square. 
 
―Fresh headlines over the weekend could portend another difficult week for oil bears,‖ 
energy consultant The Schork Group said.  ―Gaza-Israel violence along with new protests 
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in Tahrir Square against the military could incite another buying frenzy in the market.‖ 
 
Investors are also watching closely the currency markets as the U.S. dollar fell to a 15-
month low against the euro last week.  A weaker U.S. currency makes dollar-based 
commodities such as oil cheaper for investors with other currencies. 
 
The euro was down slightly at $1.4457 on Monday from $1.4483 late Friday. 
 
Analysts expect the surge in oil prices will undermine consumer demand, but some are 
optimistic higher fuel costs won‘t derail the global economy recovery. 
 
―The rise in the price of oil in reaction to the spreading of unrest from Tunisia and Egypt 
to Libya and Bahrain remains below the threshold that is likely to have lasting impact on 
the global economy,‖ said Jeffrey Morrison of MFS Investment Management.  ―We 
expect the global economic recovery to be sustained.‖ 
 
In other Nymex trading in May contracts, heating oil fell 1.8 cents to $3.30 a gallon and 
gasoline dropped 1.4 cents to $3.25 a gallon.  Natural gas futures were down 2.6 cents at 
$4.02 per 1,000 cubic feet.  
 
Oil Prices and Middle East Turmoil: The Economic Consequences 
Christopher Boucek, Jamie Webster, Hans Timmer, Uri Dadush, Mohsin Khan Thursday, 
March 31, 2011 – Washington, D.C.  
Resources  
Even though recent unrest in the Middle East has been limited to countries that have little 
effect on the global supply of oil, uncertainty in the oil markets has surged and prices 
have increased significantly.  If prices rise further and stay elevated for a period of time, 
the global recovery could be in danger.   
 
Carnegie‘s Christopher Boucek, Mohsin Khan of the Peterson Institute, the World Bank‘s 
Hans Timmer, and PFC Energy‘s Jamie Webster discussed the complex set of political 
and economic issues shaping today‘s oil markets.  Carnegie‘s Uri Dadush moderated. 
 
Today’s Oil Price 
Even before turmoil broke out in the Middle East, the global recovery—and rising 
demand from emerging markets in particular—had placed upward pressure on oil prices.  
The Brent Crude oil marker, which is used to price the majority of crude oil, was at $90 
per barrel in December.  Since then, little has changed in the oil market‘s supply and 
demand, but, Webster explained, market fears have caused Brent to surge to $115 per 
barrel. 
 Market Fundamentals: Webster explained that the biggest changes in the 
Middle East have so far occurred in countries that have only modest effect on the 
actual oil market.  Tunisia is neither a large supplier nor consumer of oil; Egypt‘s 
Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline have not posed a transit risk; and the disruption in 
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Libya‘s production poses only a modest production risk.  Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia and the Emirates, which have not seen widespread protests, have unused 
oil capacity that can offset the decline in Libyan exports.  Based on market 
fundamentals, Webster said, the oil price should be closer to $80 or $90 per 
barrel—near the lowest price Saudi Arabia requires to cover all its government 
spending. 
 
 Market Fears: Oil prices are significantly higher, however, because investors are 
worried that unrest could erupt in Saudi Arabia, the region‘s biggest oil producer 
and supplier of reserves.  According to Boucek, however, revolution is not likely 
there.  Saudi Arabia is deploying a powerful mix of force, religious ideology, and 
public spending to quell unrest. 
Though the oil price has risen, Timmer noted that price volatility was low in March.  
Even as events unfolded in the Middle East, the price held steady, suggesting that 
forward-looking oil markets had already taken the unrest into account.  Feedback 




If another disruption affects supply, prices could spike very quickly, with potentially 
dangerous implications, the panelists warned.  Khan cited research by the International 
Monetary Fund, which determined that a sustained price of $120 per barrel—not far from 
the Brent marker‘s recent $115 per barrel—would inflict some damage on the world 
economy.  Under a plausible bad-case scenario—disruptions in Algeria‘s oil supply, for 
example—the price could even reach $140 or $150 per barrel over an extended period, 
enough to cut a percent or more from world growth.  The panelists agreed that estimates 
are more likely to undershoot than overshoot the realized oil price. 
 Political Worries: From a political standpoint, Yemen and Bahrain are the 
biggest concerns and could spell trouble for oil markets—the first through 
transport obstructions and the second through its proximity to Saudi Arabia, 
explained Boucek.  Regional tensions could ignite fears that Iran blocks the Strait 
of Hormuz, though, as Webster noted, Iran depends vitally on the Strait for 
transporting oil.  Boucek added that some of the region‘s players, such as al-
Qaeda, have a history of attacking oil infrastructure. 
 
 Macroeconomic Implications: Timmer noted that any increase in the oil price 
will be harmful.  For every 50 percent increase in the oil price, global economic 
growth will diminish by 1.5 percent.  This will prove particularly difficult for 
high-income countries, which are already growing at lower rates than emerging 
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economies, and especially for Euro area countries already facing debt crises.  
Headline inflation could also spiral and encourage premature monetary tightening, 
particularly in developing countries, which could have secondary effects on 
financial markets.  Most dangerously, a higher oil price could hurt production 
capacity and lead to another recession, Timmer warned. 
 
 Poverty and Employment: In addition, the higher price of oil and their spillover 
onto food could push millions of people into deeper poverty, said Timmer.  Khan 
predicted that employment in high-income countries would also suffer 
significantly. 
Looking Ahead 
Panelists agreed that demand for oil is likely to rise rapidly and perhaps outpace supply 
over the next three to four years even without accounting for supply disruption in the 
Middle East. 
 Demand from Asia: Though China‘s most recent Five Year Plan aims to lower 
its oil consumption, Khan argued that both China and India will grow as oil 
markets as they build up their strategic oil reserves.  Meanwhile, the damage done 
to Japan‘s Fukushima nuclear plants by the recent earthquake and subsequent 
tsunami could turn the entire discussion of nuclear power on its head, reducing the 
likelihood that nuclear energy‘s role as an alternative to oil increases.  Timmer 
suggested that general energy and climate policy will affect oil prices. 
 
 The Middle East: Khan suggested that developments in the Middle East will be 
particularly interesting to watch.  He predicted a rise in populism in the region, 
with expansionary government policy to provide more jobs and food and fuel 
subsidies to citizens.  Timmer agreed that the changes will be very important, as 
stability will emerge only when unemployment in the region is addressed.  
Webster suggested that Saudi Arabia, which uses crude oil for power, could 
become an even larger oil consumer in the future. 
 
 Supply: Webster noted that Iraq‘s oil production will likely increase, particularly 
in the short run, though he predicted protests could escalate in August and 
potentially offset the oil supply growth.  Khan added that there is a need to set up 
more refineries capable of processing heavy Saudi oil to ensure that its unused 
supply capacity is effective in moderating incipient price pressures.  
G20 Policy 
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There is very little that the major economies can do to affect the oil market in the short 
term, but they can change the game in the long term by lowering their reliance on fossil 
fuels and instituting carbon taxes. 
 Strategic Oil Reserves: The release of oil reserves to lower prices is unlikely, 
stated Khan.  Most countries are actually moving in the opposite direction and 
building reserves.  In addition, Webster argued that releasing reserves would 
likely have little impact—prices are not reflecting a lack of oil supply but rather a 
host of political and economic concerns.  
 
 What Not to Do: Timmer noted that countries should refrain from decreasing gas 
taxes, subsidizing energy use to protect their own economies, or portraying 
climate change policy as only a long-term solution.  Because oil markets are very 
forward-looking, announcing bold, realistic policies to mitigate climate change 
could dampen oil price pressures in the short term. 
Afternoon Price Check: Oil Prices Rally On Libya Fighting, Middle East 
Protests 
Posted by Josh Garrett on March 22, 2011 at 4:10 pm 
Civil war in Libya and unrest and uncertainty in the Middle East drove crude oil 
prices higher at the NYMEX today.  (image: ft.com) 
World oil markets now appear to have re-focused completely on the events in the 
Middle East and North Africa and their implications for global crude supplies.  
International intervention in Libya could prolong the civil war there, which would 
mean and extended loss of at least a million barrels per day of crude oil supplies to 
the world.  As street protests and violent crackdowns on activists Bahrain, Yemen, 
and Syria continue, nervousness on oil markets continues to build.  The primary 
concern is that the political movements could spread to Saudi Arabia, the world‘s 
leading oil exporter, and take a substantial bite out of oil supplies.  Turbulent times in 
Libya in the Middle East drove oil prices higher at the NYMEX today, 
overshadowing an announcement that Japan will tap its strategic crude oil reserve to 
help power recovery efforts.  That announcement, which implied a major (but 
temporary) reduction in global demand, pushed prices lower in early trading before 
giving way to gains by the afternoon.  Crude oil closed at its highest price since the 
March 11 earthquake in Japan.  Today‘s price increases at the NYMEX will likely 
bring a small to moderate increase in retail heating oil prices tomorrow 
What impact will the Middle Eastern protests have on the world economy? 
By  
James Arter  
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– March 31, 2011 
The Middle Eastern protests have dominated the news agenda ever since the ‗Jasmine 
revolution‘ began in Tunisia in mid December.  The protests have since spread to many 
neighbouring countries; there have been protests as far afield as Mauritania, Somalia and 
Iran.  Libya is in the throes of a conflict approaching civil war as protesters opposed to 
Colonel Gaddafi have seized key cities such as Benghazi and Tobruk and are attempting 
to gain control of the capital Tripoli.  The protesters have undoubtedly caused a seismic 
shift in the political landscape of the Middle East. 
Like most global events of this significance, it is already becoming apparent that the 
turmoil in the area is affecting the global economy.  The Middle East is a major source of 
global oil production with Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Iran and Algeria together supplying a 
tenth of the world‘s oil.  Additionally Saudi Arabia, as the regional heavyweight, 
accounts for 8.5 million barrels per day, making it the world‘s third biggest supplier. 
Following the unrest in many of these nations, the global price of oil, which had seen 
significant increases in the months before the protests, has rocketed to a high of $119 per 
barrel, the highest for two and a half years and the price seems set to rise with further 
unrest predicted.  The market worries that oil production in the region could shrink due to 
the workforce either protesting or having fled to avoid the violence.  Additionally, 
protests increase the price of future extraction.  Investors would add a risk premium to 
any new projects in the area, making investment more expensive.  Furthermore, markets 
don‘t like sudden changes; the speedy ousting of governments across the region and 
widespread protests appear to have spooked the market, raising fears of another oil shock 
similar to the first gulf war or the Iranian revolution. 
Increasing oil prices directly affect consumers through higher fuel prices at the pump as 
well as additional costs through industries that use large quantities of oil as inputs or fuel.  
For example, last week both Thompson and Thomas Cook both added additional fuel 
surcharges onto the costs of flights in response to the increased price of fuel.  Any 
increase in oil prices will have a knock on effect on general transport costs, for instance 
the cost of shipping food around the globe is likely to increase leading to further rises in 
global food prices.  Food prices are currently already rising as a result of last year‘s 
droughts in Russia and China and heavy floods in Pakistan. 
The current inflation rate in the UK is 4%, fully twice the target rate; any increase in fuel 
and food prices is likely to push this even higher.  This will have significant ramifications 
for the wider economy.  A higher inflation rate reduces the real wages of workers 
lowering overall spending within the economy.  With the UK teetering on the edge of a 
‗double-dip‘ recession any decrease in consumer spending may weaken the struggling 
economic recovery. 
However currently, disruption to oil supply is relatively slight.  Libya for instance only 
produces about 2% of the world‘s oil and other countries such as Algeria and Bahrain 
supply even less.  If Saudi Arabia were to be affected by similar protests as have been 
seen in the rest of the region then it is likely that the effects would be much more serious.  
The Saudi leaders have promised reform in an attempt to placate the protesters and 
applied pressure on its neighbour Bahrain to take a strong line with its own protesters lest 
the protests spill over the border into the country.  However a ‗day of rage‘ has been 
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called for the 11
th
 of March in the capital Riyadh and the markets are understandably 
nervous as to the extent of the protest and any disruption caused to oil output. 
However the effects of the protests have been felt most keenly by the Middle Eastern 
countries themselves.  With millions of people off work, foreign companies evacuating 
staff and the slowdown in commerce, the economies of the region almost halted.  
However long after the short term damage is repaired, the region‘s international 
reputation will be tarnished.  Rioting and large scale civil unrest do not attract business 
and unity governments or those thrust into power on the back of popular protest may be 
weak and leave the area prone to slip back into chaos.  In recent years countries like 
Bahrain and the UAE have attracted huge levels of foreign investment with cities such as 
Dubai booming with vast sums of money.  The recent violent clashes in Bahrain, where 
at least seven people have died, have dashed the image as the area being a ‗business 
idyll‘.  With the prospect of further conflicts in the area, it is likely that the Gulf States 
will find it harder to attract foreign companies and investment in the future.  This could 
be devastating to the smaller states‘ economies that rely on business tax revenues rather 
than the larger states with significant oil reserves. 
Tourism is a key part of many of the regions‘ economies, for example 5.5% of Tunisia‘s 
income comes from tourism and the sector employs one in five of the workforce.  The 
violence has forced many tourists to leave the area and at least in the short term it is 
unlikely that tourists will return until the area‘s reputation improves. 
The global stock markets have also not been spared the effects of the instability in the 
area, with many stock markets falling as the severity of the unrest increased and 
uncertainty as to the length and impact of the protests grew.  Companies that are exposed 
to oil price fluctuations have suffered the greatest with many airlines, for example, 
suffering falls in their share price as their costs rose. 
Undoubtedly the recent events in the Middle East offer great hope for the people of the 
region but will also be highly influential for the global economy.  At present it seems like 
there will be a moderate increase in oil prices and the effects of such an increase will be 
amplified through higher prices for a variety of fuel dependent industries.  These will 
have an effect on consumer spending and inflation and so have a knock-on effect on each 
country‘s macroeconomic performance.  Additionally the protests will have been felt 
across the business world with volatility in the stock market and lower investment in 
Middle Eastern countries.  However the long term effects remain to be seen and depend 
heavily on what happens in the next few months.  Were Saudi Arabia or some other 
major oil exporter like Iran to suffer some of the turmoil that their neighbours have, then 
the global effect of the protests could be far larger than initially predicted.  With Libya 
still in a state of violent flux it is impossible to say what may happen into the future.  If 
the violence was to continue for any length of time or result in any serious damage to the 
oil infrastructure in the country such as the export terminals in Tobruk, Brega or Tripoli 
then the world oil price would rise to new heights. 
 
Libya crisis drives up oil prices 
Clifford Krauss & Jad Mouawad, New York Times, Mar 2, 2011, 01.45pm IST 
 174 
HOUSTON: Just when oil markets appeared to be calming, crude oil prices surged again 
on Tuesday as the potential for more oil shipment disruptions spread across the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
With Libya‘s oil exports almost entirely halted for the last several days, renewed unrest 
in Oman, Iran and Iraq rattled oil traders.  An interruption of shipments from any of those 
countries would further tighten oil supplies, even as Saudi Arabia has rushed to fill the 
vacuum of Libyan supplies by pumping more oil from its fields. 
The worries about the oil supply rippled through other markets, with stock markets 
turning lower on concerns that the higher cost of energy would slow economic recovery. 
Gold prices also surged on the latest reports, and indexes on Wall Street declined sharply, 
with the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 1.3 percent.  The Saudi Arabian 
benchmark stock index fell 6.8 percent. 
In the latest sign that the political contagion was spreading, demonstrators in Oman on 
Tuesday tried to block a major road leading to the industrial port town of Sohar.  
Protesters in recent days have set fire to at least one police station and two government 
office buildings in the normally stable Persian Gulf country, which is ruled by a family 
dynasty and is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in the Middle East. 
―To have protests in Oman, which had previously been seen as a sleepy gulf kingdom, 
heightens concerns that nowhere is immune from the contagion affects,‖ said Helima L. 
Croft, a director and senior geopolitical analyst at Barclays Capital.  ―Every day we seem 
to have a new country with a new problem.‖ 
Oman produces 860,000 barrels of oil daily, almost 1 percent of world supplies, and its 
production has been rising in recent years with investments from Royal Dutch Shell, BP, 
Repsol and other international companies.  Its importance is magnified by the fact that its 
crude is of such quality that it can be blended by most refineries around the world, 
although most of its exports now go to China and Japan. 
Oman straddles the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic route through which 40 percent of the 
world‘s oil tanker traffic crosses.  On the other side of the strait lies Iran, another major 
producer, where there were reports on Tuesday that security forces had used tear gas to 
disperse protesters in Tehran.  Iran, with approximately 10 percent of the world‘s oil 
reserves, exports about 3.7 million barrels a day 
 
Middle East and North African Turmoil Raised the Oil Prices  
 
Fluctuating dollar and hostile environment in the Middle East including political 
instability in North Africa added to the worries of the traders taking oil prices up by jump 
of 33% since February to $112 a barrel on Monday. 
During the late afternoon trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange, the prices of 
the crude for the May delivery slipped by 42 cents from $112.79, highest since 
September 2008, to $112.37 per barrel. 
In middle east Asia, firing of 120 rockets and mortar shells by Palestine into southern 
Israel has once again intensified the violence between the two countries while in northern 
Africa, the Egyptian soldiers assaulted the protestors and killed one, who were 




On Monday, the euro slipped slightly to $1.4457 from $1.4483 of late Friday. 
Jeffrey Morrison of MFS Investment Management asserted, ―The rise in the price of oil 
in reaction to the spreading of unrest from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya and Bahrain 
remains below the threshold that is likely to have lasting impact on the global economy.‖ 
The U.S. dollar fell to a 15-month low against the euro, thus making the dollar based 
commodities cheaper for the euro based investors. 
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href=―/myciteseer/action/submitUrl;jsessionid=5AC149882DBB363288302750A37F33E6‖ title=―Add 
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Your Document‖>Submit Documents</a> &#124; <a 
href=―/feedback;jsessionid=5AC149882DBB363288302750A37F33E6‖ title=―Submit Your 
Feedback‖>Feedback</a> &#124; <a 
href=―/privacy;jsessionid=5AC149882DBB363288302750A37F33E6‖ title=―Privacy Policy‖>Privacy 
Policy</a> &#124; <a href=―/about/metadata;jsessionid=5AC149882DBB363288302750A37F33E6‖ 
title=―CiteSeerX Data‖>CiteSeer<sup>x</sup> Data</a> &#124; <a 
href=―http://sourceforge.net/projects/citeseerx/‖ title=―Get SeerSuite Source Code‖>Source Code</a></p> 
<p>&copy; 2007–2010 <a href=―http://www.psu.edu‖>The Pennsylvania State University</a></p> 
<p>Developed at and hosted by <a href=―http://ist.psu.edu/‖>The College of Information Sciences and 
Technology</a> at Penn State</p> <p><a class=―remove‖ href=―http://ist.psu.edu/‖ title=―Penn State 
College of Information Sciences and Technology‖> <img id=―ist‖ 
src=―/images/istlogo.gif;jsessionid=5AC149882DBB363288302750A37F33E6‖ alt=―IST logo‖ 
/></a></p> </div> </div> <!-- page_wrapper opened on IncludeTop --> </body> </html> </string> 
<string>name</string> <string>CiteSeerX—Memory Performance of Master Go Players</string> -
<gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.MetadataMap serialization=―custom‖> <unserializable-parents/> -<map> -
<default> <loadFactor>0.75</loadFactor> <threshold>12</threshold> </default> <int>16</int> 
<int>5</int> <string>Urls</string> -<gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.Metadata> <id>99fd5419–208c-4350–



























































































































































> <url>http://sourceforge.net/projects/citeseerx/</url> <url>http://www.psu.edu</url> 
<url>http://ist.psu.edu/</url> <url>http://ist.psu.edu/</url> 
<url>http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/images/istlogo.gif;jsessionid=5AC149882DBB363288302750A37F33E6</
url> </data> </gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.Metadata> <string>Content-Encoding</string> -
<gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.ReadableMetadata> <id>7917ffe9–608e-49e5–9b35–2cccd1dfa63aContent-
Encoding</id> <name>Content-Encoding</name> <data class=―string‖>ISO-8859–1</data> 
<readableData>ISO-8859–1</readableData> </gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.ReadableMetadata> 
<string>FilePath</string> -<gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.ReadableMetadata> <id>9547160b-4528–435c-









Type</id> <name>Content-Type</name> <data class=―string‖>text/plain</data> 
<readableData>text/plain</readableData> </gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.ReadableMetadata> </map> -
<gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.MetadataMap> -<default> <targetID>7917ffe9–608e-49e5–9b35–
2cccd1dfa63a</targetID> </default> </gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.MetadataMap> 
</gov.sandia.cortext.metadata.MetadataMap> </gov.sandia.cortext.document.Document> 
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APPENDIX E. ANALYSIS ON ORIGINAL STANLEY RESULTS 
This appendix contains an analysis of the original STANLEY results.  A major 
disparity, and one that could dramatically affect the comparison, was the number of 
scores for each site that were returned as zero (0.000).  This could be attributed to the tool 
being unable to score the document (i.e., it is a picture) or there are no words in common 
except for the common stop words such as ―and‖ or ―the.‖  It could also be due to 
weaknesses in the classifiers, but this would generally not lead to scores of zero.  
Regardless of the cause, the number of zero scores was significant in some cases.  For 
example, Bloomberg.com returned 43 scores for March, 2010.  Of these 43 scores, 20 
were zero.  Likewise, for May, www.nyt.com returned 26 sites; 24 were zero.  Similar 
results were encountered across all the websites returned.  This thesis assumed that these 
scores were due to tool‘s inability to score the document, meaning that the site was text 
free.  The reader will notice that the correlation and fit values presented here are lower 
than those in section IV.C. 
 




Figure 53.   Oil prices, forbes.com and all sites score (means, normalized) (best viewed in 
color) 
 




Figure 55.   Scatterplot matrix showing correlations of oil price to similarity scores 
 
Figure 56.   Pair-wise correlations among oil prices and similarity scores 
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Figure 57.   Regression analysis for oil prices with mean similarity scores (Forbes and All) 
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Figure 58.   Summary of fit results for oil prices and Forbes and All mean similarity scores 
(combined) 
When the zero scores were removed from the results, there was a significant 
increase in correlation and R-squared values between the two sets of data.  For the 
www.forbes.com mean similarity regression, the R-squared value increased from 0.140 to 
0.415, an increase of nearly 300%.  This is a significant increase and is intriguing and 
deserves some further investigation in future research.   
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APPENDIX F. SURVEY DATA DEVELOPMENT TOOL USERS 
GUIDE 
To generate the case files for the survey data: 
1) Determine if you are going to use previously run survey settings or new settings.  
If previously used survey settings are to be used, the 
surveydatacasefilegenerator.ini MUST contain the desired session‘s settings.  See 
section 12) below for information regarding the saving of settings and the .ini file.  
If new settings are to be run, ensure that the surveydatacasefilegenerator.ini file is 
deleted from the directory, if one exists. 
2) Double click the SurveyCaseFileGenerator.bat file to launch the generator tool. 
3) A ―Survey Data Tool - Case file Generator‖ window will pop up. 
4) If a previously run setting is being used, and you simply want to modify the 
parameters, go to step 9). 
5) The first field prompts you to specify the directory where Survey Data is located.  
Click on the file browse button next to the field, a ―Load Survey Data‖ file 
chooser window will pop up.  Navigate to the appropriate root directory where all 
the survey data files are located.  The input data files should be in the *.csv 
format.  They should all be under the same root directory.  You can also select a 
single data file.  In that case, the tool would only load the data from that particular 
data file. 
6) Click the ―Load‖ button from the file chooser window after the directory or file is 
selected.  This will dismiss the file chooser window and cause the tool to update 
the ―Term Types‖ table.  By default, all terms are type ―Categorical.‖  To change 
a term to ―Continuous,‖ click on the appropriate ―Type‖ cell, and select the 
desired type from an option menu.  You can also specify a particular term as a 
―Target‖ by selecting the appropriate ―Target‖ cell.  If a term is selected as the 
―Target,‖ it will not be ranked since its values are used to calculate Two-Way 
Classification Chi-Square for other ―Categorical‖ terms. 
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7) If you DO NOT specify a ―Target‖ term, you can customize the distributions for 
Categorical terms.  To do that, click on the ―Customize Target Distributions for 
Categorical Terms‖ button below the ―Term Types‖ table.  This customizes the 
expected distribution for the terms.  By default, all categorical terms are evenly 
distributed, i.e., if a categorical term has values either 1 or 2, by default, the tool 
expects 50% of the term is valued as 1, and 50% of the term is valued as 2.  You 
can alter the distribution to match expected output for each term. 
8) After you specify/customize the characteristics of the terms, click the ―Load‖ 
button underneath the file or directory selection space towards the top of the 
interface.  The tool will read through all the data files you specified here, whether 
a single file or all the *.csv files located under the specified directory.  Depending 
on the size of the data, this may take a while.  But when all the data is read and 
loaded, the tool will update the ―Terms Ranking Table.‖  For Categorical terms, 
the ranking is determined by comparing the chi-square values, and for Continuous 
terms, the ranking is determined by comparing the variance.  By default, only the 
top 4 ranked terms are selected.  You can select all the terms, or deselect a term or 
select another term by selecting the appropriate ―chi-square/variance‖ cell.  The 
selected terms will affect what terms are used in stereotype generation and which 
are used for data importation.   
9) See Figure 59 
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Figure 59.   Survey tool with ability to order terms 
10) After you specify the exact terms you want to included in the construction of 
stereotypes, it is a good idea to customize the definition of the ―bins‖ for each 
selected terms.  To do that, you should click the ―Define Stereotypes Based on 
Selected Factors...‖ button below the Terms Ranking Table.  This will bring up 
another dialog window that lists all the terms you‘ve selected.  By default, an 
individual value (survey response) from a categorical term is set as a ―bin,‖ i.e., if 
the term ―Race‖ has 3 values: 1, 2, and 3, three ―Bins‖ should be defined for that 
term.  The tool initially assumes all terms contain 6 bins.  This is adjustable.  To 
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change, deselect the ―Use each value to designate a demographic‖ bin toggle 
button.  Note that all checked terms from 6) above will be displayed in the new 
window.  Only terms that are desired for stereotype generation should be changed 
in this step, unless you desire to alter the format or name of the survey responses 
as they will appear in the case files.  For terms that will be included in the 
stereotype, check the ―Stereotype‖ button.  Then, edit the table to customize the 
values for each ―Bin.‖  To add another row or delete and old one, you should 
change the value in the ―Number of Demographic Bins‖ numerical spinner.  For 
each ―Bin,‖ the ―Short Name‖ blank will determine the naming convention for 
that portion of the stereotype, so choose a clear, unambiguous short name. 
11) Once you customized all the bins, click the ―Apply‖ button on the dialog window.  
Once all the demographic bins are defined, the ―Generate Case File‖ button on the 
Survey Data Tool will become enabled.  Before generating the case files, specify 
a Case Files Directory where all the generated case files should reside.  Ensure the 
directory where the files will be saved is new or empty, as case files will not be 
overwritten.  See Figure 60. 
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Figure 60.   Bin delineation GUI 
12) You can also specify a minimum number of rows per case file.  If selected, unless 
a case file for the stereotype has empty rows to begin with, the tool will perform 
sample with replacement on the existing rows to generate up to minimum number 
of rows for that case file. 
13) At any time in the above process, but most probable once the bins have been 
delineated, you can save the settings.  This is done by exiting the tool by pressing 
the red ―X‖ at the upper right of the tool‘s GUI.  You have to exit this way for the 
settings to be saved.  After a few moments, while the tool is updating the .ini file, 
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the tool will exit.  Upon reopening the tool, the last settings will be present.  To 
run the tool with those settings, press the ―Define Stereotypes Based on Selected 
Factors‖ button, press ―Apply‖ in that GUI, then rerun the tool by pressing the 
―Generate Case Files‖ button. 
NOTE:  It is advisable to save your settings under recognizable names.  Make a 
copy of the surveydatatoolcasefilegenerator.ini file.  Rename it as something you 
will recognize.  If you desire to use these settings again, you MUST rename the 
file as surveydatatoolcasefilegenerator.ini, open the tool, open the ―Define 
Stereotypes…‖ GUI, and press ―Apply.‖  Then you can generate case files. 
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